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 The current methodology for prioritizing highway-rail grade crossing (HRGC) warning 
system upgrades focuses on the likelihood of collisions and highway user casualties at crossings. 
However, these two metrics do not encompass all crossing risks. Specifically, they do not 
consider the potential for grade crossing incidents to cause train derailments and the consequent 
casualties to passengers and crew members, property damage, and release of hazardous 
materials. In contrast to the large body of research devoted to understanding the impact of 
crossings on highway users, almost no research has considered the risk that highway users pose 
to trains at HRGCs. With increased interest in passenger rail transport and the growth in 
transportation of hazardous materials such as crude oil, the importance of a comprehensive 
understanding of the risk of HRGC collisions is critically important. 
This dissertation develops an HRGC-caused derailment probability calculator using data 
analytics and statistical modeling. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and state 
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) have developed large databases of historical incidents 
that can be used to better understand the effect HRGCs have on train derailment rates. I use these 
databases to develop statistical regression models that quantify actual experience to understand 
the differences between derailment and non-derailment incidents. I first develop a set of 
univariate statistical analyses to identify the incident-specific factors affecting derailment 
likelihood. Then, I develop three logistic regression models of derailment likelihood with these 
factors as input variables. Next, I develop a series of proxy variables to relate the incident-
specific factors to crossing-specific characteristics. All of this is combined in a spreadsheet-
based calculator, whose function I illustrate with a case study of four Illinois rail corridors. I 
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combine these results with incident likelihood predictions generated by the FRA’s WBAPS 
system to show how consideration of derailment likelihood can affect crossing prioritization. 
By quantifying derailment likelihood, my research adds a new dimension to our 
understanding of how to assess grade crossing risk and warning system upgrade prioritization. 
The model allows users to identify crossings with high derailment likelihood, something that was 
not previously possible. This model will enable more informed allocation of safety resources to 
minimize the occurrence of derailments at grade crossings. It can be integrated into an 
overarching risk analysis framework that would consider all sources of risk at a grade crossing. 
Ultimately, this tool will open up new opportunities for railroad risk reduction, leading to a safer 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
Highway-rail grade crossing safety has been a topic of concern to both railroads and the 
general public since the earliest days of railroads. For most of the first century of railroading, 
grade crossings were for horse-drawn vehicles. In the first decades of the 20th century, incidents 
with motor vehicles increased. With the rise of the personal automobile, by the 1920s over 1,000 
people were being killed at crossings each year, with an additional 4,000 injuries (Aldrich, 2008; 
Enoch, 2014). Today, with about 2,000 incidents per year, grade crossing collisions are the most 
common cause of railroad incidents by a substantial margin. They are also the leading cause of 
railroad-related casualties (about 1,000 per year) and the second-largest cause of railroad-related 
fatalities (about 250 per year) (FRA, 2011a).  
From 1991 to 2010, approximately 71,000 collisions occurred at public highway-rail 
grade crossings in the United States, including about 57,000 at publicly-accessible grade 
crossings on mainline railroad tracks (FRA, 2011a). The next most frequent incident cause is 
broken rails/welds, which led to approximately 2,200 incidents over the same 20 years.  
Much of the attention to improving grade crossing safety has been motivated by concern 
for highway user safety. However, these collisions also have the potential to cause train 
passenger and crew casualties, property damage, and the release of hazardous materials. There 
have been several serious grade crossing collisions in recent years. In 2015 alone, passenger 
trains were involved in several casualty-causing grade crossing incidents including in Valhalla, 
New York; Oxnard, California; and Halifax, North Carolina (NTSB, 2015a, 2015b; Associated 




resulted in casualties and major property damage. An incident in Rosedale, MD in 2013 resulted 
in the release of four cars of hazardous materials (sodium chlorate crystal and terephthalic acid), 
leading to a fire and large explosion (NTSB, 2014). Such incidents, as well as substantially 
expanded rail transport of flammable liquids have led to renewed interest in developing new 
grade crossing management strategies (NCHRP, 2014). 
The U.S. railroad network consists of approximately 140,000 miles of track, and in 2016 
there were approximately 220,000 publicly-accessible highway-rail grade crossings (FRA, 
2016). This corresponds to a national average of almost one grade crossing per half mile (AAR, 
2017) and in urban centers, the density of crossings can be much greater. Furthermore, in these 
urban areas, highway vehicle traffic may be particularly high, and the population density of areas 
adjacent to the crossings and thus potentially affected by an incident is also greater. Resources 
for highway-rail grade crossing improvements are limited, so it is in the interest of both the 
private and public sector to identify and rank which crossings pose the greatest risk. 
Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of all factors affecting this risk is necessary so 
that resources can be invested most efficiently and effectively. 
As stated above, grade crossings have long been understood to pose risk to highway 
users. Early campaigns to improve safety led to standardized signage at grade crossings, and 
expanded educational initiatives. The number of fatalities at grade crossings in the 1980s was 
around 600 per year (FRA, 2017a). In an effort to reduce this number, railroads, government and 
non-government organizations, and researchers devoted significant effort and resources to reduce 
the risk. This has significantly improved grade crossing safety, with fatalities declining to 




A variety of methods for modeling collision likelihood have been developed, focusing on 
the risk trains pose to highway vehicles and their occupants, including the widely-used U.S. 
Department of Transportation Accident Prediction Model (FRA, 1987; Ogden and Korve 
Engineering, 2007). In addition a variety of models have been developed to address limitations 
of that model (Benekohal and Elzohairy, 2001; Austin and Carson, 2002; Saccomanno et al., 
2004; Oh et al., 2006; Washington and Oh, 2006; Saccomanno et al., 2007). The results of these 
and other studies have led to improved grade crossing warning systems, integration of grade 
crossing operations with highway traffic signaling, public education programs such as Operation 
Lifesaver, and numerous other improvements in engineering and education (Mok and Savage, 
2005). These technologies and programs aim to reduce the number of casualties due to train-
highway vehicle collisions, and the result has been a steady decline in the number of incidents 
and casualties over the past several decades (Figure 1.1a).  
Although the focus on grade crossing safety has led to considerable improvements, one 
aspect has been largely overlooked – the risk that highway-rail grade crossings pose to trains. 
While the number of grade crossing collisions each year has been going down, the number of 
these incidents that result in derailment has not seen a similar decline (Figure 1.1b; Table 1.1). 
Each year, 0.4 to 1% of grade crossing collisions result in a train derailment, with the rate 














Figure 1.1: (a) Trend in number of grade crossing collisions and casualties over time 


















Table 1.1: Number of Grade Crossing Collisions and Related 








1991 5387 25 0.46% 
1992 4917 29 0.59% 
1993 4933 19 0.39% 
1994 4988 26 0.52% 
1995 4645 28 0.60% 
1996 4268 23 0.54% 
1997 3867 23 0.59% 
1998 3520 20 0.57% 
1999 3509 22 0.63% 
2000 3589 17 0.47% 
2001 3227 25 0.77% 
2002 3077 14 0.45% 
2003 2977 17 0.57% 
2004 3085 14 0.45% 
2005 3066 15 0.49% 
2006 2942 20 0.68% 
2007 2777 15 0.54% 
2008 2430 17 0.70% 
2009 1926 12 0.62% 
2010 2013 18 0.89% 
 
The consequences of derailment- and non-derailment grade crossing collisions differ 
considerably (Zhang 2017). In a typical non-derailment grade crossing collision, most casualties 
are sustained by highway users, and as a result the average number of casualties per incident is 
fairly low (0.27 per incident) (Figure 1.2a; Table 1.2). For grade crossing collisions that result in 
derailment, casualties are almost equally split between highway users, railroad passengers, and 
railroad employees (Figure 1.2b; Table 1.2). As a result, the average number of casualties per 










Figure 1.2: Proportion of casualties sustained by highway users (gray), railroad passengers 
(orange) and railroad employees (blue) in (a) non-derailment grade crossing collisions and 









Table 1.2: Number of Grade Crossing-Related Casualties by Type 
(data from Zhang 2017) 
 Non-Derailments  Derailments 
  Count Percent   Count Percent 
Highway User Casualties 17,293     0.90  220 0.30 
Rail Passenger Casualties 670 0.04  288 0.39 
Rail Employee Casualties 1,148 0.06  231 0.31 
Total Casualties 19,111  739 
Total Incidents 70,744  399 
Casualty Rate 0.27  1.85 
 
For freight trains, if a train does not derail, then in addition to casualties to highway users 
and train crew, damage to the railroad track can result in lost service time and financial impacts. 
If the train does derail, there is additional potential for a release if the train is carrying hazardous 
materials. With increased interest in passenger rail transport and the growth in transportation of 
hazardous materials such as crude oil, the importance of comprehensive understanding of the risk 
of grade crossing collisions is more critical than ever.  
There has been only limited research on grade crossing-caused derailments. Cherchas et 
al. (1979, 1982) developed a mathematical model and computer simulation to study the 
dynamics of rail and highway vehicles in grade crossing collisions, and the potential for 
derailment based on the train’s resulting L/V ratio (the ratio of lateral to vertical force the train 
applies to the rail). However, Cherchas et al.’s study was directed at a limited set of questions 
and they focused exclusively on passenger trains, since their goal was to inform decisions about 
increased passenger train speeds in Canada. 
The need to conduct additional research has been recognized by multiple agencies. The 
risk of grade crossing-caused derailments was identified as one of the 27 risk factors in the Rail 
Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS) project initiated by the Railroad Research 




funded by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the Association of American Railroads.) The research in this dissertation grew out of an 
element of the RCRMS project.  
The goal of this dissertation is to develop an understanding of the factors that affect 
derailments due to highway-rail grade crossing collisions, and to develop a statistical model that 
will enable quantitative assessment of the relative probability that different crossings may cause 
a derailment. Such a model will enable more informed allocation of safety resources so as to 
reduce grade-crossing risk. This model could ultimately be integrated into an overarching risk 
analysis framework that would consider all sources of risk at grade crossings. 
 
1.2. GRADE CROSSING COLLISION EVENT TREE 
Simply stated, risk can be defined as the probability of an event occurring, multiplied by 
the consequence of that event. The probability component can be broken into a series of 
conditional probabilities to describe the probability of multiple events occurring in sequence. 
Therefore, in developing a risk model, it is important to understand the chain of events leading to 
a consequence to identify the conditional probabilities of each event occurrence. The flow chart 
in Figure 1.3 shows a simplified event chain beginning with a train encountering a grade crossing 






Figure 1.3: Simplified flowchart describing factors affecting risk at highway-rail grade 
crossings and role of this dissertation. 
 
For a highway-rail grade crossing collision to occur, a train must first encounter a grade 
crossing. For every grade crossing it encounters, a train has a certain probability of being 
involved in an incident with a highway vehicle, p(I). This likelihood is dependent on a number of 
factors, including exposure (traffic on the highway and railroad), visibility, highway speed limit 
and type of warning device. Extensive work has gone into understanding and quantifying the 
factors that affect the likelihood of a grade crossing incident. An example of an incident 
prediction model is the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Model, which calculates the expected 
collision frequency at a crossing (FRA, 1987; Ogden and Korve Engineering, 2007). 
Given that an incident occurs, there is a probability that a derailment will result, p(D|I). 
This probability depends on a variety of factors. It is possible that passenger and freight trains 
may have different derailment likelihoods because of different weight, speed and operating 
characteristics. Due to their differing cargo, they will also have different consequences. 




Once the derailment has occurred, the probability of each potential consequence can be 
determined, p(Cx|DI) (Figure 1.3). For freight trains, consequences include employee casualties 
and railroad financial loss. Another possible consequence of a freight train incident is the release 
of hazardous materials. Hazardous materials release models have been developed (Saat and 
Barkan, 2005; Verma and Verter, 2007; Glickman and Erkut, 2007; Liu et al. 2012) that could be 
combined with the derailment likelihood model to estimate the risk of a hazardous materials 
release resulting from a grade crossing incident. For passenger trains, consequences include 
passenger casualties, train crew casualties, and a variety of financial losses. The probability of 
each consequence occurring, as well as the value of that consequence, should be investigated by 
future researchers and could be integrated with the derailment likelihood model presented in this 
dissertation.  
Stated as an equation, the overall risk at a crossing is then calculated as: 




1.3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
To quantify the probability of a grade crossing collision-caused derailment (p(D|I)), it is 
necessary to determine what makes derailment incidents different from non-derailment incidents. 
A basic hypothesis is that the underlying physical properties of the incidents play a large role. 
From a simple physics perspective, it is plausible that collisions with more energy would be 
more likely to result in derailment. Very generally, a derailment involves two bodies (the train 




1.4). By quantifying each of these factors, it is hypothetically possible to model how their 
variation relates to the probability of derailment.  
Cherchas et al. (1979, 1982) used a computer model to investigate factors such as the 
weight and speed of the rail and highway vehicles. The same type of factors motivated the 
variables investigated and overall statistical approach used in my research. 
 
Figure 1.4: Simple free body diagram of the bodies involved in a grade crossing collision. 
 
The variables shown in Figure 1.4 are defined as follows: 
vV: Highway vehicle speed 
mV: Mass of highway vehicle 
vT: Train speed 
mT: Mass of train 
α: Angle of collision 
 
An additional factor, incident type, accounts for the difference between incidents where 
the train strikes the vehicle (TSV) and incidents where the vehicle strikes the train (VST) (Figure 
1.5). Due to factors such as the interaction between the train’s wheels and the rail, the effect of 




Cherchas et al. (1982) referred to TSV incidents as “frontal impact” incidents and VST incidents 






Figure 1.5: Free body diagram for (a) train strikes vehicle (TSV) incidents and  
(b) vehicle strikes train (VST) incidents. 
 
There are two potential approaches for investigating these factors. The first is to analyze 
the physical interactions between the highway vehicle, train and track through finite element 
analysis or other computer modeling techniques. This was the approach used by Cherchas et al. 
(1979, 1982). The second is to use data collected from highway-rail grade crossing incidents to 
develop statistical regression models that quantify actual experience to understand the 
differences between derailment and non-derailment incidents. My dissertation takes the second 
approach, using twenty years of grade crossing collision data to investigate the relationships 
between the proposed factors and derailment probability. No previous study has taken advantage 
of the extensive data collected by FRA to explore this approach. Beside filling a void in this 
research domain, it has the potential to provide new insights derived from the empirical 




I consider each potential factor, first independently through univariate analysis (Chapter 
4), then as a component of a multivariate incident-level model (Chapters 5 and 6), and finally in 
the context of a crossing-specific model (Chapter 7). This leads to the development of the grade 
crossing incident derailment likelihood calculator (Chapter 8), a Microsoft Excel workbook that 
can be used to estimate the conditional probability of derailment for a grade crossing based on its 
specific characteristics. I then describe a case study illustrating use of the calculator and discuss 
how this model could affect grade crossing upgrade prioritization (Chapter 9). I conclude with a 
summary of future data and research needs that my work has uncovered (Chapter 10). 
 
1.4. DISSERTATION APPLICATIONS 
The results of my research serve three purposes. First, through development of the p(D|I) 
model I shed light on a variety of underlying factors in grade crossing collision caused 
derailment likelihood. The basic factors involved in these events have been suggested 
anecdotally by railroad employees who investigate derailments; however, the factors have not 
previously been systematically investigated. An understanding of these factors might also lead to 
techniques for potential derailment avoidance. 
Second, my model can serve as a ranking tool for transportation agencies that are trying 
to determine which grade crossings to upgrade with available funds. If an agency uses a model 
such as the US DOT Accident Prediction Model, multiple crossings may have similar incident 
likelihoods, but there may not be sufficient resources to upgrade them all at the same time. The 
derailment consequence model could be used to further refine the prioritization of upgrades for 




The third purpose of my research is to put in perspective the relative likelihood of 
catastrophic, grade-crossing-collision-caused derailments compared to other sources of railroad 
and highway risk. Preliminary evaluation of the expected number of lives lost as a result of 
grade-crossing-caused-derailments, compared to the expected lives lost due to grade crossing 
collisions generally, shows that for most crossings, derailments should not be the primary source 
of concern. This research can lead to a cost-benefit analysis of different safety improvement 
programs that can be undertaken by railroads and communities, to determine how resources can 
be most effectively used to reduce casualties.  
Since I began work on this project several years ago, I have had numerous opportunities 
to present my research to members of the railway industry, government officials and academic 
researchers. Representatives from all three groups have expressed interest in applying the results 
of my research in their work. I believe this dissertation advances the state of the art in grade 
crossing safety and risk analysis, and provides useful insights and tools to all three groups. 
 
1.5. DEFINITIONS / GLOSSARY 
Throughout this dissertation, I use consistent terminology to describe the objects involved 




A grade crossing incident is defined as any collision between a rail consist and a highway 
user at a grade crossing1. A grade crossing derailment is defined as any grade crossing incident 
where one or more cars or locomotives were derailed because of the incident. 
A rail vehicle is here defined as any equipment that is traveling on railroad track. Rail 
vehicle refers to both locomotives and railcars, regardless of whether they are passenger or 
freight equipment.  
A highway vehicle is any motorized vehicle traveling on the roadway system. Unless 
specified, it refers to both large highway vehicles (semi-trucks and straight trucks) as well as 
small highway vehicles (personal automobiles, pickup trucks and vans). It does not include non-
motorized vehicles such as bicycles, or pedestrians. 
Incident type is a variable used to differentiate between incidents where the train struck 
the vehicle (TSV) and the vehicle struck the train (VST). This is not a standard terminology, and 
other sources refer to these incidents by different names. In the HRA database, they are referred 
to as “rail equipment struck highway user” (TYPACC = 1) and “rail equipment struck by 
highway user” (TYPACC = 2). 
FRA track class is a rating system used by the Federal Railroad Administration to assess 
track condition. Track class for a rail segment is determined based on the maximum speed at 
                                                 
1  The FRA defines a grade crossing accident as “any collision, derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or 
other event involving operation of railroad on-track equipment (standing or moving) that results in damages greater 
than the current reporting threshold to railroad on-track equipment, signals, track, track structures, and roadbed.” A 
grade crossing incident is defined as “any event involving the movement of on-track equipment that results in a 





which a railroad wishes to operate trains. In turn, this determines the standard to which the track 
must be maintained. The maximum speed for a track class differs for freight and passenger trains 
(Table 1.3). 
 







X (Excepted) 10 --1 
1 10 15 
2 25 30 
3 40 60 
4 60 80 
5 80 90 
6 110 110 
1Revenue passenger trains are not allowed to operate on 
excepted track (49 CFR 213.9, 2011). 
 
 
Timetable speed is effectively the “speed limit” for trains on a segment of track. It is 
related to FRA track class, in that the maximum speed permitted based on track class is the upper 
limit of the timetable speed. However, track segments frequently have a lower timetable speed 
than that permitted by their FRA track class due to civil speed restrictions and other factors. 
Grade crossing warning devices are any sign or signal added to the roadway at or near a 
grade crossing to help alert motorists to the presence of a grade crossing. A distinction is 
typically made between “passive” and “active” devices. Passive devices do not change state 
when a train approaches the crossing, and therefore alert motorists to the presence of a railroad 
track but not the presence of a train. The most common passive device is the crossbuck (or 
railroad crossing sign). In contrast, active devices employ technology that detects a train 




before the train reaches the crossing). For example, flashing lights will illuminate when a train 
approaches. The most common active devices are flashing lights (or flashers), bells, and gates. In 
this dissertation, I further differentiate between “gates” and “other active” devices, because gates 
provide a physical warning blocking the roadway in front of motorists entering the crossing, 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides an overview of literature related to grade crossing safety. I begin 
with background information regarding regulation of highway-rail grade crossings in the U.S., 
then discuss incident likelihood models and information on the statistical techniques employed in 
later chapters. I conclude with some information on alternative grade crossing warning devices 
and human factor aspects of crossing safety. 
 
2.1. GRADE CROSSINGS AND LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES  
Highway-rail grade crossings in the U.S. are regulated by the government through a 
number of federal and state agencies. Much of the funding for grade crossing warning device 
upgrades comes from the federal government. This funding has been distributed through a series 
of acts and programs over the years, including the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA), and the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act – A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Other funding is provided by local 
transportation agencies. Additionally, railroads often contribute to crossing upgrade projects, 
either financially or through provision of labor (Ogden and Korve Engineering, 2007). 
In general, railroads are responsible for design of a grade crossing on tracks, including 
crossing surfaces and, if present, whatever active warning system that may interface with the 
track, since these systems require specialized maintenance expertise (Ogden and Korve 
Engineering, 2007). Railroads are also required to install and maintain crossbuck signs (the 
minimum level of warning device required by law at public grade crossings). Beyond the 




highway signals falls to the local highway agency. Standards for traffic control signs at grade 
crossings are maintained by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and codified in the 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) (FHWA, 2012). Conditions at grade 
crossings are legally required to meet “accepted standards and practices”, especially those 
outlined in MUTCD (Ogden and Korve Engineering, 2007). Beyond this, all states are required 
to have a highway safety improvement plan (HSIP) that includes the ability to prioritize grade 
crossing improvements in the state. 
As train speeds have increased, special grade crossing regulations have been developed 
governing high-speed sections of track (Table 2.1). The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
has issued regulations requiring complete grade separation for railroad operations with FRA 
track class 8 or higher, meaning operating speed in excess of 125 mph (referred to as “high speed 
rail”, or HSR). For “higher-speed rail” (HrSR) operations between 110 and 125 mph on class 7 
track, grade crossings are not recommended but may still be used with certain extra protections. 
The FRA requires active warning devices on all crossings on class 6 track. For track class 5 and 
lower, there are no specific requirements beyond the presence of a crossbuck at public crossings. 
Outside the Northeast Corridor most track is FRA class 5 or lower, although classes 6 and 7 are 
slowly expanding as higher speed passenger services are implemented. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of federal regulation related to grade-crossings (CFR, 2012) 
 




110-125 mph  
(177-201 kph) 
> 125 mph  
(201 kph) 
Track Class 6 7 8-9+ 





Grade Separate  
or Close 
1 FRA recommends but does not require sealed corridor treatment for all grade crossings with train speeds in excess of  
79 mph (127 kph) 





The most economical approach to eliminating the risk of collisions at a crossing is to 
close it; however, local communities are often opposed to this because of a real or perceived loss 
of convenience. Additional concerns may be raised about increased emergency service response 
time and reduced access to schools and other strategic places. If a crossing cannot be closed, 
other approaches may be considered including grade separation and upgraded warning and 
protection devices. 
 
2.2. GRADE CROSSING ACCIDENT PREDICTION 
Many methods of modeling collision likelihood at grade crossings have been developed, 
mainly with the goal of understanding the risk posed to highway users by trains. These models 
have traditionally been used to decide how funds for highway-rail grade crossing improvements 
should be allocated. However, the collision rates predicted by these models can also be used to 
quantify risk to the train, its passengers, or its cargo. 
Faghri and Demetsky (1986) categorized collision likelihood models into two groups: 
relative formulas and absolute formulas. Relative formulas use crossing data to rank the relative 
hazards at each crossing so that improvements can be prioritized from most dangerous to least 
dangerous crossings. Absolute formulas predict the number of collisions expected to occur at 
each crossing over a certain time period (i.e. a rate), thereby allowing estimation of the casualties 
prevented if a crossing is upgraded.  
Formulas to rank grade crossings by their collision risk were developed at least as early 
as the 1940s (Austin and Carson, 2002; Faghri and Demetsky, 1986). Many of these formulas are 
still used by state departments of transportation. The four formulas presented here are the New 




Report 50 Hazard Index, and the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Model. They are presented in 
order from least to most complex. 
The New Hampshire model is a relative formula that can be used to rank the importance 
of crossing upgrades (Austin and Carson, 2002; Faghri and Demetsky, 1986). It has been widely 
used across the country, either in its original form or with various modifications. Analysis has 
shown that the New Hampshire hazard index ranks crossings similarly to more complex 
formulas, but it is limited in that it does not predict the expected number of collisions. The 
hazard index formula is: 
𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑉 𝑇 𝑃𝑓 (1)  
Where: 
𝑉 = average 24-hour (highway) traffic volume 
𝑇 = average 24-hour train volume 
𝑃𝑓 = protection factor (0.1 for gates; 0.6 for flashing lights; 1.0 for signs only) 
The Peabody-Dimmick formula (also called the Bureau of Public Roads formula), 
developed in 1941, is an absolute formula that predicts the number of accidents at a crossing 
over a period of five years (Austin and Carson, 2002; Faghri and Demetsky, 1986). The five-year 







𝐴5 = expected number of accidents in five years 
𝑉 = annual average daily traffic (AADT) 
𝑇 = average daily train traffic 
𝑃 = protection coefficient 
𝐾 = additional parameter (smoothing factor) 
The NCHRP Report 50 Hazard Index is an absolute formula developed in 1968 by 




be expressed as a formula, but is more commonly determined from a series of charts and tables 
that allow the user to calculate the expected yearly accident rate. It is dependent on factors such 
as AADT, number of trains per day, type of warning device in use, the geographic location of the 
crossing, and geometric aspects of the crossing. 
Today, the most commonly used model is the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Model 
(Austin and Carson, 2002; Faghri and Demetsky, 1986; Ogden and Korve Engineering, 2007). 
First developed in the early 1980s, this absolute formula uses nonlinear multiple regression 
techniques on a wide variety of factors, including highway type and train traffic, to predict the 
expected yearly number of collisions at a crossing. The general expression of the formula is: 




















For passive devices 





𝑎  = initial collision prediction, collisions per year at the crossing 
𝐾  = formula constant 
𝐸𝐼  = factor for exposure index based on product of highway and train traffic 
𝑀𝑇  = factor for number of main tracks 
𝐷𝑇  = factor for number of through trains per day during daylight 
𝐻𝑃  = factor for highway paved (yes or no) 
𝑀𝑆  = factor for maximum timetable speed 
𝐻𝑇  = factor for highway type 
𝐻𝐿  = factor for number of highway lanes 
𝐵 = adjusted accident frequency value 
𝑇0 = formula weighting factor; = 1.0/(0.05 + 𝑎) 
𝑇 = the number of years under study 
𝑁 = number of observed accidents in 𝑇 years at a crossing 




A table provides each of the factors, for crossings with passive devices, flashing lights, 
and gates. The U.S. DOT also provides a procedure for using this formula to determine grade 
crossing upgrade resource allocation (FRA, 1987). 
Faghri and Demetsky (1986) tested four absolute formulas and found that the U.S. DOT 
formula most accurately predicted the number of collisions occurring at grade crossings in 
Virginia for the five-year period of study. They recommended that the Virginia DOT use the 
U.S. DOT formula in combination with site visits to evaluate the importance of grade crossing 
upgrades. 
However, are some concerns remain about the accuracy of the U.S. DOT model. It is 
based on data from the entire U.S. so it may not account for regional differences. As a result, 
some states have developed specialized formulas using more detailed state-specific data. For 
example, Benekohal and Elzohairy (2001) examined ten years of highway-rail grade crossing 
collisions in Illinois. They found that the U.S. DOT formula selected only 89 of the top 200 
grade crossings with collisions for upgrade, and did not reliably identify the most dangerous 
crossings. They developed a regression model, the Illinois Hazard Index, that suggested a higher 
percentage of crossings with collisions for improvement; it also selected locations with higher 
crash rates compared to other equations.  
Another concern about the accuracy of the U.S. DOT formula is that crossing conditions 
and warning/protection technologies may have changed since its development. Austin and 
Carson (2002) showed that the normalizing coefficients used in Equation 5 to account for the 
difference between the model’s predicted and observed values have been steadily declining over 
time; that is to say, the model’s prediction accuracy has diminished, and the normalizing 




accuracy could be improved if it were re-evaluated using present-day data. However, they also 
considered the complexity of the U.S. DOT’s three-part formula to be problematic, since it is 
difficult to interpret and prioritize the effects of changing various parameters. To address this 
concern, Austin and Carson developed an alternate model using negative binomial regression. 
This model identified many of the same significant variables as the U.S. DOT formula, but as it 
was developed using only collision data at public crossings in six states, further testing would be 
needed to see if it is more broadly applicable. 
Chaudhary et al. (2011) compared the performance of the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction 
Formula to that of the Transport Canada Accident Model to see which would more effectively 
identify “hot spots” (high-risk areas) on a network in California. Overall, the U.S. DOT model 
more closely predicted the annual number of accidents occurring at a crossing. However, in cases 
where the crossing had an accident history, the Transport Canada model was more accurate. 
Chaudhary et al. suggested adapting the Transport Canada model to U.S. crossing data and using 
it to rank the most dangerous crossings. 
A variety of statistical models have been developed with the goal of improving the 
accuracy of collision frequency prediction of the earlier models. The following five papers are a 
sample of those using a variety of advanced statistical methods including Poisson regression, 
negative binomial regression, gamma probability models, and Bayesian analysis. 
Saccomanno et al. (2004) developed models for identifying highway-rail grade crossing 
black-spots in Canada, where a “black-spot” is an area that is unusually prone to incidents. They 
performed both a Poisson regression and a negative binomial (NB) regression on the data, 
considering 11 variables. For each regression method, three separate models were developed – 




They found that the NB models performed better. Significant factors varied by crossing 
treatment. For passive crossings, train speed and exposure were the only significant factors. For 
crossings with flashing lights, surface width was also found to be significant. For crossings with 
gates, road speed, number of tracks and exposure were found to be significant. They also found 
that crossings with the highest collision frequency were in urban areas, probably because the 
exposure factor is likely to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas. 
Other frequency models have been developed abroad. South Korea evaluated the 
effectiveness of the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Formula for predicting accidents at Korean 
grade crossings (Oh et al., 2006). They found that the U.S. DOT formula did not accurately 
predict collision rates in South Korea. This may be because, unlike the U.S, all grade crossings in 
South Korea are equipped with gates. They then developed a gamma probability model using 
Korean accident data. Collisions were observed to increase with highway traffic volume, train 
volume, proximity to commercial areas, distance of train detector from crossing, and time 
between activation of warning signals and gates. An interesting aspect of Oh et al.’s work is that 
grade crossing warning device type, which is a critical factor in most other collision prediction 
models, is eliminated from the analysis because all crossings in South Korea have the same 
warning device. This illustrates that some factors, such as proximity to commercial areas, might 
affect collision rates in the U.S. but are not considered in U.S. models. 
Washington and Oh (2006) and Saccomanno et al. (2007) both used Bayesian 
methodology to assess the effectiveness under uncertainty of different grade crossing treatments 
at reducing collision rates. Washington and Oh analyzed 18 grade crossing treatments. For each 
treatment, a survey of past research findings was conducted to determine a Bayesian prior 




occurred at South Korean grade crossings, and were asked to evaluate how each treatment would 
have affected the occurrence of each collision. This information was aggregated into a best-
estimate “current” accident modification factor (AMF). Bayes’ theorem was then used to 
combine the experts’ AMF with prior knowledge to obtain “posterior” intervals of AMFs. 
Applying this methodology, Washington and Oh determined that the three highway treatments 
that most effectively reduce crashes are in-vehicle warning systems, crossing obstacle detection 
systems, and constant warning time device activation systems. As the authors point out, the 
rankings do not consider cost; however, this is a critical factor to consider when upgrading a 
crossing and should be included in further analysis. Additionally, their ranking of treatments 
does not account for variation among crossing locations. Saccomanno et al. (2007) took a 
different approach in their analysis. Their model can be calibrated to a specific crossing and 
provides a statistical distribution of the expected change in collision likelihood for a given 
treatment. Since grade crossing collisions are random events, and there is a lack of before-and-
after studies for many grade crossing treatments, engineers must make decisions about grade 
crossing upgrades under uncertainty. By considering a range instead of an absolute value for the 
reduction of risk, engineers will be able to better evaluate the cost-benefit ratio for a given 
crossing upgrade. 
Mok and Savage (2005) took a different approach to analyzing collision rates at grade 
crossings. They observed that the number of collisions and fatalities at grade crossings in the 
U.S. has decreased significantly over the past 30 years, despite an increase in both train and 
highway traffic. Their analysis showed that about 70% of the decrease could be attributed to 
human-factor related aspects (such as educational programs like Operation Lifesaver, and the 




installation of gates and/or flashing lights and crossing closures. This result suggests that 
collision prediction models rightly attribute high importance to the type of crossing warning 
device in use, but should also consider human factor aspects. 
Overall, a variety of models for the prediction of collision rates at highway-rail grade 
crossings have been developed. In general, there appear to be trade-offs between ease-of-use, 
accuracy, and specificity. The most accurate models are generally developed for a small set of all 
collisions – for example, considering data from only one state in the U.S. This may mean that 
each individual state would need to create its own model using its own data – a task that may be 
worthwhile to more reliably identify the most dangerous crossings. Additionally, the more 
accurate models may be more difficult to use for decision-makers who do not have a statistical 
background. This problem could likely be avoided if a straight-forward procedural document 
were developed, as was done for the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Formula. 
 
2.3. ACCIDENT SEVERITY 
In terms of overall risk, the frequency of an event occurring is half the equation; the other 
half is the consequence of that event. Most previous research has focused on the risk grade 
crossings pose to highway vehicle users. These represent a large percentage of railroad-related 
fatalities (FRA, 2017c). However, it is also important to study the impact collisions could have 
on train crew and passenger injuries and fatalities, as well as hazardous materials. This section 
presents statistical models of severity, as well as crashworthiness research, that seeks to 




2.3.1. Statistical modeling of severity 
The U.S. DOT developed equations for predicting the probability of an injury accident 
given an accident and the probability of a fatal accident given an accident (Ogden and Korve 











Where  CI = formula constant = 4,280 
CF = formula constant = 695 
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed 
TK = factor for number of tracks 
TT = factor for through trains per day 
TS = factor for switch trains per day 
UR = factor for urban or rural crossing 
The FHWA Grade Crossing Handbook (Ogden and Korve, 2007) provides tables listing 
the value of each factor based on the initial prediction of the base collision likelihood model, as 
well as the number of observed accidents at the crossing over the past one to five years. The 
results of the injury and fatality likelihood models can be used in conjunction with the accident 
likelihood model to prioritize the most dangerous crossings.  
Limited research has been conducted quantifying the consequences of grade crossing 
collisions from the rail perspective. Cherchas et al. (1979, 1982) developed a computer 
simulation tool to analyze the dynamics of highway-rail grade crossing collisions, specifically 




speed passenger train operations in Canada. The simulation also enabled them to investigate the 
effects of highway vehicle size and speed on derailment likelihood. Their simulation suggested 
that train derailment likelihood should increase with highway vehicle mass and speed. The model 
also indicated that derailment likelihood was a function of train speed; however, this effect 
changed based on the exact location of the highway vehicle’s impact on the rail vehicle (for 
example, whether the highway vehicle struck the front of the locomotive or its side). The 
simulation used the ratio of railhead lateral force to vertical wheel load (L/V ratio, or derailment 
coefficient) as the criteria for derailment. The results were calibrated using experiments 
conducted by Japan National Railways in the early 1970s to show that they reflected real-world 
scenarios. Cherchas’ study only considered passenger train consists, because the motivation for 
their study was to inform safety and risk aspects of possible increased passenger train service in 
Canada. Consequently, the results cannot be directly applied to freight trains. 
2.3.2. Crashworthiness 
U.S. researchers have conducted extensive studies of rail passenger car crashworthiness. 
This research has focused primarily on American commuter and intercity rail cars traveling at 
speeds below 100 mph.  
Simons and Kirkpatrick (1998) developed a finite element model of a theoretical generic 
U.S. high speed passenger train and then used it to understand the safety risks posed to 
passengers. The train consist was tested in seven different crash scenarios, mimicking head-on 
collisions with various objects at various speeds. For each scenario, the expected number of 
casualties was predicted based on primary and secondary impact data. Collisions at speeds of 60 




collided with a large highway vehicle such as a tractor-semitrailer. Simons and Kirkpatrick 
demonstrated the potential for severe casualty levels in grade crossing collisions.  
A 1998 collision in Portage, Indiana between a commuter train and a tractor-trailer 
carrying steel coils led to new regulations addressing passenger rail car structural design. Full-
scale collision testing of the new passenger cars was conducted to compare their performance to 
the pre-1999 car design. Jacobsen et al. (2003) tested the crash performance of the two car 
designs by colliding them with a steel coil truck to imitate the Portage incident. They found that 
the 1990’s cab-car end structure deformed more than 20 inches (50.8 cm) longitudinally, 
resulting in loss of operator survival space, whereas the new design deformed only 8 inches (20.3 
cm) and preserved survival space. Martinez et al. (2003) developed a computer model to predict 
crushing behavior in the cab car. They validated their model with the full-scale collision test, and 
found that the model accurately predicted crush patterns. Samavedam and Kasturi (2011) 
performed the same full-scale test at higher speeds to validate their finite element model (FEM) 
of train collisions. The model closely predicted the overall damage to the locomotive, as well as 
predicting the intrusion into operator survival space. 
In the wake of the 2005 Glendale, California collision between a Metrolink commuter 
train and an SUV, in which 11 people were killed, the FRA released a report on the safety of 
push-pull and multiple-unit locomotive passenger rail operations (FRA, 2006). This report 
sought to understand the relative crashworthiness of multiple-unit electric (EMU) cars, cab-car 
leading trains (“push mode”), and conventional locomotive-led trains (“pull mode”). Analysis of 
20 years of data showed that, while locomotive-powered trains operated in the push mode had a 




differences were not statistically significant. EMUs were shown to have a superior safety record, 
with the lowest fatality rate of all passenger transportation modes (including air travel).  
Also in response to the Glendale collision, Metrolink worked with the FRA, the Federal 
Transit Administration, and the American Public Transportation Association to develop a 
performance-based technical specification for railroad passenger car crashworthiness, focused on 
crash energy management (CEM). This work resulted in performance specifications for the 
overall train consist; for the cab and passenger-carrying cars; and for mechanical components 
such as couplers (Tyrell et al., 2006). CEM trains are designed to deform in a controlled way 
during a collision, collapsing unoccupied areas to absorb energy and preserving survival space in 
the occupied areas. Tyrell and Perlman (2003) compared the crashworthy (or survivable) speeds 
of CEM and conventional trains, in both train-to-train collisions and highway-rail grade crossing 
collisions. They found that passengers in CEM trains could experience a much higher primary 
collision speed and survive, even though their secondary impact velocity would be slightly 
greater than in a conventional train.  
 
2.4. ALTERNATIVE GRADE CROSSING WARNING STRATEGIES 
The formulas for highway-rail grade crossing collision likelihood and severity discussed 
above account for existing grade crossing warning devices and strategies. Typical levels of 
protection in the U.S. are passive crossings with crossbucks or stop signs, active crossings with 
flashing lights and bells, and gated crossings that include flashers and bells. Crossings with a 
history of collisions can be upgraded to more restrictive warning devices. If a crossing has a full 
gate treatment and still experiences a high collision rate, railroads and local departments of 




Ideally, rail lines on which passenger trains or trains carrying hazardous materials operate 
whould be completely grade separated; however, due to cost and other factors it may be 
infeasible to grade-separate an entire line. New ideas on grade crossing protection include 
augmented passive systems and sealed corridors. Nelson (2010) reviews numerous strategies to 
reduce grade crossing risk currently in use around the world. These include closures and 
consolidation, upgraded lights and gates, and alternative technologies such as in-pavement 
flashers. The goal in the U.S. is to develop a strategy that balances cost with risk reduction. 
2.4.1. Sealed Corridors 
The sealed corridor concept has been developed as a way to upgrade conventional rail 
lines to carry higher-speed passenger trains. For trains operating in the 110-125 mph range, grade 
separation is suggested but not required; instead, the FRA requires crossings to have approved 
barrier systems that can prevent highway vehicle incursion onto the right of way. Obstacle 
detection systems to alert the train if a vehicle becomes stuck on the tracks are also 
recommended. These requirements and appropriate technologies for use in achieving these goals 
were summarized by FRA (2009a). 
The state of North Carolina (NC) was the first to make aggressive use of the sealed 
corridor concept (Bien-Aime, 2009; FRA, 2009a, 2009b). The NC DOT Sealed Corridor is part 
of the Southeast High Speed Rail (SEHSR) Corridor and included 216 grade crossings, 44 of 
which were private crossings. Between 1987 and 2004, this section experienced 282 collisions, 
resulting in 74 injuries and 55 fatalities to motorists. The program has consolidated as many 
grade crossings as possible and upgraded the rest to include self-monitoring four-quadrant gates, 




between 2004 and 2009 by implementing the sealed corridor concept due to a sharp decrease in 
the number of grade crossing collisions (Bien-Aime, 2009; FRA, 2009c). 
Illinois DOT (IDOT) has been upgrading sections of track for 110 mph operation 
between Chicago and St. Louis using a sealed corridor approach (Hellman and Ngamdung, 
2009). The route between Chicago and Springfield, IL had 311 grade crossings, of which 68 
were proposed for closure. However, only 10 crossings were ultimately closed due to strong 
opposition from impacted communities. Of the remaining crossings, 69 were equipped with four-
quadrant gates and vehicle detection systems. The results in North Carolina suggest that this 
approach will reduce collisions and fatalities along the route, even with higher speed passenger 
trains. 
2.4.2. Obstacle Detection 
Glover (2009) summarizes the goal of obstacle detection as “identifying the presence of a 
vehicle or person on the crossing as the train approaches and communicating this to the train 
driver in time for him or her to stop before reaching it.” Obstacle detection technology may 
mitigate grade crossing risk; however, a substantial challenge is that these systems provide 
relatively little time to react to an intrusion and stop a train. Glover suggests that there may only 
be a limited reduction in the severity of an incident because a train may still collide with the 
obstructing highway vehicle, though at reduced speed. Additionally, Glover cites concerns that 
these systems could be less reliable than traditional gated crossings; since the devices are fail-
safe, an error in the detection system could result in a “false-positive” that closes the crossing 
gates when no train is approaching. If highway users become accustomed to higher error rates, 




activated by the presence of a train. If they attempt to circumvent the gates, a collision could 
occur. 
Hall (2007) suggests that there are benefits to obstacle detection even if the system is not 
entirely effective in preventing collisions. Advance warning of a track obstruction could allow 
the train to decelerate sufficiently to reduce the likelihood of train passenger deaths, especially 
when combined with more crashworthy passenger train designs. Additionally, Hall states that 
obstacle detection systems will have the greatest benefit when information can be communicated 
directly between the grade crossing and an approaching locomotive (such as might be possible 
with some forms of Positive Train Control (PTC)). 
Obstacle detection systems are being used both domestically and abroad. On the line 
between Chicago and St. Louis, which is being upgraded for 110 mph operation, IDOT and 
Union Pacific (UP) use a detection system consisting of an inductive loop embedded in the 
pavement on either side of the track. It is capable of detecting the presence of a vehicle within 
the crossing gates and alerting the approaching train through in-cab signaling (Hellman and 
Ngamdung, 2009). This system could also be integrated with a PTC-equipped train consist. 
The system usually operates in “dynamic” mode, meaning the exit gates function based 
on the presence of highway vehicles within the grade crossing. However, in the fail-safe 
condition, it operates in a “timed” mode that closes the exit gates after a specified amount of 
time. The FRA and the Volpe Center conducted tests of this equipment to verify its reliability. 
They found that the average total delay caused by malfunction of this gate equipment to the five 
higher-speed passenger round-trips that occur daily was approximately 38.5 minutes. They also 
found that this equipment had a “minimal impact on the frequency and duration of grade 




2.4.3. Traffic Channelization 
Traffic channelization devices direct or separate traffic flow. In the context of highway-
rail grade crossings, these devices are intended to prevent drivers from using a grade crossing in 
an unsafe manner by confining them to controlled lanes (FRA, 2010). An example is a raised 
median. Research has suggested that channelization discourages risky driving behavior around 
grade crossings, such as “zig-zagging” past closed gates. Several states have already begun to 
employ channelization in an effort to improve grade crossing safety. 
2.4.4. Low-Cost Grade Crossing Warning Devices 
An emerging trend in grade crossing warning devices is the development of low-cost 
systems that provide a level of safety comparable to conventional devices. These systems 
generally cost between 5% and 30% of conventional technologies and often rely on wireless 
communications and solar power (FRA, 2011c). Wullems (2011) summarizes the state-of-the-art 
of this technology and considers its potential for large rural networks such as on the Australian 
rail network. Hellman and Ngamdung (2010) described several low-cost warning devices that 
satisfy the FRA’s minimum performance requirements for grade crossing warning devices. They 
emphasized the importance of reducing annual maintenance costs, not just installation costs. 
While low-cost grade crossing warning devices may be interesting from a cost-efficiency 
point of view, it is unlikely that the devices currently on the market will be used for higher-
speed, shared-corridor applications in the U.S. They do not incorporate gates and instead rely on 
augmented passive systems (adding lights or advance warnings to areas around crossings). 
Additionally, there are significant legal concerns stemming from public perception of the 




Ngamdung, 2010; Wullems, 2011). However, the concept will likely continue to develop and 
may expand to include gate technology.  
 
2.5. HUMAN FACTORS AND DRIVER BEHAVIOR 
Understanding driver behavior and identifying human factors that cause  accidents at 
highway grade crossings can contribute to development of better accident-prevention strategies. 
This section provides an overview of literature relating to human factors and driver behavior at 
grade crossings, as they might pertain to shared corridor operations. For an excellent in-depth 
review of all literature on driver behavior at grade crossings, see Yeh and Multer (2008). 
Caird et al. (2002) developed a taxonomy of human factor accident contributors to 
highway-rail grade crossing accidents. The taxonomy groups common accident contributors into 
six categories: unsafe actions, individual differences, train visibility, passive signs and markings, 
active warning systems, and physical constraints.  
People react differently to warning signs at grade crossings. Several studies have been 
conducted with the goal of identifying the source of this variation (Lenné et al., 2011; Jeng, 
2005; Tey et al., 2011a, 2011b; Caird et al., 2002). On average, males are involved in crossing 
fatalities more than females (Raub, 2007; Caird et al. 2002). The age group of 26 to 64 accounted 
for the most fatalities (Caird et al., 2002); however, this age group drives the most and thus has 
the greatest exposure (Evans, 1991). Different age ranges within this group might have different 
results. Taylor (2008) stated that 16- to 25-year-old drivers were the group most at risk at grade 
crossings because they were most likely to engage in risky crossing behavior. 
In response to warning signs at grade crossings, drivers showed lower compliance rates at 




Additional warnings, especially the addition of active warning devices, should result in increased 
crossing compliance. However, due to cost, it is not feasible to update all passive signs to active 
warning systems. Alternative ways of augmenting passive crossings are being studied (Cairney, 
2003; Tey et al., 2011b; Wullems, 2011; also see Section 2.4.4). Caird et al. (2002) summarized 
the effectiveness and cost of different countermeasures at grade crossings (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Caird et al. (2002) summary of effectiveness and cost of countermeasures 
 
Countermeasure Effectiveness Cost References 
Stop signs at passive 
crossings 
Unknown $1.2 to $2 K (US) NTSB (1998) 
Intersection lighting 52% reduction in nighttime accidents 
over no lighting 
Unknown Walker and Roberts 
(1975) 
Flashing lights 64% reduction in accidents over 
crossbucks alone; 84% reduction in 
injuries over crossbucks; 83% reduction 
in deaths over crossbucks 




Lights and gates (2) + 
Flashing lights 
88% reduction in accidents over 
crossbucks alone; 93% reduction in 
injuries over crossbucks; 100% reduction 
in deaths over crossbucks 
 
44% reduction in accidents over flashing 
lights alone 





Hauer and Persaud 
(1986) 
Median barriers 80% reduction in violations over 2-gate 
system 
$10 K (U.S.) Carroll and Haines 
(2002a) 
Long arm gates (3/4 of 
roadway covered) 
67 to 84% reduction in violations over 2-
gate system 
Unknown Carroll and Haines 
(2002a) 
4-quadrant gate systems 82% reduction in violations over 2-gate 
system 
$125 K (U.S.) from 
standard gates; $250 
K (U.S.) from 
passive crossing 
Carroll and Haines 
(2002a), Hellman 
and Carroll (2002) 
4-quadrant gate system + 
median barriers 
92% reduction in violations over 2-gate 
system 
$135 K (U.S.) Carroll and Haines 
(2002a) 
Crossing closure 100% reduction in violations, accidents, 
injuries and deaths  
$15 K (U.S.) Carroll and Haines 
(2002a); NTSB 
(1998) 
Photo/video enforcement 34 to 94% reduction in violations $40 to $70 K per 
installation (U.S.) 
Carroll and Haines 
(2002b) 
In-Vehicle Crossing Safety 
Advisory Warning 
Systems (ICSAWS) 
Unknown $5 to $10 K (U.S.) 
per crossing + $50 




Caird et al. (2002) and Sussman and Raslear (2007) classified the primary reasons for 




confusion) for both passive and active grade crossings. Each of these requires a different 
approach to reducing incident occurrence.  
A system for addressing such problems is referred to as the “Three Es”: engineering, 
education, and enforcement (Jeng, 2005; Sussman and Raslear, 2007). “Engineering” involves 
using better devices or systems to alert people to the presence of a grade crossing, or to prevent 
them from entering it. “Education” aims to increase public awareness of the hazards of train 
movements, as well as reduce dangerous behaviors. “Enforcement” seeks to enforce compliance 
with existing laws at grade crossings. The most prominent educational and outreach effort for 
grade crossing safety in the U.S. is Operation Lifesaver (OL). OL’s network includes certified 
volunteer speakers and trained instructors offering free rail safety education programs to school 
groups, driver education classes, community audiences, commercial drivers, law enforcement 
officers, and emergency responders (Savage, 2006). Mok and Savage (2005) found that the 
introduction of state-wide Operation Lifesaver programs results in a 15% decrease in grade 
crossing incidents, and a 19% decrease in fatalities.  
Jeng (2005) developed a railroad safety section for inclusion in the New Jersey driver’s 
manual, then performed an experimental driver’s test on a set of drivers. Drivers who studied the 
manual with the additional section performed significantly better on the test than those who did 
not. This suggests that an accurate and easily understood driver’s manual could improve drivers’ 
behavior at grade crossings.  
Research into human factors has shown that engineering solutions solve only part of the 
problem. Education is also a critical component for reducing collisions at grade crossings. It is 
important to study the response of drivers to any new type of grade crossing and, if necessary, 




crossings, where drivers may be accustomed to conventional train speeds and frequencies, but do 
not expect more frequent, higher-speed passenger trains. 
 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
Highway-rail grade crossing risk is a topic that has received considerable attention from 
the highway perspective, but much less from the rail perspective. The results of these studies 
have led to significant safety advancements, especially in improved train crashworthiness, 
improved grade crossing design, and expanded driver education. These advancements, combined 
with increased government oversight, have led to a steady, decades-long reduction in the number 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND STATISTICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter discusses the U.S. DOT Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) databases 
used in this research, and provides a basic background in the statistical techniques and terms 
used in later chapters. 
  
3.1. PERIOD OF STUDY 
Although grade crossing incidents are common, derailments due to grade crossings 
accidents are relatively infrequent, with an average of fewer than 20 each year. In order to 
develop a database with a sufficient number of records, I used data for the 20 year period from 
1991 to 2010. This provided a robust sample of grade-crossing-caused derailments to enable 
model development. Data were most recently downloaded from the FRA Safety Data website in 
2015. Information in the FRA databases is updated for a period of five years after the end of each 
calendar year. This suggests that, by 2015, incident data from 2010 should be “stable” and no 
additional modifications are likely. However, it is possible that future researchers downloading 
the same years’ data will observe small differences in the number of incidents compared to the 
numbers presented here. This is normal due to how the databases are maintained. 
To validate the model, data from 2011 through 2014 were used, which was all the new 
data available at that point. These data were downloaded in early 2016, and therefore had 
probably not reached a fully “stable” state. Therefore, if the analysis is repeated in five years, the 
numbers might differ slightly from those presented here, though the overall trends are expected 





3.2. FRA DATABASES 
The FRA maintains three databases that were used in this study: the Rail Equipment 
Accident/Incident (REA) database, the Highway Rail Accident (HRA) database, and the Grade 
Crossing Inventory (GCI) historical file. Since the databases and the fields in them change 
periodically, the file structures that were current at the time of this study are attached (Appendix 
H). Future researchers can cross-reference with any updated file structures to find comparable 
fields. 
3.2.1. REA Database 
The REA database collects data concerning “events involving the operation of railroad 
on-track equipment (standing or moving) and causing reportable damages greater than the 
reporting threshold for the year in which the accident/incident occurred” (FRA, 2011b). This 
threshold periodically changes to account for inflation and other adjustments; as of 2011 it was 
set at $9,400. These data are reported to the FRA using the FRA F 6180.54 form, which is filed 
by railroads that experienced an incident meeting the reporting threshold criterion. It provides 
useful information about incidents, such as incident cause, number of cars or locomotives 
derailed, length of consist, type of track involved, and a number of other variables of interest. 
The fields primarily used in this study were those concerning the time and location of the 
incident (IYR, IMO, DAY, TIMEHR, TIMEMIN, AMPM, GXID), incident cause/circumstance 
(TYPE, CAUSE, TYPEQ), derailed rail vehicles (HEADEND2, MIDMAN2, MIDREM2, 
RMAN2, RREM2, LOADF2, LOADP2, EMPTYF2, EMPTYP2, CABOOSE2), and train length 





3.2.2. HRA Database 
The HRA database contains data concerning “any impact, regardless of severity, between 
a railroad on-track equipment consist and any user of a public or private crossing site” (FRA, 
2011b).  All grade crossing collisions are reported to the FRA regardless of the monetary value 
of damage caused. The data are reported using form FRA F 6180.57. The database contains a 
variety of information including data about the type of highway vehicle involved, speed of the 
train at collision, and environmental factors such as time of day and weather conditions. 
The fields primarily used in this study were those concerning the time and location of the 
incident (IYR, IMO, DAY, TIMEHR, TIMEMIN, AMPM, GXID), highway vehicle 
characteristics (TYPVEH, VEHSPD), train characteristics (RREQUIP, RRCAR, TYPEQ, 
TRNSPD), incident type (TYPACC), and warning device (CROSSING).  
3.2.3. GCI File 
The GCI database includes information reported to the FRA by each state DOT about the 
condition of each crossing. This includes information about the highway (i.e. annual average 
daily traffic (AADT), percent truck traffic) and the rail line (i.e. timetable speed, daily number of 
trains).  
There are two types of GCI file available to download from the FRA’s data website. The 
first is a current file, indicating the current conditions at each crossing based on the most recently 
submitted crossing condition report. The second is a historical file that collects all condition 
reports. A new crossing condition report is supposed to be submitted each time conditions 
change at the crossing (such as adding gates or changes in train service), so many crossings have 




In practice, some states have been better about updating the file than others, so data in the 
GCI may be incomplete or out of date. Information that would come from the railroads (such as 
number of trains per day) is often particularly sparse. As of 2015, FRA requires railroads to 
provide information for crossings over which they travel directly to the GCI (FRA, 2017b). This 
will improve the accuracy of the database for future researchers, though it did not affect the 
records used in this study.  
The fields primarily used in this study were those concerning the location of the grade 
crossing (CROSSING), the effective dates of the crossing report (EFFDATE, EDATE), number 
of trains using the crossing (TOTALTRN, PASSCNT), timetable speed (MAXTTSPD), highway 
characteristics (HWYCLASS, AADT, PCTTRUK), and crossing angle (XANGLE) 
As of 2015, the structure of the GCI files has also been changed compared to what was 
used in this study. Most of the same data are being collected, but the names of some data fields 
have been changed.  
 
3.3. ADDITIONAL DATA SOURCES 
For some analyses, data were needed that could not be obtained from the FRA databases. 
In these cases, other sources were used, including the Universal Machine Language Equipment 
Register (UMLER), the Official Railway Equipment Register (ORER), locomotive registers and 
spotters’ guides, railroad photography websites, and Google Earth. These will be explained later 





3.4. COMBINING DATABASES 
A contribution of this dissertation is a methodology for combining information from all 
three databases. Each database contains information that is useful for developing a model of 
grade crossing derailment likelihood, but none of the databases by itself contains all the 
information needed. The HRA database includes data about factors that may affect derailment 
likelihood and severity; however, it does not provide a means of identifying derailment events, 
which can only be found in the REA database. Additionally, only the GCI provides information 
about crossing angle and geographical location. Therefore, the first step was to identify a way to 
combine this information. 
The REA and HRA databases have a set of common fields that can be combined to create 
an identifier. I combined the fields for incident year (IYR), month (IMO), day (DAY), hour 
(TIMEHR), minute (TIMEMIN) and grade crossing identifier (GXID). This produced a unique 
code, since it is unlikely that two incidents will occur at the exact same time at a single crossing. 
This code (IDNO) was used as a relationship key between the two databases in Microsoft 
Access, the database software used in this analysis. All records in the HRA database were 
preserved in the analysis. For incidents listed in both the REA and HRA databases, the REA 
information was added to the HRA record. Arguably the most important fields from the REA 
database were those indicating the number of rail vehicles derailed. I assumed that if an HRA 
record had no corresponding REA record, no derailment occurred. 
Information from the GCI was incorporated using GXID as the relationship key. The GCI 
is a historical record, and as such contains many records for each grade crossing. Therefore, 
when relating information from the HRA database to the GCI, one must select the GCI record 




inaccurate, thereby affecting the results. I selected the GCI record whose effective (EFFDATE) 
and end (ENDDATE) dates bracket the incident date from the HRA1. Due to incomplete 
reporting, many HRA records did not have corresponding information in the GCI. For example, 
of the approximately 44,000 freight train grade crossing collisions in the HRA database, only 
2,221 had complete records in the GCI. Analysis that relied on GCI information was conducted 
using only complete records.  
The complete GCI data might not be representative of all grade crossings. There may be 
reasons that inventory data were collected for these crossings but not for others. For example, 
more complete data may be provided by some states than others. Additionally, some road types, 
such as major arterials, may be evaluated more frequently due to their importance, resulting in 
better data quality for these roads compared to local roads. If this is the case then it would 
contribute unexplained variance to the results. 
It was also important to determine which records were internally inconsistent and to 
eliminate records that could not be used in the analysis. Records that were missing values for the 
most important factors (incident type, vehicle speed, vehicle type, and train speed) were 
excluded. Additionally, records with inconsistent values were excluded. For example, if an 
incident was reported as “vehicle strikes train” and the vehicle speed was reported as zero, then 
the incident was excluded since such an incident is impossible. 
                                                 
1 These two fields (EFFDATE and ENDDATE) were removed from the GCI when the FRA updated its data 
collection methodology in 2015. However, the fields can be recreated using the new field “RevisionDate” by 
assuming that RevisionDate is equal to EFFDATE for the record, and the day before RevisionDate is equal to 




3.5. STATISTICAL BACKGROUND 
3.5.1. The SAS LOGISTIC Procedure 
The models in Chapters 5 and 6 were developed using the LOGISTIC procedure in the 
Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) program. This procedure uses the method of maximum 
likelihood to fit a linear logistic regression model to binary response data (SAS Institute, 2013). 
In this way, the relationship between certain explanatory variables and the outcome responses 
can be analyzed. In the case of grade crossing incidents, for each incident record the output of 
the model is a value between 0 and 1 representing the probability of a derailment occurring. 
Logistic regression is generally discussed in terms of “events” and “non-events”; in the analysis 
described here, a derailment is an event, and an incident in which no derailment occurs is a non-
event.  
The SAS LOGISTIC procedure has five effect selection techniques: none, forward 
selection, backward elimination, stepwise selection and best subset selection (SAS Institute, 
2013). “None” fits the full specified model, so if four variables are provided, all four will remain 
in the model. Forward selection adds each statistically significant variable to the model in 
sequence according to the strength of its influence. Backward elimination begins with the full 
specified model, then removes non-significant variables in order from least significant. In 
stepwise selection, the variable having the strongest influence on the response variable is added 
at each step. Variables are not added if they are found to have an insignificant influence on the 
model. At each step, the procedure tests the influence of including each factor by performing a 
“goodness-of-fit” test. It also examines the factors that have already been added and removes any 
that are found to no longer have a significant effect. The best subset option identifies a number of 




with categorical variables and so was not used. Stepwise selection was used to develop the 
models in Chapters 5 and 6, though it was found to produce the same models as forward 
selection and backward elimination. SAS indicates any co-linear variables to the user, as highly 
correlated variables can impair the ability of SAS to identify the best variable for inclusion in the 
model. 
The model produced by SAS LOGISTIC identifies the probability of an event having 
occurred based on historical data. Dick et al. (2001) define this as a “retrospective” model, as 
opposed to a “prospective” model. The retrospective model makes predictions about past events 
using a subset of the data, consisting of some number of events and some number of non-events. 
The output of this retrospective model must be calibrated to more accurately represent the 
probability of a derailment occurring in the overall population. While the factor coefficients from 
the small data set are equally valid for the large data set, the intercept term needs to be adjusted 
in the prospective model in order to account for the average rate of events in the actual 
population (Scott and Wild, 1986). This adjusted “prospective” model can then be used to make 
predictions about unseen data. 
Additionally, SAS LOGISTIC has an option called SCORE that can be used when 
validating a logistic regression model. SCORE allows the user to specify a set of unseen data that 
the software analyzes using the model developed by the training data.  
3.5.2. Evaluating the Fit of a Logistic Regression 
Once a model has been created using logistic regression, there are a variety of metrics 
that can be used to assess how well the model “fits” the data. The SAS LOGISTIC procedure 




fit: the Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) goodness-of-fit test (for fitted data only), the area under the 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, and the Brier test (for scored data only) 
 Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) Goodness-of-Fit Test  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test returns a value between 0 and 1 indicating 
how well the model performed at predicting the number of events in various random subsets of 
the input data set. Values closer to 1 indicate good model fit, and values closer to 0 indicate poor 
fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2002). A value of 0.5 essentially indicates that the model performs 
no better than flipping a coin or random guessing. 
 Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve (AUC) 
The Area Under the ROC curve (AUC) is a value between 0 and 1 that describes the 
ability of the logistic regression model to discriminate between events and non-events for any 
chosen threshold. The threshold is a value selected by the model’s user to represent the 
distinction between an event and a non-event. Since the logistic model returns a value anywhere 
between 0 and 1, it is a matter of statistical or engineering judgment to choose the threshold, 
though the “best” threshold will generally be equal to the proportion of events in the dataset. Any 
datum with a value less than the threshold will be considered a non-event, and any datum with a 
value greater than the threshold will be considered an event. The AUC value is important 
because it quantifies the model’s ability to distinguish between events and non-events regardless 
of the chosen threshold. The ROC curve plots sensitivity versus (1 – specificity) for every 
threshold value. Sensitivity can be thought of as the “true positive rate”, or a measurement of 
actual events divided by the number of events identified by the model. Analogously, specificity 
is the “true negative rate”, or a measurement of the number of actual non-events divided by the 




As with the HL test, an AUC closer to 1 indicates a model that better discriminates 
between events and non-events; if the AUC is 0.5, then it is no more accurate than random 
chance. The positive diagonal 1:1 line shown on the ROC curves in Chapters 5 and 6 indicates 
what the ROC curve would look like if the AUC was 0.5. Generally, a model is considered to 
provide acceptable discrimination if the AUC value is between 0.7 and 0.8, good discrimination 
for values between 0.8 and 0.9, and excellent discrimination if the value exceeds 0.9 (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow, 2002). 
 Brier Score 
The SAS software does not provide an HL value for scored data; however, it does 
provide a Brier score. The Brier score of a data set is a measure of goodness-of-fit; it represents 
the difference between the predicted probability and the observed response of a data point. Brier 
scores range from 0 to 1, with the best possible value being 0. 
3.5.3. Rare Events Logistic Regression (RELR) 
When logistic regression is used on data that have many more non-events than events, the 
regression will produce a poor fit even though there are indications of strong statistical 
relationships in the data. The models predict non-events correctly at the expense of predicting 
events, since this reduces the error rate. In this way, the model predicts a large percentage of all 
events correctly, but has poor fit because it fails to predict most derailment events. 
This problem can be addressed by using a modified form known as “rare events logistic 
regression” (RELR) (King and Zeng, 2001; van den Eeckhaut et al., 2006). RELR corrects for 
the disproportionate number of non-events by selecting a random subset of them equal to 1 to 5 
times the number of events. In this research, a dataset was created containing a number of 




The retrospective model makes predictions about past events using a subset of the data, 
consisting of some number of events and some number of non-events. The output of this 
retrospective model must be calibrated to more accurately represent the probability of a 
derailment occurring in the overall population. While the factor coefficients from the small data 
set are equally valid for the large data set, the intercept term needs to be adjusted in the 
prospective model to account for the average rate of events in the actual population (Scott and 









This chapter presents statistical analysis examining the basic characteristics of grade 
crossing incidents. Three databases maintained by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
were used to understand the effect that grade crossing collisions have on trains, especially as they 
affect train derailments. Although some highway-rail grade crossing collisions result in 
derailment of the train, most do not; the challenge is to identify the critical factors affecting the 
former. This chapter begins by describing some of the characteristics of grade crossing-caused 
derailments, comparing them to other railroad incident types, and seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
 How severe are grade crossing collision-caused derailments, and how do they compare to 
other derailment causes? 
 Does vehicle size affect derailment likelihood? 
 Does vehicle size affect derailment severity? 
 Does impact velocity (of the highway vehicle or train) affect derailment rate or severity? 
 How does vehicle size affect the speed distribution of a vehicle striking a train? 
 Does the weight of the rail vehicle involved in the collision affect derailment likelihood? 
 Does the collision angle of the train and highway vehicle affect derailment likelihood? 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
The analysis in this chapter uses data from the Highway-Rail Accident (HRA), Railroad 




through 2010 (described in Chapter 3). The HRA database contains the largest amount of 
pertinent information; however, it does not provide information about the number of cars or 
locomotives derailed in the incident. On the other hand, the REA database provides derailment 
information but lacks detailed data regarding grade crossing incidents. The GCI provides 
additional information about crossing characteristics that is useful for the crossing angle analysis. 
The three databases were merged to create a unique dataset consisting of incidents that 
were reported using both the HRA and REA forms. A unique identification code was created for 
each incident in the HRA and REA databases. The code concatenates the date, time, and crossing 
identification number (GXID) for each incident to provide a field that can be cross-referenced 
between the two databases. The GCI information is cross-referenced by looking at the GXID and 
effective date range of each record.  
This methodology results in a consolidated dataset consisting only of incidents that 
occurred at grade crossings and were also REA-reportable (i.e. exceeded the REA damage value 
threshold). This consolidated dataset contains what are likely the most severe grade crossing 
incidents. Mainline grade crossing incidents are the focus of this study because they account for 
approximately 88% of all incidents, and because mainline derailments are the ones most likely to 
result in major consequences.  
 
4.3. RESULTS  
 From 1991 through 2010, 71,153 total grade crossing incidents occurred in the U.S. Of 
these, 59,893 occurred at public grade crossings on mainline tracks, including 3,135 incidents 
that exceeded the FRA reporting threshold for track and equipment damage and therefore were 




crossings. About 90% of crossings had only one incident during the study period, 8% had two 
incidents, and 2% of crossings had three or more incidents. Of the REA-reportable incidents, 399 
resulted in derailment. Over the study period, mainline grade crossing derailments resulted in: 
 399 derailments 
 2,185 freight and 235 passenger cars/locomotives derailed 
 138 railcars carrying hazardous materials damaged or derailed 
 Nine hazardous materials railcars released 
 29 highway truck hazardous materials spills (such spills can also be caused by grade 
crossing incidents that do not result in derailment) 
 Evacuation of over 1,000 people due to safety precautions related to hazardous 
materials spills  
The frequency distribution of incident severity as measured by the number of cars or 
locomotives derailed in individual grade crossing incidents was plotted (Figure 4.1).  The modal 
value was for incidents in which one car or locomotive derailed with declining frequency up to a 








Figure 4.1: Number of rail vehicles derailed per incident at grade crossings given 




4.3.1. Grade Crossing Incident Frequency and Severity 
When discussing grade crossing incidents in the context of railroad safety, it is useful to 
compare the frequency and severity of such incidents to other railroad incident causes (Barkan et 
al., 2003; Liu et al., 2012). The frequency and average number of rail vehicles derailed was 
calculated for each incident cause (Figure 4.2). Most REA-reportable incidents are derailments 
(FRA 2011a). Grade crossing incidents are an exception, in that most do not result in 
derailments. Therefore, two points are shown for grade crossing incidents: one for derailments 









Figure 4.2: Railroad Incidents by Cause Severity vs. Frequency, 1991-2010 (Note: figure 
uses data from the REA database, therefore only REA-reportable grade crossing  
incidents are represented). 
 
 
Comparing other railroad incident causes to all REA-reportable grade crossing incidents 
shows that they are the most common; however they have a low derailment rate (only 399 of the 
approximately 2,900 REA-reportable grade crossing incidents resulted in derailment) and 
consequently low severity. However, if the comparison is made to only those grade crossing 
incidents that resulted in derailment, they are less frequent than many other incident causes but 
have above average severity.  
Combined, this means that grade crossing collisions having the potential for catastrophic 
consequences including passenger fatalities and the release of hazardous materials, if a 
derailment does occur. Even if this does not happen, the frequency of grade crossing incidents 




largest cause of railroad fatalities, after trespassing), as well as significant lost time to railroad 
operators. 
4.3.2. Incident Type 
The FRA database differentiates between grade crossing incidents in which the train 
struck the highway vehicle (TSV) and the highway vehicle struck the train (VST)1. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, incident type is an important factor in my analysis as the factors affecting 
derailment likelihood are different for the two types.  
Derailment likelihood also varies with respect to incident type. VST incidents represent 
22% of all grade crossing incidents, but 32% of grade crossing-caused derailments (Figure 4.3). 




                                                 
1 This is not a standard terminology, and others refer to these by different names. In the HRA database, these are 
referred to as “rail equipment struck highway user” (TYPACC = 1) and “rail equipment struck by highway user” 





Figure 4.3: Incidents occurring at grade crossings on mainline track from 1991 to 2010  
by incident type (TSV or VST). 
 
4.3.3. Comparison of Point of Derailment against Various Incident Types 
To better understand how grade crossing-caused derailments compare to other derailment 
causes, an analysis was performed examining the point of derailment (POD) distributions for 
grade crossing and other incidents. The POD is the position in the train of the first (closest to the 
front of the train) rail vehicle to derail in an incident. 
Figure 4.4a shows, for all incident types, the frequency and cumulative distribution of the 
position-in-train of the first rail vehicle derailed. Approximately 20% of incidents involve 
derailment of the front-most locomotive or car. In contrast, Figure 4.4b shows the same chart but 
for grade crossing incidents alone. In these incidents, most – nearly 80% – involve the front-most 
locomotive or car in the train. Therefore, grade crossing incidents are more biased to the front of 
the train compared to all incident causes. Additionally, the POD distribution is different for VST 
and TSV incidents; while TSV incidents almost exclusively involve the first few rail vehicles in 








Figure 4.4: Frequency and cumulative distribution of the POD for (a) all derailment 





Train lengths vary widely depending on train type (passenger or freight) and other 
factors. As a result, shorter trains will naturally have a POD closer to 1, which exaggerates the 
front-of-train bias. To account for this, the normalized point of derailment (NPOD), which is the 
position-in-train of the first derailed car divided by the train length, can be used. This distribution 
was calculated for a variety of incident cause groups to show the effect of incident cause on 
NPOD (Figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Cumulative Distribution Probabilities for normalized POD  
of various accident causes. 
 
Of the four incident cause groups examined, grade crossing collisions were the most 
heavily biased towards front-of-train derailments. In comparison, incidents with the cause group 




are also somewhat biased towards the front. In contrast, derailments due to “Bearing Failures” 
are uniformly distributed throughout the train. To illustrate the difference in NPOD distributions, 
consider that 75% of grade crossing collisions have an NPOD less than or equal to 0.1, whereas 
the same is true for only 43% of obstructions, 23% of broken rails, and 8% of bearing failures. If 
NPOD was uniformly distributed, we would expect 10% of incidents to have NPOD less than or 
equal to 0.1. It is evident that derailments resulting from grade crossing incidents are more likely 
to occur at the front of the train compared to other causes.  
The NPOD analysis was repeated for grade crossing incidents alone (Figure 4.6a). The 
data were split into categories according to freight- and passenger-involved derailments, and 
further divided into TSV and VST incidents. Freight train-involved incidents might appear to be 
more strongly biased toward the front of the train; however, since this is a normalized point of 
derailment, this difference is mostly due to the fact that passenger trains are much shorter than 
freight trains. Given a 50-car freight train and an 8-car passenger train, if the first car in each 
were to derail, the freight train would have a normalized POD of 0.02 and the passenger train 
would have a normalized POD of 0.125. This is illustrated by plotting the non-normalized POD 
for freight and passenger trains (Figure 4.6b). No passenger train derailments affected a point in 
the train farther back than the 20th rail vehicle, and only 13% of freight train derailments had a 
POD greater than 20. Therefore, I also plotted the POD distributions considering only incidents 












Figure 4.6: Cumulative Distribution Probabilities for (a) normalized POD of grade crossing 









Figure 4.6 (cont.): Cumulative Distribution Probabilities for (c) non-normalized POD for 
trains shorter than 20 rail vehicles2.  
 
Of greater interest is the effect of incident type on POD distribution. For both passenger 
and freight trains, derailments were more biased towards the front of the train for TSV incidents 
compared to VST incidents. This is not surprising, given that if a train strikes a vehicle the rail 
vehicle in the leading position is most likely to derail. If the train is struck by a highway vehicle, 
it will affect whatever part of the train is struck. Consequently, there is lower likelihood of the 
POD being near the front of the train compared to TSV incidents. However, even VST incidents 
still show some bias towards the front of the train. 
                                                 




4.3.4. Large Highway Vehicle Involvement 
An underlying physical factor discussed in Chapter 1 was the mass of the highway 
vehicle. The weight of the highway vehicle is not reported in the HRA database, but there is a 
field (TYPVEH) indicating the type of highway vehicle that provides some insight (FRA, 2011a, 
2011b). This field defines 11 categories of highway user, including automobiles, semi-tractor-
trailers, buses, motorcycles and pedestrians. For the purposes of this study, incidents involving 
straight trucks and tractor-semitrailers (categories B and C) – believed to be the two heaviest 
categories of highway vehicle – were defined as “large highway vehicles” and all others were 
defined as “small highway vehicles” 3. Incidents were omitted if they were classified as “other 
motor vehicles,” “pedestrian” or “other”, as is further explained in Appendix A. Removing these 
categories reduced the size of the dataset by about 2,500 entries. It is possible that about half of 
these could be added back to the dataset if the narrative fields were used to code the vehicle type 
manually; however, the dataset is large enough that these entries are unnecessary. 
The larger mass of trucks suggests that train collisions in which they are involved may be 
more likely to result in a derailment (Chapter 1).  An analysis was conducted to test this 
hypothesis and quantify the relative difference between large and small highway vehicles. The 
total number of REA-reportable, mainline grade crossing derailments involving large vehicles 




                                                 
3 It is possible that buses (type “F”) should also be included in the large vehicle category; however, analysis showed 
that their exclusion did not affect the results for the 20-year period being studied because no derailments exceeding 





Figure 4.7: Incidents occurring at grade crossings on mainline track from 1991 to 2010 
involving large highway vehicles versus all other vehicles4. 
 
Large highway vehicles were involved in 31% of all mainline grade crossing incidents 
and 91% of mainline REA-reportable grade crossing derailments and thus were three times more 
likely to cause a derailment (χ2 test p < 0.0001). The other 9% of grade crossing derailments 
involved automobiles, pick-up trucks, other motor vehicles, and vans.   
The greater tendency for large vehicles to cause derailments led to the question about 
whether they might also affect derailment severity. To investigate this hypothesis, the 
distribution of total cars and locomotives derailed in incidents was compared for incidents that 
did and did not involve large vehicles (Figure 4.8).  There was no significant difference between 
the severity of derailment incidents involving large vehicles and the severity of derailment 
incidents not involving large vehicles (Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) Pr<Z = 0.0753; t-test p = 
                                                 
4 Fifteen derailments had a reported highway vehicle type of H (motorcycle), J (other motor vehicle) or M (other) 




0.1775).  In other words, once a motor vehicle has caused a derailment, the severity of that 
derailment is little affected by the size of the vehicle that caused it. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Number of cars and locomotives derailed in grade crossing incidents by 
highway vehicle type. Frequencies are given as a percentage of all incidents of each type. 
 
4.3.5. Speed of Highway Vehicle at Collision 
Another physical factor of interest is highway vehicle speed. The FRA records data about 
the speed at collision of the highway vehicle involved in grade crossing incidents. These data are 
typically estimated by observers at the incident scene and thus are subject to some uncertainty.  
The data were divided in two categories based on incident type (TSV or VST). As 
explained in Chapter 1, the physical mechanism involved in these two types of collisions is likely 
very different and will be accounted for differently in the final statistical model. For each 
incident type category, the data were further divided into derailments and non-derailments. Pair-










Figure 4.9: Speed at collision of vehicles involved in grade crossing incidents, 1991-2010  
for (a) train striking highway vehicle (TSV) scenario and (b) highway vehicle striking  
train (VST) scenario5. 
                                                 




The majority of TSV incidents occurred at highway vehicle speeds less than 10 mph. A 
large number (37%) of incidents occurred in which the highway vehicle was stopped on the 
tracks. Speeds for the VST incidents were generally higher, with many incidents in the 40 to 60 
mph speed range.  
The data were analyzed to determine if there was a difference in speed between 
derailment and non-derailment incidents. For both the TSV (WRS test one-sided Pr < Z = 
0.0135) and VST (WRS test one-sided Pr < Z < 0.0001) derailments were more likely to occur at 
higher vehicle speeds, but the trend is stronger for VST incidents (Figure 4.9b). 
The effect of vehicle speed on derailment severity was also examined. The distributions 
of the total number of cars and locomotives derailed do not suggest a strong relationship between 
highway vehicle speed at collision and derailment severity (small highway vehicles – TSV: WRS 
Pr > F = 0.1786, VST: WRS Pr > F = 0.1506; large highway vehicles – TSV: WRS Pr > F = 
0.5543, VST: WRS Pr > F = 0.0663; α = 0.05). 
As discussed in Section 4.3.4, large highway vehicles are involved in a disproportionately 
large percentage of grade crossing derailments, so the highway vehicle speed analysis was 
repeated using only large highway vehicles (Figures 4.10a and b). The results for the VST data 
were the same as in the all-vehicle analysis (WRS test one-sided Pr < Z < 0.0001). However, for 










Figure 4.10: Speed at collision of large vehicles involved in grade crossing incidents, 1991-





4.3.6. Speed of Train at Collision 
Train speed is also of interest. An analysis was conducted to investigate the effect of train 
speed on derailment occurrence and severity. The FRA records information about the speed of 
trains involved in grade crossing incidents, and these data may be either exact or estimated.  The 
data were grouped into the same four categories described in Section 4.3.5, and the percentage of 









Figure 4.11: Speed at collision of trains involved in grade crossing incidents for (a) train 
striking vehicle and (b) vehicle striking train scenarios6. 
                                                 




The distributions for all four scenarios were roughly the same, with the majority of 
collisions occurring in the 35 to 55 mph range. This is probably because this represents the 
typical range of mainline train speeds. For both the TSV (WRS test one-sided Pr < Z < 0.0001) 
and VST (WRS test one-sided Pr < Z = 0.0005) scenarios, derailments were more likely to occur 
at higher train speeds.  
Since derailment severity is known to increase with train speed for other incident causes, 
a linear regression was performed to see if the same would be observed for grade-crossing-
caused derailments. No relationship between train speed and derailment severity was observed 
for incidents involving small highway vehicles (TSV: Pr > F = 0.4456, VST: Pr > F = 0.3449; α 
= 0.05); however, a relationship was observed for incidents involving large highway vehicles 
(TSV: Pr > F = 0.0006, VST: Pr > F = 0.0015; α = 0.05). Specifically, the number of rail 








Figure 4.12: Relationship between average number of rail vehicles derailed per incident 
and speed of train at collision. Orange bars represent VST incidents and blue bars 
represent TSV incidents. Note: Analysis is for large highway vehicles only, as no 
relationship was observed for small highway vehicles. 
 
4.3.7. Train Weight 
Train weight is another physical factor that could affect incidents. Information on the 
weight of rolling stock involved in the incident is not provided in the HRA or REA databases, 
though some information about the “first [rail vehicle] involved” is reported, namely its reporting 
mark. The reporting mark is a unique identifier that can be cross-referenced with other sources to 
provide additional information about the rail vehicle.  
4.3.7.1. Weight of First Railcar Involved 
Due to the complexity of gathering the weight data, the rolling stock weight variable was 
approached simultaneously in two ways. Data on weight was manually gathered for 




Machine Language Equipment Register (UMLER), and the Official Railway Equipment Register 
(ORER) – provide information about the loaded and tare weights of rail vehicles; however, for 
most records in the HRA/REA databases these sources must be cross-referenced manually, 
especially for rail vehicles that may have been scrapped after their involvement in an incident. 
The UMLER database is online and easily-referenced, but only has data for rail vehicles 
currently in service. Therefore, data for older rail vehicles must be sourced by hand from print 
books such as the ORER, or websites in the case of privately-held railroad equipment. 
Information about rail equipment can often be found on railroad photography websites (such as 
railroadpictures.net) when other sources fail.  
Due to a combination of reporting errors and gaps in the weight databases, roughly 5% of 
records could not be matched to weight data and were discarded. The discarded records were 
predominantly related to the oldest incidents (those between 1991 and 1995) creating a time bias 
in the completeness of the weight data. The disadvantage of this method of accounting for rail 
vehicle weight is the time required. It was infeasible to collect data for all the records in the 
database, so instead a random selection technique was used to create a sample dataset of  
1,000 records. 
The effect of rail vehicle weight differed for passenger and freight trains (Table 4.1). For 
freight trains, average weight varied significantly between derailment and non-derailment 
incidents (2-tailed t-test, p-value < 0.0001), with derailments more likely if lighter rail vehicles 
were involved. In contrast, passenger trains showed no significant difference in average weight 
between derailment and non-derailment incidents (2-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.7717). Note that 
there are fewer records for passenger trains than freight trains, which could contribute to the lack 




Table 4.1: Effect of Rail Vehicle Weight on Derailment Likelihood 
 
  Passenger Freight 
  Derailment Non-Derailment Derailment Non-Derailment 
Average Weight (lbs)  245,121   248,058   330,579   359,595  
Standard Deviation    45,177     61,214     84,474     63,005  
N           47            92          194          642  
t-test p-value 0.7717 <0.0001 
   
4.3.7.2. Equipment Type 
While the exact-weight analysis was being developed, another, simpler method for 
quantifying rail vehicle weight was developed. Though the weight of rail vehicles varies widely, 
in general, freight rail vehicles are heavier than passenger vehicles. Additionally, locomotives 
are typically heavier than railcars. Therefore, if the type of rail vehicle (freight or passenger, 
locomotive or railcar) first involved in the incident could be determined, an ordinal variable with 
four values could be created representing rail vehicle weight to approximate the weight effect. 
Further differentiation between loaded and unloaded freight cars would have been ideal, since 
the former are heavier and the latter are lighter than passenger cars. While the loading condition 
of the railcar is reported in the REA database, this information is not included in the HRA 
database. Since most grade crossing incidents do not exceed the REA reporting threshold, this 
information does not exist for most incidents and therefore could not be analyzed. 
To determine the type of rail vehicle involved in the incident, some assumptions were 
made based on the data in the HRA database. First, the field TYPEQ, which identifies the type of 
equipment in the train consist at the time of the incident, was used to determine whether a rail 
vehicle was passenger or freight. There are 10 types of consist specified, and these were divided 
into two groups based on whether they were more like passenger cars or freight cars. For 




adapted passenger cars or various high-rail vehicles which are motor vehicles adapted to operate 
on railroad tracks. These were collectively classified as “passenger”. A complete list of the 
TYPEQ categories and freight/passenger sorting is shown in Appendix B. 
It was then necessary to determine if a rail vehicle was a locomotive or railcar. Some 
categories only apply to one or the other. For example, incidents in category 6 – cut of cars – 
certainly involve a railcar. However, for some categories, such as “freight train”, the individual 
rail vehicle involved in the incident could be either a locomotive or a railcar. Therefore, it was 
necessary to use another field in the database to determine if a rail vehicle was a locomotive or a 
railcar. I compared two fields – RRCAR (indicating the position-in-train of the first railcar 
involved in the incident) and NBRLOCOS (indicating how many locomotives were in the train 
consist) – and assumed that the struck rail vehicle was a locomotive if the value of RRCAR was 
less than the value of NBRLOCOS. This is an oversimplification, especially in the case of freight 
trains, which may use distributed power, meaning locomotives are placed elsewhere in the 
consist besides the front. However, it is not possible to determine from the HRA database how 
many of the consist’s locomotives were at the front of the train. 
Comparing the category distributions for derailments and non-derailments shows that 
derailments are not occurring at the same rate for all equipment types (χ2 test with 3df p<0.0001). 
For incidents in which the struck rail vehicle was a freight locomotive, derailments occurred only 
0.73% of the time, whereas 16.67% of incidents involving passenger railcars resulted in 







Table 4.2: Number and Percentage Derailment of Incidents by Equipment Type 
 
  Derailment7 Non-Derailment Percent Derailments 
Freight Locomotive         251     34,529  0.73% 
Passenger Locomotive           50       3,671  1.36% 
Freight Railcar           80       4,075  1.96% 
Passenger Railcar           15            90  16.67% 
 
4.3.8. Crossing Angle 
The last physical factor, crossing angle, measures the angle at which the train and 
highway vehicle collide. While there is a variable describing crossing angle (XANGLE) in the 
FRA’s Grade Crossing Inventory (GCI), this variable is categorical, not continuous. Grade 
crossing angle is classified into three categories based on the smallest (acute) angle of incidence 
(Table 4.3). 
  
Table 4.3: Grade Crossing Inventory XANGLE Value and Actual Angle Ranges 
 
XANGLE Value Acute Angle Range Obtuse Angle Range 
1 0-29° 180-151° 
2 30-59° 150-121° 
3 60-90° 120-90° 
 
Consequently, exact collision angle is not available from the GCI. For example, a 
crossing might have XANGLE = 1, indicating that the smallest crossing angle is between 0° and 
29°. This means the actual angle of collision could be between 0° and 29° or between 151° and 
180° (Figure 4.13). The collision angle could affect the closing velocity between the train and 
                                                 




highway vehicle since speed is a vector. Crossing angle could also have an influence on 
derailment likelihood since it may affect the interaction of the train’s wheels with the rail. 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that these two cases could have different implications for the 
physics of the collision.  
For a data set of 3,062 unique mainline freight train grade crossing collisions, the latitude 
and longitude of the crossing, as well as the travel direction of the train and the car, were 
determined from HRA and GCI records. Google Earth was used to analyze aerial photos of each 
grade crossing, and the exact angle of collision, θ, between the train and the highway vehicle was 




Figure 4.13. Diagram showing angle of collision, θ. Notice that although the crossing is the  
same in both collisions, the angle of collision is greater in (a) than in (b)  
because of the direction the highway vehicle is traveling. 
 
Approximately one third of the data points were excluded from the analysis because of 
errors or omissions in the data. For example, in many instances the longitude and latitude of the 







were reporting errors in travel direction that made the data ambiguous. For example, the highway 
vehicle’s direction of travel would be reported as “west” when the road it was traveling on was 
oriented north-south. (It was sometimes possible to determine by zooming out that the road was 
generally oriented east-west, in which case it was assumed that this was the correct direction.) 
Complete data were collected for 2,064 entries. 
The crossing angle data were divided according to whether a derailment occurred and the 
two distributions were compared. Angle of collision is normally distributed for both samples. 
The mean angle of the two samples was approximately the same. Derailments occurred over a 
slightly smaller range of values (Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics Divided by Derailment Occurrence 
 





Min Value Max Value 
Non-Derailment 1,424 87.68° 20.95 0.5551 15° 155° 
Derailment 220 90.95° 23.19 1.5633 25° 160° 
 
A t-test was performed to determine if the distribution of crossing angles was different 
for incidents in which derailments did or did not occur. The results indicated that the means of 
the two samples were unequal (Pr > F = 0.0339; α=0.05) and the difference between the two 
populations is statistically significant. Specifically, derailments were slightly more likely to 
occur at higher collision angles.  
Ultimately, it is difficult to determine exactly what effect crossing angle has on 
derailment likelihood. If the train and highway vehicle were both rigid bodies on smooth 
surfaces, then the effect would follow logically from basic energy transfer equations. However, 




collision. Combined with the interaction that exists between rails and train wheels due to the 
wheels’ flanges, the effect of collision angle is probably mitigated. The best way to study this 
component would be through detailed computer modeling of the collision. 
4.3.9. Other Variables 
Various railroad practitioners who have experience with grade-crossing-collision-caused 
derailments have suggested other variables that might affect derailment occurrence. Two 
variables that are consistently mentioned are the curvature and gradient of the track at the 
crossing. It has been suggested that because curved track is generally superelevated, a collision 
occurring on a curve might be more likely to result in derailment if the train is struck from the 
high side of the curve (outside rail) compared to the low side (inside rail). It has also been 
suggested that grade could play a role in derailment probability. Trains traveling downgrade at 
the time of a collision might have more momentum because of the effect of gravity, and 
therefore have greater derailment potential. Neither grade nor curvature are provided in the FRA 
Grade Crossing Inventory or any other feasibly referenced source, therefore I have not 
investigated the effect of these factors. These data could be obtained from railroad track charts 
by future researchers. 
 
4.4. DISCUSSION 
This chapter examined each of the physical factors identified in Chapter 1. Large 
highway vehicles such as trucks appear to be about three times more likely to cause grade 
crossing derailments than small vehicles.  Large vehicles are, by a considerable margin, involved 
in a disproportionately greater number of derailments considering the number of incidents they 




heavy highway vehicle its greater mass may make it more likely to dislodge the train from the 
tracks, and it is also capable of absorbing more of the train's momentum causing severe run-in 
and possible jack-knifing of the train. A smaller, lighter vehicle is more likely to be pushed down 
the tracks allowing the train to lose speed more gradually.  
Highway vehicle size did not appear to have much effect on derailment severity. While 
the most severe incidents – those resulting in the derailment of more than 25 cars and 
locomotives – were generally caused by trucks, they accounted for only 3% of all incidents. 
Statistical analysis found no significant difference between the two severities.  
Impact velocity of both the highway vehicle and the train were found to influence 
derailment rate. Derailments tended to occur at higher vehicle speeds regardless of incident type. 
Also, derailments tended to occur at higher train speeds for both TSV and VST incidents though 
the trend is stronger for TSV incidents. That higher speeds result in more derailments is not 
surprising given that the energy involved in high speed collisions is greater than other collisions, 
making the train more likely to leave the tracks.  
Additionally, some interesting patterns were evident in the velocity study. For the “train 
striking vehicle” category, about 37% of these incidents occurred between a train and a vehicle 
that was stationary on the tracks (with a speed of 0 mph). 31% of all derailments for this 
category occurred with a stationary vehicle. Examination of the narrative fields for these 
incidents showed that at least 40% were caused by a truck being stuck on a crossing and unable 
to move in time. This suggests that further efforts to modify crossing geometry so that trucks are 
less likely to get stuck would yield benefits. In addition, more frequent crossing inspections 
combined with careful route planning could prevent trucks from becoming stuck by directing 




The rail vehicle weight study indicated that derailment likelihood varies according to 
equipment type, with freight locomotives being the least likely to derail, and passenger railcars 
being most likely. An analysis using actual rail vehicle weights was also conducted, but the 
results were less conclusive, probably due to the size variance of the dataset. Exact rail vehicle 
weight data are difficult to obtain given current incident reporting requirements. 
The collision angle analysis showed that derailments are slightly more likely to occur at 
higher collision angles. All else constant, the effective collision force will increase with 
increased collision angle. One caveat is that this analysis was conducted using a sample size of 
only 2,000 incidents instead of the full dataset. This was unavoidable due to the complexity of 
gathering exact collision angle information, as well as inaccuracy in the GCI database. While 
there were enough randomly-selected records to provide statistically significant results, it is 
possible that some bias was introduced into the analysis through the selection process. For 
example, some states might provide more accurate latitude/longitude coordinates than others, 
meaning they would have more crossings that could be identified in Google Earth during the data 
collection process. Combined with the fact that some states are making efforts to eliminate non-
right-angle crossings, this could create a sample that is not completely representative. However, 
regional variations should not affect incident physics, so this is less likely to be a problem. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis considered mainline, REA-reportable incidents from the years 1991 to 
2010, using a large dataset that was developed in order to obtain a robust sample size and greater 
statistical power. The major physical factors affecting grade crossing incidents and their effect on 




an effect on these metrics and to facilitate development of a multivariate model to predict 
derailment risk at a given grade crossing. The results show that vehicle size has a strong effect on 
derailment rate, but little effect on derailment severity. Vehicle and train speed at collision also 
influence derailment rate. Additionally, derailment severity increases with increased train speed, 




CHAPTER 5: STATISTICAL MODELING OF FREIGHT TRAIN DERAILMENTS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes development of a statistical model to estimate the conditional 
probability of a grade crossing collision resulting in a freight train derailment, based on a variety 
of characteristics of the collision. Modeling began with incidents involving only freight trains 
because freight and passenger trains have different characteristics and consequences. 
Additionally, while grade crossing incidents involving passenger trains are approximately two 
times more likely than freight trains to result in derailment, freight train data are much more 
numerous. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, development of a separate passenger model was 
ultimately not possible. Development of the freight train models led to interesting observations 
about how best to create suitable statistical models, which in turn helped with creation of the 
final model presented in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2. DATASET 
The analysis in this chapter combines data from the Rail Equipment/Accident (REA), 
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accident (HRA) and Grade Crossing Inventory (GCI) databases. 
Data for all U.S. freight railroads during the 20-year period 1991 through 2010 were used. The 
HRA database contains factors useful for developing a predictive model; however, it does not 
provide a means of identifying incidents resulting in derailment, which are found in the REA 
database. Additional factors, including information about the characteristics of the crossing, 




and sidings because these accounted for approximately 88% of all incidents. The databases were 
combined as explained in Chapter 3. 
Since different data are included in the HRA and REA databases, three different datasets 
were used to help develop the statistical model (Table 5.1). Dataset “A” includes all unique 
incidents reported in the HRA database that involved freight equipment on mainline track. 
Dataset “B” includes those incidents that were reported in both the HRA and REA databases. 
These incidents are assumed to be the most severe in regards to damaging rail equipment, track 
and structures, since they exceeded the reporting threshold for the REA database. Dataset “C” is 
a subset of dataset “B” that includes all grade crossing derailment events and a randomly 
selected subset of non-derailment events. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Datasets Used in Model Development 
 
Dataset Derailments Non-Derailments Total Events 
A 312 43,326 43,638 
B 312 1,934 2,246 
C 312 624 936 
 
5.3. METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this chapter is to develop a statistical model to predict the conditional 
probability of a highway-rail grade crossing collision resulting in derailment of a freight train 
given that a collision has occurred. The model has a binary response variable: either there is a 
derailment or there is not. The input variables to the model were the physical factors identified in 
Chapters 1 and 4: highway vehicle size, highway vehicle speed, train speed, crossing angle, and 
incident type. Train mass was not considered in this chapter. The input variables were binary, 




Table 5.2: Definition of Model Variables 
 
Variable Name Definition (FRA 2011) Variable Type Range of Values 
VEHSPD Highway vehicle 
estimated speed in mph 
Continuous Range*: 0-105 mph 
Average*: 10.50 mph 
Standard Deviation*: 13.57 
 
TRNSPD Train speed in mph Continuous Range*: 0-80 mph 
Average*: 31.45 mph 
Standard Deviation*: 15.58 
 
LGVEH Was a large highway  
vehicle involved? 
Binary N if no;  
Y if yes 
 
TRNSTK Did train strike  
highway user? 
Binary N if highway user struck train;  
Y if train struck highway user 
 
TRKCLAS FRA track class Categorical 0-9 (0 represents X) 
 
WARNSIG Crossing warning 
interconnected with  
highway signals 
Categorical 1 if yes;  
2 if no;  
3 if unknown 
 
VIEW Was the driver’s view of 
the track obstructed? 
Binary N if not obstructed;  
Y if obstructed  
 
PUBLIC Did the collision occur at 
a public crossing? 
Binary Y if public;  
N if private 
 
XTYPE Type of warning device  
at crossing 
Categorical 1: gates 




* Note: Statistics are for dataset A. Sets B and C have similar statistics. 
 
 
Track class, crossing visibility, type of warning device and accessibility of crossing 
(public or private) were also considered, since they are characteristics that appear in many 
incident prediction models. Second-order interaction and polynomial effects were considered for 




While the quality of the databases is generally quite good, there were some data points 
that were internally inconsistent or had empty fields. Additionally, some fields were re-coded 
based on groupings used in the model. A detailed procedure for data clean-up can be found in 
Appendix A. 
The model was developed using the LOGISTIC procedure in the Statistical Analysis 
Software (SAS) program. This procedure uses the method of maximum likelihood to fit a linear 
logistic regression model to binary response data (SAS Institute, 2013). In this way, the 
relationship between certain explanatory variables and response variables can be analyzed. For 
each collision, the output of the model is a value between 0 and 1 representing the probability of 
a derailment occurring.  
The SAS LOGISTIC procedure has four effect selection techniques: forward selection, 
backwards elimination, stepwise selection and best subset selection (SAS Institute, 2013). All 
four techniques were evaluated and it was found that, for this dataset, stepwise selection was best 
for model formulation. In stepwise selection, the variable having the strongest influence on the 
response variable is added at each step. Variables are not added if they are found to have an 
insignificant influence on the model. At each step, the procedure tests the influence of including 
each factor by performing a “goodness-of-fit” test. It also examines the factors that have already 
been added and removes any that are found to no longer have a significant effect. Additionally, 
SAS indicates any co-linear variables to the user, as highly correlated variables can impair the 
ability of SAS to identify the best variable for inclusion in the model. 
The model produced by SAS LOGISTIC identifies the probability of a derailment having 
occurred as the result of a given grade crossing collision over the past 20 years. Dick et al. 




retrospective model makes predictions about past events using a subset of the data, consisting of 
33% derailments and 67% non-derailments. The output of this retrospective model must be 
calibrated to more accurately represent the probability of a derailment occurring in the overall 
population. This adjusted “prospective” model could be used to identify grade crossings with a 
greater likelihood of derailment. 
Several models were produced using the LOGISTIC procedure. Initially, models were 
produced using dataset B; however, these models proved to be inaccurate, regardless of whether 
interaction effects were included in the LOGISTIC procedure. It was hypothesized that, since 
there are six times more non-derailment events than derailment events, the models were forced to 
predict non-derailment events more correctly at the expense of predicting derailment events. In 
this way, the model predicted a large percent of all events correctly, but had poor fit because it 
failed to predict most derailment events, which are of the greatest interest in this study. 
This problem can be remedied by using a modified form of logistic regression referred to 
as “rare events logistic regression” (RELR) (King and Zeng, 2001; van den Eeckhaut et al., 
2006). RELR corrects for the disproportionate number of non-events by selecting a random 
subset of non-events, which are equal to 1 to 5 times the number of events. Therefore, dataset C 
was created, containing a number of randomly-selected, non-derailment events equal to twice the 





5.4.1. Unified Model 
5.4.1.1. Retrospective Derailment Model 
Four subsets of dataset B were created (C1 through C4) using all 312 derailment events 
and 624 randomly-selected non-derailments. The non-derailments were different in each of the 






𝑥 = −0.6001 + {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−0.4106,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
+ {
0,                   𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾 = 𝑌
0.3822, 𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾 = 𝑁
+ 0.0316 𝑉𝐸𝐻𝑆𝑃𝐷 − 0.0141 𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐷 
(0.1059)                          (0.1019)                              (0.00530)               (0.00533)      (s.e) 
where VEHSPD, TRNSPD, TRNSTK and LGVEH are described in Table 5.2. 
This model provided the best fit to the data, with a Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) goodness-
of-fit test result of 0.5771, indicating that the model performs slightly better than random 
guessing. This model also has a suitable ability to discriminate between derailment and non-
derailment events, as measured by the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, with an 





Figure 5.1 ROC Curve for retrospective model. Area under the curve is 0.7006. 
 
Additional performance statistics for this model are presented in Table 5.3. For these 
values, the threshold value for predicting a derailment was a p value of 0.3. If the calculated 
value of p for a data point was greater than 0.3, it was classified as predicting a derailment, and if 
it was less than 0.3, it was classified as predicting no derailment. 
 
Table 5.3: Performance Statistics for Retrospective Model 
 
Statistic Cases 








In this model, the intercept term (b = -0.6001) is based on the average probability of a 
derailment for dataset C. While the factor coefficients from the small dataset are equally valid for 
the large dataset, the intercept term needs to be adjusted in the prospective model in order to 
account for the average rate of derailment in the actual population (Scott and Wild, 1986). The 
next two sections consider a prospective model based on dataset A. 
5.4.1.2. Prospective Derailment Model for All Grade Crossing Collisions (Dataset A) 
In this section, the retrospective model is adjusted to reflect the derailment rate for all 
grade crossing collisions. As explained previously, in order to be able to predict the likelihood of 
a highway-rail grade crossing collision resulting in a derailment, the retrospective model 
developed above must be altered to become a predictive model. This is accomplished by altering 
the intercept term to account for the 20-year average likelihood of a derailment occurring. For 







The intercept term is then modified to account for  pavg(A) using the log-odds operator 
(Dick 2001). 
 





𝑏𝐴 = −0.6001 + ln (
0.0071
1 − 0.0071




Using the modified intercept term adjusts the probabilities predicted by the model to 
more accurately reflect the actual observed rate of derailments. Based on dataset A, the following 







𝑥 = −5.5349 + {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−0.4106,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
+ {
0,                   𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾 = 𝑌
0.3822, 𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾 = 𝑁
+ 0.0316 𝑉𝐸𝐻𝑆𝑃𝐷 − 0.0141 𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐷 
 
where VEHSPD, TRNSPD, TRNSTK and LGVEH are described in Table 5.2. 
An ROC curve was generated by analyzing dataset A with equation pA (Figure 5.2). The 






Figure 5.2: ROC Curve for dataset "A". Area under the ROC curve is 0.7551. 
 
5.4.2. Split Model 
While the model developed in Section 5.4.1 is reasonably effective at describing the 
factors that determine whether or not a grade crossing incident will result in derailment, there is 
still some unaccounted-for variance. As explained in Chapter 1, the incident type (train striking 
vehicle or vehicle striking train) was expected to play a key role in the statistical model. Incident 
type was selected as a factor, but there were no interaction effects with the other factors. 
Hypothetically, since the physical effects involved in each incident type are probably 
different, the single model might be having a difficult time separating them, even using 
interaction effects. Therefore, the dataset was split into two parts based on incident type and 




4.1, starting with a retrospective model using a small dataset, and expanding to a prospective 
model using the full dataset (Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: Summary of Datasets Used in Model Development 
 
Dataset Number of Derailments Number of Non-Derailments Total Number of Events 
AVST 110 8,639 8,749 
ATSV 202 34,687 34,889 
CVST 110 220 330 
CTSV 202 404 606 
 
 
Dataset AVST represents all freight VST incidents reported in the HRA database. Dataset 
ATSV represents all TSV freight incidents reported in the HRA database. Similarly, dataset 
CVST represents all VST derailments and a number of randomly selected VST non-derailments 
equal to twice the number of derailments. Dataset CTSV represents all TSV derailments and a 
number of randomly selected TSV non-derailments equal to twice the number of derailments. 
CVST and CTSV were used to develop logistic regression models. As with the unified model, 
four of each “C” dataset were developed and tested to ensure that any observed trends were not 
artifacts of the specific selected records. From these, the statistical model with the best fit 
characteristics was selected. 
5.4.2.1. Retrospective Derailment Models 
Based on dataset CVST, the following model was developed for incidents where the 









𝑥𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑇 = −2.0403 + {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−1.5044,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
+ 0.00101 𝑉𝐸𝐻𝑆𝑃𝐷2 
     (0.2558)                     (0.1853)                       (0.000156)                          (s.e) 
where VEHSPD and LGVEH are described in Table 5.2. 
This model provided the best fit to the data, with an HL test result of 0.9920. The area 
under the ROC curve for this result is 0.8871 (Figure 5.3). Additional performance statistics for 
this model are given for a derailment threshold p value of 0.3 (Table 5.5). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: ROC Curve for retrospective model. Area under the curve is 0.8871. 
Table 5.5: Performance Statistics for Retrospective Model “CVST” 
Statistic Cases 







Based on dataset CTSV, the following model was developed for incidents where the 





𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑉 = −2.0330 + {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−1.8687,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
+ 0.0166 𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐷 
     (0.3239)                  (0.1712)                  (0.00766)                                 (s.e) 
where TRNSPD and LGVEH are described in Table 5.2. 
This model has an HL goodness-of-fit test result of 0.8110. The area under the ROC 
curve for this result is 0.8422 (Figure 5.4). Additional performance statistics for this model are 
given for a derailment threshold p value of 0.3 (Table 5.6) 
 
 





Table 5.6: Performance Statistics for Retrospective Model “CTSV” 
 
Statistic Cases 




In these models, the intercept terms (bCVST = -2.0403; bCTSV = -2.0330) are based on the 
average probability of a derailment for datasets CVST and CTSV. The next section develops the 
prospective models based on datasets AVST and ATSV.  
5.4.2.2. Prospective Derailment Model (Datasets AVST and ATSV) 
In this section, the retrospective models are adjusted to reflect the derailment rate for all 
grade crossing collisions of a given incident type. This is accomplished by altering the intercept 
term to account for the 20-year average likelihood of a derailment occurring. For dataset AVST, 





The intercept term is then modified to account for  pavg(AVST) using the log-odds operator. 




𝑏𝐴𝑉𝑆𝑇 = −2.0403 + ln (
0.0126
1 − 0.0126
) = −6.4039 
Using the modified intercept term adjusts the probabilities predicted by the model to 
more accurately reflect the actual observed rate of derailments. Based on dataset AVST, the 








𝑥𝐴𝑉𝑆𝑇 = −6.4039 + {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−1.5044,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
+ 0.00101 𝑉𝐸𝐻𝑆𝑃𝐷2 
where VEHSPD and LGVEH are described in Table 5.2. 
An ROC curve was generated by analyzing dataset AVST with equation pAVST. The area 
under the ROC curve was found to be equal to 0.8800, which is considered to be good 
discrimination. 





The intercept term is then modified to account for  pavg(ATSV) using the log-odds operator. 




𝑏𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑉 = −2.0330 + ln (
0.0058
1 − 0.0058
) = −7.1789 
Using the modified intercept term adjusts the probabilities predicted by the model to 
more accurately reflect the actual observed rate of derailments. Based on dataset ATSV, the 





𝑥𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑉 = −7.1789 + {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−1.8687,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
+ 0.0166 𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐷 
where TRNSPD and LGVEH are described in Table 5.2. 
An ROC curve was generated by analyzing dataset ATSV with equation pATSV. The area 







5.5.1. Interpretation of Model Terms – Unified Model 
The model presented in Section 5.4.1 contains four terms that indicate the effects of 
different vehicle and incident characteristics. Out of the nine variables provided in the dataset, 
the SAS LOGISTIC procedure selected four variables as providing the best fit model. Table 5.7 
summarizes the order that the terms were added to the model. It is interesting to note that no term 
was added and then removed in a subsequent step. 
 
Table 5.7: Summary of of Model Variable Selection 
 
Step Term Added Term Removed Chi-Square 
1 VEHSPD -- 109.90 
2 LGVEH -- 16.14 
3 TRNSTK -- 16.75 
4 TRNSPD -- 7.11 
  
The first term in the model, 0.0316 VEHSPD, indicates that the speed of the vehicle at 
collision affects derailment likelihood. The probability of derailment increases with higher 
vehicle speed. 
The second term in the model, {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−0.4106,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
, indicates that the type of highway 
vehicle involved in the collision affects derailment likelihood. If the highway user is a small 
vehicle such as a car, motorcycle or pickup-truck (LGVEH = N) then this term assumes a value 
of -0.4106; if the highway user is a large vehicle such as a tractor-semi-trailer or a straight truck 
(LGVEH = Y) then the term disappears and probability increases. This means that, all else equal, 




The third term in the model, {
0,                   𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾 = 𝑇𝑆𝑉
0.3822,       𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾 = 𝑉𝑆𝑇
, shows that the circumstances of 
the collision have an important effect. If the highway user strikes the train (TRNSTK = VST) then 
this term assumes a value of 0.3822; if the train strikes the highway user (TRNSTK = TSV) then 
the term disappears and probability decreases. This means that, all else equal, a collision where 
the highway vehicle strikes the train is more likely to result in a derailment. 
The final term in the model, -0.0141 TRNSPD, shows that the speed of the train at 
collision has an effect on derailment likelihood. As train speed increases, the probability of 
derailment decreases. This is the opposite of the trend observed in the univariate analysis in 
Chapter 4 and will be discussed further in Section 5.5.2 below. 
Since both TRNSTK and LGVEH are binary variables, it is possible to directly compare 
their coefficients. These coefficients suggest that the model is slightly less sensitive to incident 
type than to highway vehicle type.  Similarly, the coefficients of VEHSPD and TRNSPD can be 
compared because both are continuous variables with similar ranges. The model is slightly more 
sensitive to vehicle speed than to train speed.   
5.5.2. Interpretation of Model Terms – Split Model 
The models presented in Section 5.4.2 each contain two terms that indicate the effects of 
different vehicle and incident characteristics. Out of the nine variables provided in the dataset, 
the SAS LOGISTIC procedure selected three variables between the two models. Tables 5.8 and 
5.9 summarize the order that terms were added to the models. No term was added to the model 







Table 5.8: Summary of of Model Variable Selection – CVST 
 
Step Term Added Term Removed Chi-Square 
1 LGVEH -- 101.70 
2 VEHSPD^2 -- 54.56 
 
The first term in the model for VST incidents, {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−1.5044,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
, indicates that the 
type of highway vehicle involved in the collision affects derailment likelihood. If the highway 
user is a small vehicle (LGVEH = N) then this term assumes a value of -1.5044; if the highway 
user is a large vehicle (LGVEH = Y) then the term disappears and probability increases. This 
means that, all else equal, a collision where the highway user is a large vehicle is more likely to 
result in a derailment.  
The second term in the model, 0.00101 VEHSPD2, indicates that the speed of the vehicle 
at collision affects derailment likelihood. As vehicle speed increases, the probability of 
derailment also increases. 
 
Table 5.9: Summary of of Model Variable Selection – CTSV 
 
Step Term Added Term Removed Chi-Square 
1 LGVEH -- 223.51 
2 TRNSPD -- 4.75 
 
The first term in the model for TSV incidents, {
0,                 𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑌
−1.8687,    𝐿𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐻 = 𝑁
, indicates that the 
type of highway vehicle involved in the incident affects derailment likelihood. If the highway 
user is a small vehicle (LGVEH = N) then this term assumes a value of -1.8687; if the highway 




means that, all else equal, incidents involving large vehicles are more likely to result in a 
derailment.  
The second term in the model, 0.0166 TRNSPD, shows that the speed of the train at 
collision has an effect on derailment likelihood. As train speed increases, the probability of 
derailment increases, consistent with the work presented in Chapter 4. This is the opposite of the 
trend observed in the unified model, likely because the unified model attempted to predict two 
different trends with only one variable. 
As confirmation of the value of the split models, it is interesting to note that each has two 
factors that are logical considering the differences in physical characteristics of VST and TSV 
incidents. For VST incidents, the key factors are vehicle size and speed. For TSV incidents, the 
key factors are vehicle size and train speed.  
5.5.3. Discussion of Threshold Value 
In Section 5.4, receiving operator characteristic curves were shown for each of the 
models as a way of demonstrating the model’s ability to discriminate between derailment and 
non-derailment events. A more traditional way of demonstrating discrimination is to show the 
sensitivity (proportion of correctly identified derailments), specificity (proportion of correctly 
identified non-derailments) and correct predictions for a model, at a given threshold value, as 
shown in Tables 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6. However, the predictive accuracy of the model varies widely 
based on the threshold value selected. This threshold value is often based on the observed 
likelihood of the event, but can also be decided on as a matter of policy. For example, Table 5.3 
gives performance statistics for the retrospective model at a threshold value of 0.30. For this cut 
point the model has a percent correct, sensitivity and specificity all between 60-70%. It is 




threshold; however, this will reduce the sensitivity. In the case of derailment prediction, as a 
matter of policy it might be preferable to overestimate risk instead of underestimating it. In this 
case, it may be desirable to select a threshold with greater sensitivity, because the model will 
then correctly identify a larger percentage of derailments. 
The models presented here are capable of differentiating between collisions that are likely 
to result in derailments, and those that are not. This is an additional factor that railroads and 
communities may wish to consider when evaluating funding for grade crossing warning system 
upgrades. 
5.5.4. Model Validation 
The models in Section 5.4 were validated using data from 2011 and 2012, the two most 
recent years for which data were available. The purpose of this validation was to test the models’ 
predictive ability against unseen data, as well as to ensure that their predictive ability does not 
decline over time.  
I considered trying to validate the models by comparing the observed and expected 
number of derailments using yearly data as the observed values for number of derailments and 
the model predictions as the expected. However, I determined this is not feasible. Developing an 
expected value using the models would require selection of a cut point or threshold value, and as 
discussed in Section 5.5.3, selection of this value is essentially a policy decision based on 
tradeoffs between false positives and false negatives. To ensure identification of most derailment 
incidents, the model has a high false negative rate (compared to its false positive rate). Therefore 
the number of “expected” derailments is always going to be larger than the observed number.  
Instead, I evaluated the model’s performance by testing it against new data. The 




model trained on another dataset. The characteristics of the validation datasets are shown in 
Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10: Summary of Datasets Used For Validation 
 
Dataset Number of Derailments Number of Non-Derailments Total Number of 
Events 
AV 26 2,295 2,321 
AV-VST 7 364 371 
AV-TSV 19 1,931 1,950 
BV 26 206 232 
 
5.5.4.1. Unified Model 
For the unified model presented in Section 5.4.1, the validation was performed using 
dataset AV, which represents all of the highway-rail grade crossing collisions that occurred in 
2011 and 2012. For dataset AV, tested with the unified model, the area under the ROC curve 
(Figure 5.5) was found to be 0.7616, which shows the model has an acceptable ability to 






Figure 5.5: ROC Curve for dataset AV using the unified derailment model. 
 
The SAS software does not provide an HL test value for scored data; however, it does 
provide a Brier score. The Brier score of a dataset is a measure of goodness-of-fit; it represents 
the difference between the predicted probability and the observed response of a data point 
(Chapter 3). For the validation dataset fitted with the unified model, the Brier score is 0.0722, 
which indicates a good fit of the model. 
5.5.4.2. Split Model 
For the split model presented in Section 5.4.2, the validation was performed using 
datasets AV-VST and AV-TSV. AV-VST represents all the highway-rail grade crossing 
incidents in 2011 and 2012 where the highway user struck the train. AV-TSV represents grade 
crossing incidents where the train struck the highway user. For dataset AV-VST, tested with the 
split model for incidents where the highway user struck the train, the area under the ROC curve 




between derailment and non-derailment events. For this validation dataset, the Brier score is 
0.0501, which indicates a good fit of the model. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: ROC Curve for validation dataset AV-VST. 
 
For dataset AV-TSV, tested with the split model for incidents where the train struck the 
highway user, the area under the ROC curve was found to be 0.8384, which shows the model has 
good ability to discriminate between derailment and non-derailment events (Figure 5.7). For this 





Figure 5.7: ROC Curve for validation dataset AV-TSV. 
 
5.5.5. Model Limitations 
As with any regression model, these findings are limited by the quantity and quality of 
data available. Derailments due to grade crossing incidents are uncommon events.  Development 
of a reasonably-sized dataset of incidents required use of 20 years of data during which there 
were 312 verified derailment events. A possible concern is that factors pertinent to this 
investigation may have changed over the period encompassed by the dataset. Grade crossing 
incident rates have declined by approximately 60% since 1991. This is due in large part to 
programs such as Operation Lifesaver and changes in driver behavior, as well as crossing closure 
or reconstruction and FRA-mandated reflectorization of rolling stock (Mok and Savage, 2005; 68 
FR 215, 2003; Chaudhary et al., 2011). If the data are not homogenous over the 20-year period 




crossing incidents has decreased, the percentage of grade crossing incidents that result in 
derailment has remained approximately constant (Figure 5.8).  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Percent of grade crossing incidents that were REA-reportable collisions  
or that were derailments, 1991-2010. 
 
Interestingly, the percent of REA-reportable grade crossing incidents has increased from 
less than 3% to just over 10% in the same time period. While the reason for this increase is 
unclear, one hypothesis may be that the reporting threshold for the REA is increasing at a lesser 
rate than the actual increase in incident cost to the railroads. This would mean that a greater 
proportion of incidents are being reported every year, even though those incidents are not 
necessarily more severe. The reporting threshold is determined each year based on an equation 
developed by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA, 2014) with the threshold values 




Alternatively, this change could be due to the increase in the number of crossings that 
have active warning devices (Mok and Savage 2005). If a collision involves damage to an active 
warning system, the cost of an incident is more likely to exceed the reporting threshold because 
these systems are considerably more expensive than passive warning systems subject to damage 
in a derailment. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to assess this hypothesis, but future 
researchers could investigate it using data contained in the REA and HRA databases. These 
break down the cost of incidents into multiple categories, including “equipment damage” 
(damage to the train consist) and “track damage” (damage to the track, signals, right-of-way and 
structures). If the cost of track damage is increasing at a higher rate than the cost of equipment 
damage, it would be consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
Table 5.11: REA Reporting Thresholds, 1991-2013 (FRA, 2014) 
 
Year Threshold  Year Threshold 
1991 $ 6,300  2003 $ 6,700 
1992 $ 6,300  2004 $ 6,700 
1993 $ 6,300  2005 $ 6,700 
1994 $ 6,300  2006 $ 7,700 
1995 $ 6,300  2007 $ 8,200 
1996 $ 6,300  2008 $ 8,900 
1997 $ 6,500  2009 $ 8,900 
1998 $ 6,600  2010 $ 9,200 
1999 $ 6,600  2011 $ 9,400 
2000 $ 6,600  2012 $ 9,500 
2001 $ 6,600  2013 $ 9,900 
2002 $ 6,700    
 
Overall, the quality of the data is good. There are some errors and inconsistencies 
between the REA and HRA databases, but in general it is a relatively simple matter to identify 
and correct these errors. There are sufficient data so incomplete or incorrect records can be 




derailment. It was assumed that the majority of derailment events are recorded in the REA 
database. This claim can be partially verified for incidents occurring between 1997 and 2010. 
Beginning in 1997, a narrative field was added to the HRA database. In most instances of 
derailment, the person filing the report used this field to mention that a derailment had occurred. 
Therefore, even though there is no derailment variable in the HRA database, derailment 
information could sometimes be extracted. Through this method, nine grade crossing derailments 
were found in the HRA database that were not reported in the REA database, probably because 
they did not exceed the REA damage threshold. There were 312 grade-crossing caused 
derailments during the same interval, indicating that the majority of derailment events have been 
captured in this analysis. However, it would be useful if the HRA database started tracking 
derailments as well. 
 
5.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter described development of a model to predict derailment rates at highway rail 
grade crossings involving freight trains using logistic regression modeling. Results show that 
four of the nine analyzed factors are important to the model: incident type, highway vehicle type, 
highway vehicle speed and train speed. Two separate models were developed: a simpler one 










This chapter focuses on development of a model that estimates the probability of a grade 
crossing collision resulting in either a passenger or freight train derailment, based on a variety of 
characteristics of the collision. The previous chapter developed statistical models for freight 
trains, but the goal was to expand the model to work with passenger trains as well. While most 
crossings in the US do not have freight trains, a large number have a combination of freight and 
passenger trains, so being able to model the derailment likelihood of both will better represent 
risk at the crossing, and enhance the utility of the model in other ways as well. 
 
6.2. JOINT FREIGHT-PASSENGER MODEL 
Due to the relative lack of data on grade-crossing-caused derailments of passenger trains, 
it was difficult to develop an independent model capable of accurately predicting this type of 
incident. Only 62 derailments involving passenger trains have occurred in the past 20 years, 
meaning that there is insufficient information to model the interaction of four (or more) factors. 
Therefore, I pursued an alternate approach in which freight and passenger data were combined 
into one model.  
The original motivation for separating freight and passenger data was twofold. Passenger 
and freight trains differ in their physical and operational characteristics and it was believed that 
limiting variation in the dataset would improve the accuracy of exploratory analysis and 
modeling. Second, I had already found that freight and passenger trains have different likelihood 




freight trains result in derailment, 1.2% of passenger train collisions result in derailment. 
Therefore, passenger trains are almost twice as likely to derail as freight trains. This difference in 
rate implied an inherent difference in derailment likelihood for passenger and freight trains.  
Passenger trains differ from freight trains in three key ways: they generally operate at 
higher speeds, are considerably shorter in length, and use lighter-weight rolling stock. The 
freight analysis showed that derailment likelihood was dependent on three physical factors: the 
size (or weight) and speed of the highway vehicle, and the speed of the train. By adding 
consideration of rolling stock weight and train length – the remaining factors from the physical 
description of derailments from Chapter 1 – to the model, it could be possible to combine the 
freight and passenger datasets.  
Combining freight and passenger data into one model has multiple benefits. First, by 
providing more data, it increases the power of the statistical models. Second, considering the 
impact of rail equipment type and weight improves understanding of the effect these factors have 
on derailment occurrence. Last, a joint freight-passenger model is more useful to practitioners, 
since many crossings in the U.S. have both freight and passenger traffic. A combined model will 
more accurately portray risk at these crossings. 
 
6.3. METHODOLOGY 
6.3.1. Database Development and Candidate Variables 
Three FRA databases were used in the analysis described in this chapter: the Rail 
Equipment Accident/Incident database, the Highway Rail Accident (HRA) database, and the 
Grade Crossing Inventory (GCI). Data for all U.S. mainline railroads (both freight and 




events shown in Table 6.1 is less than the numbers used in Chapter 5. This is because inclusion 
of the train length and railroad equipment type factors required additional fields to have 
information in the HRA database. Due to a combination of missing data and the elimination of 
unclear data, there are approximately 10,000 fewer records in this analysis than the previous 
analysis. However, this leaves over 30,000 records for analysis, and there is no reason to suspect 
there is bias to the removed records. 
 









VST – Passenger 6 393 399 
VST – Freight 91 6,550 6,641 
TSV-S – Passenger 17 1,273 1,290 
TSV-S – Freight 43 9,975 10,018 
TSV-M – Passenger 16 1,400 1,416 
TSV-M – Freight 98 13,513 13,611 
 
The goal of this chapter is to develop a statistical model to predict the probability of a 
highway-rail grade crossing collision resulting in a derailment, regardless of whether the train is 
a passenger or freight train. The model has a binary response variable: either there is a 
derailment or there is not. A variety of input variables were considered that described physical 
characteristics of the grade crossing as well as accident-related factors. The input variables were 





Table 6.2: Definition of Model Variables 
 
Variable Name Definition Variable Type Range of Values 
VS Highway vehicle 
estimated speed in mph 
Continuous Range*: 0-79 mph 
Average*: 9.53 mph 
Standard Deviation*: 11.94 
TS Train speed in mph Continuous Range*: 0-106 mph 
Average*: 51.16 mph 
Standard Deviation*: 23.02 
LV Was a large highway 
vehicle involved? 
Binary N if no;  
Y if yes 
IT Incident type (Did train 
strike highway user?) 
Categorical VST if highway user struck train;  
TSV-S if train struck stationary 
highway user;  
TSV-M if train struck moving 
highway user 
EC Equipment class Categorical FC if freight railcar;  
FL if freight locomotive;  
PC if passenger railcar;  
PL if passenger locomotive 
TL Train length Continuous Range*: 1-217 
Average*: 54.85 
Standard Deviation*: 39.46 
TC FRA track class Categorical 0-9 (0 represents X) 
WS Crossing warning 
interconnected with 
highway signals 
Categorical 1 if yes; 
2 if no;  
3 if unknown 
VIEW Was the driver’s view 
of the track obstructed? 
Binary N if not obstructed; Y if 
obstructed  
PUBLIC Did the collision occur 
at a public crossing? 
Binary Y if public; N if private 
XTYPE Type of warning device 
at crossing 
Categorical 1: gates 









Incident type, train speed, highway vehicle speed and vehicle type – the factors in the 
freight model from Chapter 5 – were also expected to be factors in the joint passenger-freight 
model. The effect of train mass was added and represented as two variables – train length (TL) 
and equipment class (EC). Track class, crossing visibility, type of warning device and 
accessibility of crossing (public or private) were considered in the model, as they were in the 
freight-only model. Second-order interaction and polynomial effects were considered for the 
continuous variables, as well as interactions for the categorical variables. 
While the quality of the HRA and REA databases is excellent overall, some records were 
either internally inconsistent or had missing data. Additionally, some fields were re-coded to 
make them easier to use in the model (see data cleanup procedure in Appendix A). 
During the analysis process the inclusion of “auto trains” in the FRA databases became 
apparent and led to some confounding results. Auto trains are a special Amtrak service that only 
operates in the eastern United States. These trains are unique in that they are a mix of passenger 
and freight equipment. They are substantially different from other passenger trains in several 
respects, notably their much longer length and auto-carrying railcars (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Example of Amtrak Auto Train. 




Therefore, they cannot be simply classified as either passenger or freight. Because of 
their mixture of characteristics, I excluded them from the analysis by removing any records for 
passenger trains with more than 31 rail vehicles in the consist. This threshold is an assumption 
based on information in the narrative fields of the REA database, indicating that some trains 
were auto trains. In regular service today, it is unlikely for a passenger train to have more than 20 
rail vehicles in the consist. Trains from the HRA and REA databases with between 20 and 30 rail 
vehicles were mostly part of Amtrak’s “Mail and Express” service in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. The service has since been discontinued, but these records were left in the dataset because 
the mail cars had similar characteristics to other passenger cars. 
6.3.2. Statistical Modeling Technique 
The model was developed using the LOGISTIC procedure in the Statistical Analysis 
Software (SAS) program, as described in Chapter 3. Based on the lessons learned during 
development of the freight models, I began with two models based on incident type – one each 
for VST and TSV incidents. After further consideration and analysis, I subdivided the TSV 
incidents into two categories based on whether the highway vehicle was moving or not. These 
two categories are TSV-S (train strikes stopped vehicle) and TSV-M (train strikes moving 
vehicle). About 43% of TSV incidents involve vehicles that are stopped on the crossing. The 
impact forces associated with a stopped vehicle are different than those involving a moving 
vehicle. It seemed plausible that this might mask the true effect of highway vehicle speed when 
conducting statistical regression. The same problem did not exist for VST incidents, since by 
definition the highway vehicle is moving and very few (less than five out of the whole database) 




As with the freight models, I adjusted for the underrepresentation of derailment events in 
the overall dataset using the “rare events logistic regression” (RELR) technique (discussed in 
Chapter 3).  
 
6.4. RESULTS 
6.4.1. VST Incidents 
Of the derailment incidents reported in the REA database, 97 involved incidents in which 
the highway vehicle struck the train. To use RELR, 194 non-derailment incidents were randomly 
selected from the portion of the HRA database involving VST incidents. Combining 97 
derailment and 194 non-derailment incidents gives me a model dataset with a ratio of 1:2 events 
to non-events.  
Initially, selection within the set of VST non-derailment incidents was done completely 
randomly. This resulted in selections that were not representative of the true ratio of different rail 
vehicle types in the population because incidents involving passenger rail vehicles are so rare. Of 
the VST records, 30% involved a freight car, 64% involved a freight locomotive, 1% involved a 
passenger car, and 5% involved a passenger locomotive. Thus, 59 freight car incidents, 124 
freight locomotive incidents, 2 passenger car incidents, and 9 passenger locomotive incidents 
were randomly selected to compile the model dataset of 194 non-derailment incidents. Repeating 
this process generated four different model datasets. Regression on each of them developed four 
models that performed similarly well and selected the same factors for the model, but one had 
the best fit statistics.  








𝑥𝑉𝑆𝑇 = −2.0204 + 0.0607 𝑉𝑆 + {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−1.5458,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
 + {
1.8213,          𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶
0.0648, 𝐸𝐶 = 𝐹𝐶
0,                    𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐿
−1.3087,        𝐸𝐶 = 𝐹𝐿
 (1) 
(s.e.) (0.4179) (0.0099) (0.2081) (0.7159; 0.3589; 0.3737)1  
where VS, LV, and EC are as described in Table 6.2. 
This model provided the best fit to the data, with a Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) goodness-
of-fit test result of 0.7222. Values closer to 1 indicate good model fit, and values closer to 0 
indicate poor fit. This model also has the ability to discriminate between derailment and non-
derailment events, as measured by the ROC curve (Figure 6.2). Generally, a model is considered 
to provide good discrimination if the ROC value is greater than 0.8. The area under the ROC 
curve for this result is 0.9011. 
                                                 
1 These standard errors correspond to the difference between each of the EC categories and the “baseline category”, 






Figure 6.2: ROC Curve for retrospective model. Area under the curve is equal to 0.9011. 
 
Additional performance statistics for this model are given in Table 6.3. For these values, 
the threshold value for predicting a derailment was a p value of 0.3. If the calculated value of  p  
for a data point was greater than 0.3, it was classified as predicting a derailment, and if it was 
less than 0.3, it was classified as predicting no derailment. 
 
Table 6.3: Performance Statistics for Retrospective Model 
 
Statistic Cases 




In this model, the intercept term (b = -2.0204) is based on the average probability of a 




to account for the average rate of derailment in the actual population of all grade crossing 
collisions. This is accomplished by altering the intercept term to account for the 20-year average 
likelihood of a VST derailment occurring. For the total VST population, the average derailment 





The intercept term is then modified to account for pall VST using the log-odds operator (6). 
𝑏𝑉𝑆𝑇 = 𝑏 + ln (
𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑆𝑇
1 − 𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑆𝑇
) 
𝑏𝑉𝑆𝑇 = −2.0204 + ln (
0.0138
1 − 0.0138
) = −6.2912 
Using the modified intercept term adjusts the probabilities predicted by the model to 




𝑒−𝑥𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑆𝑇 + 1
 
𝑥𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑆𝑇 = −6.2912 + 0.0607 𝑉𝑆 + {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−1.5458,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
 + {
1.8213,          𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶
0.0648, 𝐸𝐶 = 𝐹𝐶
0,                    𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐿
−1.3087,        𝐸𝐶 = 𝐹𝐿
 (2) 
(s.e.) (2.1921) (0.0197) (0.3522) (0.0195)  
where VS, LV, and EC are as described in Table 6.2. 
An ROC curve was generated by analyzing the total population dataset with equation  
pall VST (Figure 6.3). The area under the ROC curve was 0.9056, which indicates good 
discrimination. Additionally, model performance was quantified using the Brier score. This 





Figure 6.3: ROC Curve for dataset VST. Area under the ROC curve is equal to 0.9056. 
 
In addition to these traditional techniques, the model was tested to see how it performed 
at ranking incidents by derailment likelihood, and whether this ranking corresponded to whether 
a derailment actually occurred. This technique has the advantage of being independent of the 
selected threshold value. To do this, all VST incidents in the HRA database were ranked by their 
pall VST value as calculated by the model, from least likely to most likely to derail. The dataset was 
divided into quintiles and the number of derailments in each quintile were counted (Table 6.4). 
 






Percent of Actual 
Derailments in Quintile 
1 (least likely to derail) 0 – 1,408 0 0% 
2 1,409 – 2,816 1 1.03% 
3 2,817 – 4,224 7 7.22% 
4 4,225 – 5,632 12 12.37% 




 Since approximately 80% of actual derailment incidents were ranked in the 5th quintile, 
the model was good at identifying derailment incidents. If, for example, grade crossing decision 
makers ranked all crossings by derailment likelihood and chose to focus their efforts on the top 
20%, they would likely capture 80% of all derailments.  
6.4.2. TSV-S Incidents 
Of the derailment incidents reported in the REA database, 60 involved incidents where 
the train struck a stationary (VS = 0) highway vehicle. To use RELR, 120 non-derailment 
incidents were randomly selected from the portion of the HRA database involving TSV-S 
incidents. Combining 60 derailment and 120 non-derailment incidents results in a model dataset 
with a ratio of 1:2 events to non-events.  
Selection within the set of TSV-S non-derailment incidents was random. The ratio of 
incidents involving freight and passenger rail vehicles was the same in the randomly selected 
development dataset as in the overall population. Approximately 11% of TSV-S incidents 
involved passenger trains. Unlike the VST case, it is not critical (and not possible) to 
differentiate between locomotives and railcars, because in TSV incidents less than a tenth of one 
percent (0.07%) involved a railcar. This is to be expected given that most freight trains have a 
locomotive in the lead position. The dataset generation process was repeated to yield four 
different model datasets. Then a regression was run on each of them to develop four models. The 
four models performed similarly well and all selected the same factors, but one had the best fit 
statistics.  








𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 = −5.2729 + 0.0893 𝑇𝑆 + 0.0362 𝑇𝐿 −0.00075 𝑇𝑆×𝑇𝐿 + {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−1.5458,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
 (3) 
(s.e.) (1.2119) (0.0231) (0.0139) (0.0003) (0.2548)  
where TS, TL, and LV are described in Table 6.2. 
This model had an HL test result of 0.8535 and an area under the ROC curve of 0.8688 




Figure 6.4: ROC Curve for TSV-S retrospective model. Area under the curve is  
equal to 0.8688. 
 
Table 6.5: Performance Statistics for Retrospective Model 
 
Statistic Cases 






The intercept term (b = -5.2729) needs to be adjusted in the prospective model to account 
for the average rate of derailment in the population of all grade crossing collisions. For the 





The intercept term is modified to account for pall TSV-S using the log-odds operator. 
𝑏𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 = 𝑏 + ln (
𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆
1 − 𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆
) 
𝑏𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 = −5.2729 + ln (
0.0053
1 − 0.0053
) = −10.5065 





𝑥𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 = −10.5065 + 0.0893 𝑇𝑆 + 0.0362 𝑇𝐿 −0.00075 𝑇𝑆×𝑇𝐿 + {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−1.5458,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
 (4) 
where TS, TL, and LV are as described in Table 6.2. 
The area under the ROC curve for the total population dataset was 0.8790, which is 






Figure 6.5 ROC Curve for dataset TSV-S. Area under the ROC curve is equal to 0.8790. 
 
I ranked all TSV-S incidents by their pall TSV-S value calculated by the model, from least 
likely to most likely to derail. I then divided the dataset into quintiles and counted how many 
actual derailments occurred in each quintile (Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6: Performance of TSV-S Model Based on Ranking 
 
Quintile Assigned Rank 
Actual 
Derailments 
Percent of Actual 
Derailments in Quintile 
1 (least likely to derail) 0 – 2,261 0 0% 
2 2,262 – 4,522 1 1.67% 
3 4,523 – 6,783 2 3.33% 
4 6,784 – 9,044 10 16.67% 





Since approximately 80% of actual derailment incidents were ranked in the 5th quintile, 
the model did a good job identifying derailment incidents.  
6.4.3. TSV-M Incidents 
Of the derailment incidents reported in the REA database, 114 involved incidents where 
the train struck a moving (VS > 0) highway vehicle. To use RELR, 228 non-derailment incidents 
were selected from the portion of the HRA database involving TSV-M incidents. Combining 114 
derailment and 228 non-derailment incidents gave a model dataset with a ratio of 1:2 events to 
non-events.  
Selection within the set of TSV-M non-derailment incidents was random. The ratio of 
incidents involving freight and passenger rail vehicles was the same in the randomly selected 
development dataset as the overall population. Approximately 11% of TSV-M incidents involved 
passenger trains. As with TSV-S incidents, it is not critical to differentiate between locomotives 
and railcars. The dataset generation process was repeated to generate four different model 
datasets, then a regression was run on each of them to develop four models. The four models 
performed similarly well and selected the same factors for the model, but one had the best fit 
statistics.  





𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉𝑁𝑍 = −3.2144 + 0.0243 𝑉𝑆 + 0.0233 𝑇𝑆 + {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−2.2628,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
 (5) 
(s.e.) (0.5574) (0.0117) (0.0086) (0.3666)  




This model provided the best fit to the data, with an HL goodness-of-fit test result of 
0.9152 and an area under the ROC curve of 0.8438 (Figure 6.6). Additional performance 
statistics for this model are given in Table 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.6: ROC Curve for TSV-M retrospective model. Area under the curve is  
equal to 0.8438. 
 
Table 6.7: Performance Statistics for Retrospective Model 
 
Statistic Cases 




The intercept term (b = -3.2144) needs to be adjusted in the prospective model to account 
for the average derailment rate in the population of all grade crossing collisions. For the total 








The intercept term is then modified to account for pall TSV-M using the log-odds operator. 
𝑏𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀 = 𝑏 + ln (
𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀
1 − 𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀
) 
𝑏𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀 = −3.2144 + ln (
0.0076
1 − 0.0076
) = −8.0882 





𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀 = −8.0882 + 0.0243 𝑉𝑆 + 0.0233 𝑇𝑆 + {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−2.2628,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
 (6) 
where VS, TS, and LV are as described in Table 6.2. 
The area under the ROC curve created by evaluating all records with pall TSV-M was 
0.8625, which indicates good discrimination (Figure 6.7). The model has a Brier score of 0.1038. 
 





All TSV-M incidents in the model development dataset were ranked by their pall TSV-M 
value calculated by the model, from least likely to most likely to derail. The dataset was divided 
into quintiles and the actual derailments occurring in each quintile were counted (Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8: Performance of TSV-M Model Based on Ranking 
 
Quintile Assigned Rank 
Actual 
Derailments 
Percent of Actual 
Derailments in Quintile 
1 (least likely to derail) 0 – 3,006 0 0% 
2 3,007 – 6,012 1 0.88% 
3 6,013 – 9,018 0 0% 
4 9,019 – 12,024 0 0% 
5 (most likely to derail) 12,025 – 15,027 113 99.12% 
 
Since nearly 100% of actual derailment incidents were ranked in the 5th quintile, the 
model did a good job identifying derailment incidents.  
6.4.4. Model Validation 
To verify that the models developed based on data from 1991-2010 were valid for 
incidents outside the study period, data from incidents between 2011-2015 were tested to see 
where derailment incidents would end up in the ranking. The same technique used to develop 
Tables 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8 was used to analyze the model’s performance with the recent data. For 
each of the three incident types, at least 73% of the derailments that occurred between 2011 and 
2015 ranked in the fifth quintile (incidents with the highest conditional probability of 
derailment). These results showed that the model performs as well for more recent incidents as it 






Table 6.9: Performance Metrics for Validation Dataset (2011-2015) 
 
 VST (n = 1,150)  TSV-S (n = 2,578)  TSV-M (n = 2,553) 
AUC 0.9014   0.8935   0.8762 














1 0   0                  0 0  0 0 
2 0 0  0 0  0 0 
3 1 4.34  0 0  1 3.85 
4 5 21.74  3 21.43  6 23.08 
5 17 73.92  11 78.57  19 73.07 
 
6.5. DISCUSSION 
6.5.1. Interpretation of Model Terms 
Considered together, the models presented above contain five terms indicating the effects 
of different vehicle and accident characteristics. A sixth characteristic, incident type, is 
accounted for by developing three separate models (one for VST and two for TSV incidents). 
The SAS LOGISTIC procedure, using stepwise selection, chose three independent variables for 
the VST model, three independent variables and an interaction term for the TSV-S model, and 
three independent variables for the TSV-M model.  
6.5.1.1. VST Incidents  
The first term in the VST model (Equation 2), 0.0607 𝑉𝑆, indicates that the speed of the 
vehicle at collision affects derailment likelihood. As vehicle speed increases, the probability of 
derailment also increases, consistent with the univariate analysis (Chapter 4) and the findings for 
freight incidents (Chapter 5). The standard error is less than the value of the coefficient, so while 
the exact value of the coefficient may vary, the effect is always positive, meaning that increased 




The second term in the model, {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−1.5458,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
, indicates that the type of highway 
vehicle involved in the collision affects derailment likelihood. If the highway user is a small 
vehicle such as a car, motorcycle or pickup-truck (LGVEH = N) then this term assumes a value 
of -1.5458; if the highway user is a large vehicle such as a tractor-semi-trailer or a straight truck 
(LGVEH = Y) then the term disappears. This means that, all else equal, a collision involving a 
large highway vehicle is more likely to result in a derailment. This result is consistent with the 
findings described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The third and final term in the model, {
1.8213,          𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶
0.0648,          𝐸𝐶 = 𝐹𝐶
0,                    𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐿
−1.3087,        𝐸𝐶 = 𝐹𝐿
, shows the effect of 
equipment class on derailment likelihood. As the coefficients become more positive, derailment 
likelihood increases. Incidents involving passenger railcars (PC) are more likely to result in 
derailment than those involving freight railcars (FC), which in turn are more likely to result in 
derailment than those involving passenger locomotives (PL), which in turn are more likely to 
result in derailment than those involving freight locomotives (FL). This trend is consistent with 
the hypothesis that lighter rail equipment is more likely to derail than heavier rail equipment. It 
should be noted that the confidence intervals of the estimates for freight railcars and passenger 
locomotives overlap, meaning it is statistically uncertain if there is a difference between these 
two equipment classes. This overlap was observed in all four of the candidate models, suggesting 
it is not an artifact of this particular dataset. The overlap may be explained by the wide range in 
freight car weight. A loaded freight railcar can weigh five times as much as an empty one. When 
unloaded, the average freight railcar is lighter than the average passenger locomotive, but the 




whether the railcar was loaded or empty (unlike the REA, which does provide this information); 
therefore it was not possible to distinguish between loaded and empty freight cars. 
6.5.1.2. TSV-S Incidents 
The first term in the TSV-S model (Equation 4), 0.0893 𝑇𝑆, indicates that the speed of the 
train at collision affects derailment likelihood. As train speed increases, the probability of 
derailment also increases, consistent with the univariate analysis (Chapter 4) and the findings for 
freight incidents (Chapter 5). The standard error is less than the value of the coefficient, so while 
the exact value of the coefficient can vary, the effect is always positive; increased train speed 
increases derailment likelihood. 
The second term in the model, 0.0362 𝑇𝐿, indicates that there is a relationship between 
train length and derailment likelihood. As the length of the train increases, so does derailment 
likelihood. Since the standard error is less than the coefficient, the effect is positive. 
The third term in the model, −0.00075 𝑇𝑆×𝑇𝐿, is an interaction effect between train 
speed and train length. This indicates that at higher train speeds, the likelihood of derailment 
decreases with longer train length; or, alternatively, for longer trains, the likelihood of derailment 
decreases with increased speed. To fully understand the effect of train speed and train length, it is 
necessary to consider the first, second and third terms collectively. The effect of these two 
variables on derailment likelihood was investigated in two ways. First, derailment likelihood was 
plotted as a function of train length for different train speeds (all other factors were held 
constant) (Figure 6.8 (a)). Second, it was plotted as a function of train speed for different train 










Figure 6.8: Illustration of the interaction effect of first, second and third terms for TSV-S 
model, with (a) derailment likelihood as a function of train length, and (b) derailment 
likelihood as a function of train speed. 
 
The final term in the model, {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−1.5733,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
, indicates that the type of highway 




vehicle such as a car or pickup-truck (LGVEH = N) then this term assumes a value of -1.5733; if 
the highway user is a large vehicle such as a tractor-semi-trailer or a straight truck (LGVEH = Y) 
then the term disappears. Ceteris paribus, a collision where the highway user is a large vehicle is 
more likely to result in a derailment, consistent with the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
6.5.1.3. TSV-M Incidents 
The first term in the TSV-M model (Equation 6), 0.0243 𝑉𝑆, indicates that the speed of 
the vehicle at collision affects derailment likelihood. As vehicle speed increases, the probability 
of derailment also increases, consistent with the univariate analysis (Chapter 4) and the findings 
for freight incidents (Chapter 5). The standard error is less than the value of the coefficient, so 
while the exact value of the coefficient can vary, the effect is always positive, so increased 
vehicle speed increases derailment likelihood. 
The second term in the model, 0.0233 TS, indicates that the speed of the train at collision 
affects derailment likelihood. As train speed increases, the probability of derailment also 
increases, consistent with Chapters 4 and 5. The standard error is less than the value of the 
coefficient, so although the exact value of the coefficient can vary, the effect is positive, so 
increased train speed increases derailment likelihood. 
The final term in the model, {
0,                 𝐿𝑉 = 𝑌
−2.2628,    𝐿𝑉 = 𝑁
, indicates that the type of highway 
vehicle involved in the collision affects derailment likelihood. If the highway user is a small 
vehicle (LGVEH = N) then this term assumes a value of -2.2628; if the highway user is a large 
vehicle (LGVEH = Y) then the term disappears. This means that, all else equal, a collision where 
the highway user is a large vehicle is more likely to result in a derailment, consistent with 




6.5.2. Model Limitations 
As with any model, these findings are limited by the quantity and quality of data 
available. Derailments due to grade crossing collisions are uncommon events, and despite their 
higher rate of occurrence given an incident, passenger train derailments are especially 
uncommon.  Development of a reasonably-sized dataset of accidents required use of 20 years of 
data during which there were 56 verified derailments involving passenger trains. 
Overall, the quality of the data is good. As with development of the freight model, there 
are some errors and inconsistencies between the REA and HRA databases, but in general it is a 
simple matter to identify and correct these errors. There are sufficient data that incomplete or 
internally-inconsistent records can be dropped if they cannot be corrected.  
Clean-up for the passenger dataset differed from the freight data in one major aspect – the 
inclusion of “auto-trains”, which contain a combination of passenger and freight railcars. These 
are unusual trains that only run on one rail line in the US, and are much longer than typical 
passenger trains. Due to their mixture of freight and passenger train characteristics, they were 
removed from the dataset to eliminate the additional variance they would introduce. Therefore, 
this model will not necessarily represent derailment likelihood at crossings with auto-trains.  
 
6.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter explored the development of a set of models to predict derailment rates for 
both freight and passenger trains at highway-rail grade crossings using logistic regression 
analysis. Three regression models were ultimately developed based on incident type – one each 
for incidents where the vehicle strikes the train, incidents where a train strikes a stopped vehicle, 




five factors are important to derailment prediction: highway vehicle type, highway vehicle speed, 
train length, rail equipment type, and train speed. The key factors varied for each of the three 
regression models in ways that are consistent with expectations given the physical forces for 
each incident type. 
The next chapter will explore a set of proxy variables that were developed to relate the 
key factors found in these logistic regression models to crossing characteristics. This will allow 
the incident-specific models developed in this chapter to be adapted into a crossing-specific 





CHAPTER 7: MODEL APPLICATION AND PROXY DEVELOPMENT 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Use of the joint freight-passenger train derailment likelihood model to estimate 
derailment probability based on crossing characteristics is described in this chapter. While 
Chapter 5 developed an incident-specific model, a crossing-specific model is more useful 
because it can be used to inform decisions about which grade crossings to upgrade to reduce 
derailment likelihood. To adapt the model, it is necessary to identify characteristics of the 
crossing that correlate with the physical properties of the incident identified in the previous 
chapters. These crossing characteristics are called “proxy variables” to identify their function as 
a bridge between the incident- and crossing-specific models. For each incident-specific variable 
used in the model, a crossing-specific variable (or variables) will be investigated as a proxy. 
Having defined these proxies, Chapter 8 will demonstrate how this information can be combined 
into a “derailment likelihood calculator”, used to calculate a distribution of derailment 
likelihoods and/or expected values of derailment likelihood.  
To develop a model that can rank crossings by their derailment risk, the first step is to 
understand if the physical characteristics of a crossing can be used as proxy variables for the 
incident-specific variables used in this analysis. For example, knowing that derailment likelihood 
increases with increased vehicle speed is not necessarily useful unless highway vehicle speed at 






This chapter uses data from two FRA databases: the Highway Rail Accident (HRA) 
database, and the U.S. DOT Grade Crossing Inventory (GCI). For each incident in the HRA 
database, the GCI record that was current at the time of the incident was extracted. The GCI is a 
historical record, and as such contains multiple records for each grade crossing. This information 
includes posted highway speed limit, type of crossing warning device in use, and other 
characteristics. Crossing-specific information such as this is subject to change over time. The 
GCI is supposed to be updated each time conditions change at the crossing (such as adding a gate 
or increased train service, etc.); therefore, when relating information from the HRA database to 
the GCI, it is important to select the GCI record that was in effect at the time of the HRA 
incident. This was done by selecting the GCI record whose effective and end dates bracket the 
incident date from the HRA.  
To develop the proxy relationships, data were needed for a number of variables. Due to 
incomplete information (in the GCI, especially), the number of useable records were often less 
than those used to develop the incident-level models. In practice, the data in the GCI are 
irregularly entered and sometimes contain reporting errors. A data set for each proxy variable 
was developed that contained only records with complete information for the variable under 
study. As a result, the size of datasets differ from variable to variable. 
The inventory records used may not be representative of all grade crossings. There may 
be reasons that inventory data were collected for some crossings and not for others. For example, 
more complete data may be provided by some states than others. If this is the case, there could be 




prioritize data collection at crossings with high traffic or that are otherwise of greater concern. 
This could bias results towards these “high impact” crossings. 
 
7.3. ANALYSIS 
7.3.1. Proxy for Highway Vehicle Speed 
7.3.1.1. Deviation from Posted Highway Speed 
For each record with both a valid vehicle speed and highway speed limit, a value that 
compares the collision speed of the vehicle to the posted highway speed limit was calculated. 
This value was defined as the “percent deviation from posted highway speed limit” (PDHSL), as 
follows: 
% 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 =
𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑
 
The distribution of PDHSL was plotted (Figure 7.1). A value of -100% means the vehicle 
was stopped on the crossing. A value of 0% means the vehicle was traveling at the posted speed 
limit. A value of 100% means the vehicle was traveling at twice the posted speed limit. Less than 
0.2% of all incidents occurred with the vehicle traveling more than twice the posted speed limit, 






Figure 7.1: Probability mass distribution of percent deviation from  
posted highway speed. 
 
In cases where the train struck the vehicle, about 47% of incidents involved a vehicle that 
was stopped on a crossing (Figure 7.1). Otherwise, moving vehicles were more likely to strike 
the train than be struck by the train, irrespective of speed.  
7.3.1.2. Highway Classification and Warning Device 
In addition to varying by highway speed limit and incident type, highway vehicle speed 
may vary by highway classification and warning device. Highway classification is based on 
annual average daily traffic (AADT) and is correlated with posted speed limit, so the speed 
distribution would be expected to vary depending on highway type. A benefit to using highway 
classification instead of posted speed limit is that more records in the GCI have reported values 




The second factor, warning device, varies from “none”, to “crossbuck only” for passive 
crossings, through bells, flashers, standard gates, and four-quad gates for active crossings 
(Appendix C). Vehicle speed might be expected to vary somewhat based on warning device type. 
Gates provide a physical impediment that is intended to force motorists to slow down or stop. 
Flashers or bells alone alert motorists to the possibility of a train but do not “force” them to stop 
in the same manner as gates. Motorist speeds at passive crossings with crossbucks might be even 
higher because the crossbuck provides no warning of an approaching train. Some motorists 
might not know how to respond to the sign, or become accustomed to never seeing a train at a 
particular crossing and ignore it. Speed distributions might follow the typical speed distributions 
for each highway class, which are normally distributed with a certain mean (TRB, 1998); 
however, for grade crossing collision speeds, none of the distributions were normally distributed 
(Appendix D).  
The GCI database defines nine types of warning devices (WDCODE). Of these, 
categories 1 (“none”) and 9 (“four-quad gates”) were excluded because both of these were rare in 
the database, so it was not possible to develop adequate distributions for them. Furthermore, they 
are sufficiently different from other warning device types that it did not seem appropriate to 
group them together, so they were excluded from the analysis. The remaining seven categories 
were grouped into three larger categories based on similarities in physical characteristics and 
statistical distributions. The three groups are: 
“Passive”:  WDCODEs 2 (“other signs/signals”), 3 (“crossbucks”) and 4 (“stopsigns”) 
“Other Active”:  WDCODEs 5 (“special active devices”), 6 (“highway signals, wig wags, 
 bells”) and 7 (“flashing lights”) 




Similarly, when considering highway class, the GCI uses 12 classes, of which six are for 
rural roads and six are for urban roads (Appendix E). They range from interstates to local roads 
for the two land use types. Again, due to problems of data scarcity and simplification, some 
classes were excluded from the analysis and others were grouped together. Records labeled as 
“interstate”, both rural (HWYCLASS 1) and urban (HWYCLASS 11) were excluded. There 
were little data in those categories since grade crossings on true interstate highways are rare. The 
remaining groups are rural arterial, rural collector, rural local, urban arterial, urban collector, and 
urban local. 
This yields a 3 x 7 matrix of speed distributions for each of two incident types (VST and 
TSV-M), for a total of 42 distributions. The challenge was to balance the risk of overfitting the 
data versus accurately representing the probable incident speed distribution. With these 
categories, each cell in the speed distribution has a minimum of 100 records. 
7.3.2. Proxy for Train Speed 
7.3.2.1. Deviation from Timetable Speed 
Similar to the analysis of vehicle speed, for each record with both a valid train speed and 
timetable speed, a value was calculated that compares the collision speed of the train to the 
timetable speed on the rail line. This value, which will be called “percent deviation from 
timetable speed” (PDTTS) is defined as: 
 
% 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 =







Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of PDTTS. A value of -100% means the train was 
stopped on the crossing. A value of 0% means the train was traveling at the timetable speed. A 
value of 100% means the train was traveling at twice the timetable speed. While some trains 
(less than 1%) were reported to be traveling more than twice the timetable speed, these records 
were excluded from analysis because they are probably the result of reporting errors. For the 
most part, these records reported a timetable speed of 0 or 1 mph, which is implausible. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Probability mass distribution of percent deviation from timetable speed. 
 
Most trains were traveling near the timetable speed when the collision occurred (Figure 
7.2). Interestingly, no trains were stopped on the crossing at the time of collision. About 8% of 
incidents involved a train traveling in excess of the timetable speed. If true, this represents about 
150 over-speed incidents over 20 years of operation. These incidents are more likely to be 




While some of these events are confirmed over-speed incidents, many are probably reporting 
errors. This could be determined on a case-by-case basis if data regarding the particular timetable 
in effect at the time of the incident were obtained from the railroad. 
7.3.2.2. As a Function of Track Class and Equipment Type 
To further refine the predictive ability of the model, train speed was examined as a 
function of FRA incident type, track class and train type (freight vs. passenger). Train collision 
speed data from the HRA database were sorted into ten-mile-per-hour bins and plotted to 
determine the distribution of train speeds (Figure 7.3, Table G.1) (see Table 1.1 for track class 
speeds). Attempts to fit common statistical distributions to these data were inconclusive; 












Figure 7.3: CDF of train speeds, showing freight and passenger train incidents  
for FRA track classes 1 through 6 for (1) TSV-S incidents and (b) TSV-M incidents. Note: 
The speed distribution for class 1 passenger trains was developed using reported maximum 





7.3.3. Proxy for Highway Vehicle Type 
7.3.3.1. Percent Truck Traffic 
It was hypothesized that crossings with greater truck traffic are more likely to have train-
truck collisions. This was tested using the GCI data for the percentage truck traffic at crossings 
to quantify the number of trucks expected. 
Figure 7.4 shows the distribution of percent truck traffic (PTT) for cases that did or did 
not involve a large highway vehicle. A t-test comparing the two distributions showed a small, but 
statistically significant (p = 0.0113, α = 0.025) difference between the likelihood of large vehicle 
involvement based on percent truck traffic at the crossing. Specifically, the likelihood that an 
incident will involve a truck is greater for crossings with a higher percentage of truck traffic.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Distribution of Percent Truck Traffic for incidents  




Overall, it appears that there is a relationship between percent truck traffic and the 
likelihood of an incident involving a truck; however, the relationship is not strong enough to help 
predict this likelihood. Attempts were made to develop a series of models of vehicle size using 
logistic regression (since vehicle size has been defined here as a binary variable, large or small). 
This model would predict the likelihood of an incident at a specific crossing involving a large 
highway vehicle. As input to this model, highway class, warning device type, train type 
(freight/passenger) and incident type were considered, in addition to percent truck traffic and 
annual average daily traffic (AADT). For this analysis, the same groups for highway type and 
warning device type were used as in the highway speed analysis presented in Section 7.3.1 
(Appendices C and E).  
No robust logistic model was identified based on any combination of the factors listed in 
the previous paragraphs. They produced results that were only slightly better than random 
guessing, with AUC values between 0.50 and 0.55, and large Hosmer-Lemeshow test values (see 
Chapter 3 for definitions of these values). Multiple models based on the first four variables were 
also tried, but did not provide better results. This was followed by location testing that compared 
PTT distributions for large and small vehicles, divided by highway class (HC), warning device 
type (WD), train type (TT), and incident type (IT). This produced 108 “cells” (6 HC x 3 WD x 2 
TT x 2 IT). For 77 of these cells, no statistically significant difference was detected (alpha =  
0.10.) Three cells showed that incidents involving small vehicles occurred at crossings with 
higher PTT; 22 cells showed that incidents involving large vehicles occurred at crossings with 
higher PTT. The remaining six cells had insufficient data to draw a conclusion.  
Only 5.3% of incidents occurred on roads with more than 20% truck traffic, and only 




problems could stem from the lack of data at the high end of the PTT range, and better models 
might result from truncating the dataset. All data points with more than 20% PTT were removed, 
and the modeling approaches repeated as described above. The results were similarly ineffective 
at predicting the size of the vehicle involved in the collision. 
Therefore, overall it appears that the effect of PTT on the likelihood of an incident 
involving a large vehicle is indeterminate. More importantly, even for cases where PTT had an 
effect (according to the tests of location), a logistical model developed using the factors 
discussed above did not successfully identify large-vehicle-involved incidents. 
7.3.3.2. Analysis Based on Other Crossing Characteristics 
A simple but robust approach for modeling large-to-small vehicle ratio divided the data 
by highway class, warning device type, train type (freight/passenger) and incident type 
(VST/TSV-M/TSV-S). Ideally, knowledge of the ratio of truck traffic to car traffic should be 
used to predict the type of highway vehicle involved in an incident; however, due to the 
limitations of available data this was not feasible. The ratios of incidents involving large and 
small vehicles were plotted according to the four factors (Figure 7.5, Table G.2). A sample of the 











Figure 7.5: Ratio of large to small vehicles in TSV-M incidents at (top) gated crossings, 




7.3.4. Proxy for Equipment Class 
Equipment class is a complicated proxy to develop as it relies on several factors. 
Ultimately, three factors were used: the likelihood of an incident being a freight or passenger 
train, the distribution of position-struck-in-train, and the distribution of the number of 
locomotives. As equipment class is only a factor in derailment likelihood for VST incidents, 
proxies were developed based only on data for these incidents.  
The GCI database has two variables useful to this analysis: PASSCNT and TOTALTRN. 
PASSCNT is the number of passenger trains that use the crossing each day. TOTALTRN is the 
total number of trains that use the crossing each day. The percentage of trains using a crossing 
that are passenger trains is PASSCNT/TOTALTRN.  
In order to know if an incident is likely to involve a locomotive or a railcar two sets of 
distributions were developed, a distribution of where in the train a highway vehicle is likely to 
hit in a VST incident (“distribution 1”) (Figure 7.6, Table G.3), and a distribution of the number 
of locomotives in a train consist (“distribution 2”) (Figure 7.7, Table G.4).  
For distribution 1, the data were first separated by train type (freight or passenger). For 
freight train VST incidents, over 50% of highway users struck the first rail vehicle in the consist 
(Figure 7.6a). For passenger train VST incidents, over 70% of highway users struck the first rail 
vehicle (Figure 7.6b).  This difference may be due to the fact that passenger trains occupy a 
crossing for a shorter period of time than freight trains, therefore the freight train’s exposure to 













Figure 7.6: Position in train of struck rail vehicle for VST incidents involving  














Figure 7.7: Distribution of number of lead locomotives on train consist for  
(a) freight and (b) passenger trains. 
 
The data were further separated by highway vehicle type (large or small). Due to 
differences in vehicle characteristics and driver behavior, it seemed possible that the distribution 




unclear which vehicle type would be more likely to collide with a train further back in the 
consist, a two-tailed test was used to compare the distributions.  
For freight train incidents, there was a small, but statistically significant difference 
between the position-struck-in-train distributions for large and small vehicles (Figure 7.6a) (Pr > 
KSa < 0.0001), with small vehicles on average striking further back in the train than large 
vehicles. For passenger train incidents, there was no statistically significant difference  (Pr > KSa 
= 1.000) between the distributions for small and large vehicles (Figure 7.6b). Therefore, two 
separate distributions for the freight model were used, and one distribution was used for the 
passenger model. For both types of train, there was a rapid initial decrease to the function, but by 
the tenth rail vehicle in the consist the likelihood of any individual vehicle being struck is 
essentially random with a likelihood close to zero. 
For distribution 2, since there is no reason to expect that the number of locomotives in a 
consist would affect incident type, all grade crossing incidents were used to develop the 
distributions. Two sets of distributions were developed, one for freight (Figure 7.7a) and one for 
passenger (Figure 7.7b). It was assumed that all locomotives in the consist were placed at the 
front of the train. This is a simplified assumption, since some locomotives may be placed 
elsewhere in the train. The HRA database provides information about the number of locomotives 
in the train, but does not provide any information about their position. The REA database 
provides slightly more information, with fields for locomotives at the front, middle and rear of 
the train; however, it is not possible to know exactly where the middle locomotives are placed. 
Furthermore, due to the necessity of also accounting for train length distributions, trying to 
model an accurate distribution of locomotives required dividing the data into very small groups, 




Since track class correlates with speed, and speed of a train correlates roughly with the 
amount of power required to move the train, the number of locomotives could vary with track 
class. Therefore, separate distributions were developed for each track class. Trains traveling on 
higher-class track generally had more locomotives (Figure 7.7). 
It should be noted that it is uncommon for passenger trains to have large numbers of 
locomotives. The REA database identified seven passenger trains with six or more locomotives. 
On inspection, these appeared to be electric multiple unit (EMU) or diesel multiple unit (DMU) 
trains, operated by commuter rail systems. According to the FRA, EMUs and DMUs should be 
counted as railcars for the purposes of accident reporting; however, due to user error these are 
sometimes identified as locomotives instead. Since EMUs and DMUs are more similar in weight 
and structure to a railcar, any record that incorrectly identified them as locomotives was removed 
from the dataset. The REA database identified an additional 12 passenger trains with four or five 
locomotives. These consisted of long-distance Amtrak trains, mostly in parts of the U.S. that 
likely have steep grades and may require the additional power. Combining distributions 1 and 2 
enables prediction of how likely it is that the rail vehicle struck in a VST incident is a 
locomotive, based on track class. The distributions for freight and passenger are combined based 
on the ratio of freight and passenger traffic at the grade crossing. 
 
7.3.5. Proxy for Train Length 
Train length is an input for the TSV-S model. Train length differs between freight and 
passenger trains as well as between track classes. In the U.S., freight trains can be in excess of 
100 cars long, and with limited exceptions passenger trains rarely exceed 20 cars. Freight train 




standards if they have high enough traffic volumes to justify the investment in higher speed 
operation.  
For the track classes in the database, the distribution of train lengths was determined for 
freight and passenger trains (Figure 7.8, Table G.5). Only track classes 1 through 5 were used; 
class 6 track and excepted (class “X”) track were excluded due to sparse data. As with the 
highway speed analysis, these data could not be fitted to common statistical distributions; 













Figure 7.8: Distribution of train lengths by track class and consist type for  




7.3.6. Proxy for Incident Type 
There may be a number of factors that influence whether a crossing is more likely to 
experience a VST or TSV incident, including human-factors aspects that are outside the scope of 
this work. A simple proxy based on warning device type in use at the crossing was used (Table 
7.1). The data indicated that the incident type ratios vary depending on the type of warning 
device at a crossing. For example, VST incidents are substantially less frequent at gated 
crossings compared to active or passive crossings because gates provide a more obvious physical 
barrier. Subsequent work could refine this element through a better understanding of which 
crossing characteristics affect incident type. 
 
Table 7.1: Incident Type by Warning Device Type 
 
     Warning Device Type 
Incident Type   Gates Other Active Passive 
VST  18.8% 32.1% 26.1% 
TSV-S  51.1% 24.4% 23.5% 
TSV-M   30.0% 43.5% 50.4% 
 
7.4. DISCUSSION 
Ideally, one would use crossing-specific data for the proxy variables in lieu of the proxy 
variable distributions developed in this chapter. This would reduce the need for assumptions and 
in theory provide a more accurate estimate of derailment likelihood at a crossing. It would also 
limit the risk that model users might use the proxy variables inappropriately or based on out-of-
date information.  
However, in most cases it is not feasible (or even possible) for a user to obtain the 




(highway vehicle speed, train speed, highway vehicle type) cannot currently be provided by 
users, because even if they can provide the distribution of the factor at the crossing, it is not clear 
how observed distributions relate to incident-type-specific distributions. If future researchers can 
determine these relationships based on field studies or other techniques, then the calculator can 
be adapted to incorporate user-provided distributions. 
A good example of this is highway vehicle type. It seems logical that the best predictor of 
LGVEH would be percent truck traffic (PTT). However, PTT does not appear to be an accurate 
predictor of LGVEH, as quantified by my attempts to conduct multivariate analysis and generate 
regression models, as explained in Section 7.3.3.1. This could be a problem with the data in that 
PTT in the GCI might not represent the actual ratio of large to small vehicles at a crossing. It is 
my understanding that these counts are typically generated by an observer who monitors the road 
for a period of 24 hours or less. This means that fluctuations in PTT over time (both within a 
week and over the course of a year) are not accounted for. There is no guarantee that the 
observation period is representative of other days/times. This could account for the difficulty in 
developing statistical relationships. 
Even if the factor does not vary with incident type, there are other considerations. 
Accounting for equipment class in an incident requires a distribution of position-struck-in-train 
(Figure 7.6) that is necessarily based on historical data and not observation.  
Train length is the only factor for which users could provide custom data, as it is not 






The distributions developed in this chapter can be combined with the statistical regression 
models developed in Chapter 6 to predict a probability distribution for a grade crossing incident-
caused derailment to occur at a specific grade crossing based on its characteristics. This 
probability distribution can also be simplified into a point estimate, which simplifies comparison 




CHAPTER 8: DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXCEL TOOL TO EVALUATE DERAILMENT 
LIKELIHOOD AT HIGHWAY-RAIL GRADE CROSSINGS 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the “derailment likelihood calculator” is developed. It consists of an Excel 
spreadsheet combining the proxy variables discussed in Chapter 7 with the joint freight-
passenger derailment model from Chapter 6. The spreadsheet can be used to calculate a 
distribution of derailment likelihoods, as well as an expected value of derailment likelihood and 
other estimates. 
 
8.2. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 
The distributions from Chapters 6 and 7 can be combined using probability concepts. A 
joint distribution can be developed combining all variables and their distributions.  
For a function 𝑔(𝑥) of continuous random variable 𝑥, with probability density function 
𝑓(𝑥), the expected value or expectation of that function is defined as (Modarres et al., 2009) 






Analogously, for discrete distributions 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) with probability densities 𝑝𝑟(𝑥𝑖), the expected 
value is defined as  






This can be generalized to joint probability distributions with multiple variables 𝑥𝑛, 








Furthermore, algebraically, for two functions f(x) and g(y),  
𝐸[𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑔(𝑦)] = 𝐸[𝑓(𝑥)] + 𝐸[𝑔(𝑦)] (4) 
 
8.3. CALCULATOR FUNCTIONALITY 
The calculator consists of a Microsoft Excel workbook with 14 spreadsheets. The first 
sheet, “Calculator”, is edited by users to run the calculation for an individual crossing.  The 
second sheet, “Data”, gives users the ability to process a batch of crossings. The third sheet, 
“Logistic Models”, shows the three logistic models that were developed to predict derailment 
likelihood (one each for VST, TSV-S and TSV-M). This is a reference for users to understand 
the underlying equations.  
Four sheets perform the calculations that produce the estimates of derailment probability, 
one each for VST, TSV-S and TSV-M, plus a final “Combination” sheet that combines the three 
distributions based on the expected ratio of VST:TSV-S:TSV-M incidents. The “Combination” 
sheet performs the calculations for the results that are shown on the “Calculator” sheet.  
The remaining seven sheets contain the distributions developed for each of the proxy 
variables discussed in Chapter 7. These are used for calculations on the VST, TSV-S and TSV-M 
spreadsheets.  
Table 8.1 shows the relationships between the base variables of the regression models, 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.3.1. Calculator Input/Output Spreadsheet 
The calculator requires the user to input five values to calculate the conditional 
probability of derailment, 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) (Figure 8.1). All values can be found in the FRA’s Grade 
Crossing Inventory (GCI), if the records for the crossing there are complete and up-to-date (a 




Figure 8.1: Input/Output view of Excel spreadsheet “Calculator” 
 
Three of the five factors are limited to a predefined set of values so a drop-down menu is 
used. These factors are grade crossing warning device type, highway classification, and FRA 
track class. Users can select from three categories of warning device type: gates, other active, or 
passive. They can select from six categories of highway classification. These differ from the 
classifications given in the GCI; the categories are simplified, as shown in Appendix E. Lastly, 
Grade Crossing Warning Device Type Gates
Highway Class Urban Arterial
Passenger Trains per Day (PASSCNT) 6 (numeric)
Total Trains per Day (TOTALTRN) 25 (numeric)
FRA Track Class (RRCLAS) 5
P(D|I) -- Expected Value 0.0828
P(D|I) -- 5th percentile 0.0783
P(D|I) -- 25th percentile 0.0870
P(D|I) -- 50th percentile 0.1565
P(D|I) -- 75th percentile 0.2519
P(D|I) -- 95th percentile 0.3437






users select an FRA track class between 1 and 5. The calculator does not include default values 
for excepted track (class “X”) or for track classes above 5.  
The total number of trains per day and the number of passenger trains per day must also 
be provided by the user. These values are used to determine percent passenger trains at the 
crossing. The total number of trains per day must be greater than zero and must be greater than 
the number of passenger trains per day. The spreadsheet verifies that the input is a valid number.  
The calculator provides two types of output. First, it provides six estimates of the 
conditional probability: the expected value of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼), using the expectation of the functions 
(explained mathematically in subsequent sections), as well as the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th 
percentile of the probability function. These point estimates describe the overall shape of the 
conditional probability function, The 95th percentile in particular provides an upper bound to the 
𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) function but truncates the long tail. 
The methodology developed in this dissertation relies on distributions for each proxy 
variable. Therefore, to provide users with a more comprehensive understanding of the probability 
of a grade crossing experiencing a derailment, a distribution of all possible 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) values for the 
given crossing characteristics (Figure 8.2) is also provided. The mathematics behind the 
development of this distribution is discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.  
The distribution is important because it shows that, while the highest value of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) 
predicted by the calculator may be much greater than the expected value or 95th percentile, it is 
also much less likely to occur. The goal of combining the point estimates with the distribution 
figure is to provide users with perspective about the probability of derailment at a crossing. It is 
important to understand that there is variability in the estimate, without overstating the likelihood 





Figure 8.2: Sample output figure of the distribution of conditional probabilities. 
 
8.3.2. Incident Type Calculations 
As components of the overall derailment calculator, each of the three incident-type-
specific equations were first evaluated with the corresponding model variable distributions. This 
process is described below. 
8.3.2.1. VST Calculation 
The VST calculation relies on three model variables: vehicle speed, highway vehicle size, 
and equipment class. These are represented by five proxy variables: vehicle speed distributions, 
the expected ratio of large to small vehicles, the ratio of freight to passenger trains, the position-
in-train of the rail equipment, and the number of locomotives in the consist. 
The appropriate vehicle speed distribution is selected based on the warning device type 
and highway classification. The large-to-small-vehicle ratio is also selected based on these two 
inputs, as well as the freight-to-passenger-train ratio. The final three proxies are selected based 




Two approaches were used to combine this information and develop an estimate of the 
𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) value for a crossing. The first is to calculate the expected value of the 𝑥𝑉𝑆𝑇 equation and 
then use this value to calculate the expected 𝑝𝑉𝑆𝑇. The second is to propagate the distributions of 
the proxy variables through the 𝑥𝑉𝑆𝑇 and 𝑝𝑉𝑆𝑇 equations to preserve the distribution of 
probability values.  
The VST spreadsheet first determines the likelihood of each rail vehicle in the train being 
struck. Different distributions are used for freight and passenger trains; these distributions were 
developed in Chapter 7. For example, about 56% of VST freight train incidents involve the first 
rail vehicle in the train, 9% involve the second vehicle, 4% involve the third, etc. (Figure 7.6). 
Next, the number of locomotives in the train is accounted for, which varies with track class. For 
example, approximately 12% of freight trains on class 3 track have one locomotive, 46% have 
two locomotives, 27% have three locomotives, etc. (Figure 7.7a).  
By combining the two distributions, the likelihood of a collision involving freight 
locomotives, freight cars, passenger locomotives, or passenger cars (the factor “EC”) is 
calculated. These likelihoods are then multiplied by the probability distribution of vehicle speeds 
(“VS”), and the probability of highway vehicle size (“LV”). This produces a matrix of weights 
indicating how likely an incident with that combination of factors is to occur. This matrix is 
referred to as 𝑝𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶). 
Next, the logistic regression equation for VST incidents was evaluated for the possible 
range of vehicle speeds (as determined by highway classification and warning device type), and 
for each equipment class and vehicle size. This produced another matrix, with probability values 




Multiplying these two matrices together and then summing the values produces the 
expectation of the regression equation: 
𝐸[𝑓𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶)] = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶)𝑝𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶)
𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑆
 
This produces the expected value of the conditional probability of derailment for VST 
incidents. It is also used to develop the distribution of potential 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) values (Figure 8.3). For 
each value of 𝑓𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶), all corresponding values of 𝑝𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶) are summed 
(since multiple combinations of factors could produce the same value of 𝑓𝑉𝑆𝑇(𝑉𝑆, 𝐿𝑉, 𝐸𝐶)). This 
produces a probability distribution function illustrating the likelihood of each value of the 
conditional probability of derailment. 
 
 





8.3.2.2. TSV-S Calculation 
A similar calculation process is undertaken for TSV-S incidents. The TSV-S calculation 
relies on three model variables: train speed, train length, and highway vehicle size. These are 
represented by a total of three proxy variables: train speed distributions, train length 
distributions, and the expected ratio of large to small vehicles. 
The appropriate train speed distribution and train length distribution are selected based on 
the freight-to-passenger-train ratio and track class. The large-to-small-vehicle ratio is selected 
based on the freight-to-passenger-train ratio, warning device type and highway classification.  
The expected value of the 𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 equation is calculated, then this value is used to 
calculate the expected 𝑝𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 as well as propagating the distributions of the proxy variables 
through the 𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆 equation to preserve the distribution of probability values.  
The TSV-S spreadsheet multiplies the train speed distribution (the factor “TS”) by the 
appropriate train length distribution (“TL”), and adds in the effect of highway vehicle size 
(“LV”). This produces a matrix of weights indicating how likely an incident with that 
combination of factors is to occur. This matrix is referred to as 𝑝𝑟𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆(𝑇𝑆, 𝑇𝐿, 𝐿𝑉). 
Next, the logistic regression equation for TSV-S incidents is evaluated for the possible 
range of train speeds, train lengths and vehicle size. This produces another matrix, with 
probability values for each combination of factors.  This matrix is referred to as 
𝑓𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑆(𝑇𝑆, 𝑇𝐿, 𝐿𝑉). Multiplying these two matrices together and then summing the values 
produces the expectation of the regression equation: 






As for VST incidents, this formula is used to produce the expected value of the 
conditional probability of derailment for TSV-S incidents, as well as the probability distribution 
of potential 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) values (Figure 8.4).  
 
 
Figure 8.4: Example distribution of p(D|I) for TSV-S incidents. 
 
8.3.2.3. TSV-M Calculation 
The TSV-M calculation relies on three model variables: vehicle speed, train speed, and 
highway vehicle size. These are represented by a total of three proxy variables: vehicle speed 
distributions, train speed distributions, and the expected ratio of large to small vehicles. 
The appropriate vehicle speed distribution is selected based on the warning device type 
and highway classification, while the train speed distribution is selected based on the freight-to-
passenger-train ratio and track class. The large-to-small-vehicle ratio is also selected based on 




The expected value of the 𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀 equation is calculated, then used to calculate the 
expected 𝑝𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀 as well as propagating the distributions of the proxy variables through the 
𝑥𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀 equation to preserve the distribution of probability values.  
The TSV-M spreadsheet multiplies the vehicle speed distribution (the factor “VS”) by the 
train speed distribution (“TS”), and adds in the effect of highway vehicle size (“LV”). This 
produces a matrix of weights indicating how likely an incident with that combination of factors 
is to occur. This matrix is referred to as 𝑝𝑟𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀(𝑉𝑆, 𝑇𝑆, 𝐿𝑉). 
Next, the logistic regression equation is evaluated for TSV-M incidents for the possible 
range of train speeds, train lengths and vehicle size. This produces another matrix, with 
probability values for each combination of factors referred to as 𝑓𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀(𝑉𝑆, 𝑇𝑆, 𝐿𝑉). 
Multiplying these two matrices together and then summing the values produces the 
expectation of the regression equation. 
𝐸[𝑓𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀(𝑉𝑆, 𝑇𝑆, 𝐿𝑉)] = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀(𝑉𝑆, 𝑇𝑆, 𝐿𝑉)𝑝𝑟𝑇𝑆𝑉−𝑀(𝑉𝑆, 𝑇𝑆, 𝐿𝑉)
𝐿𝑉𝑇𝑆𝑉𝑆
 
This produces the expected value of the conditional probability of derailment for TSV-M 








Figure 8.5: Example distribution of 𝒑(𝑫|𝑰) for TSV-M incidents. 
 
8.3.3. Combined Probability 
The spreadsheet “Combined” calculates the overall 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) estimates and distribution 
accounting for all three incident types. To combine the values for VST, TSV-S and TSV-M 
incidents into one value of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼), the definition of expectation as shown in Equation 3 is again 
used. In this case, the equation expressing how these factors can be combined is expressed as 




where TYPACC is the incident type (VST, TSV-S, TSV-M), and 𝑝𝑟(𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶) is the probability 
of each incident type occurring based on historical data.  
A set of fixed values is used for 𝑝𝑟(𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶), with different ratios for each warning 
device type (Table 2). The type of warning device at the crossing appears to influence the type of 
incident that occurs. Gates appear to significantly reduce the likelihood of VST and TSV-M 




Table 8.2. Incident type ratios by warning device type 
 
  Warning Device Type 
Incident Type   Gates Active Passive 
VST  18.8% 32.1% 26.1% 
TSV-S  51.1% 24.4% 23.5% 
TSV-M   30.0% 43.5% 50.4% 
 
Beyond the influence of warning device type, it is not clear what factors affect incident 
type. Whether a train strikes a vehicle or a vehicle strikes a train is likely due to a complex 
combination of human factors (driver attentiveness, for example) and engineering aspects 
(reflectorization, crossing lighting, crossing geometry, visibility) at individual crossings. If future 
researchers develop a more robust understanding of these factors, the calculator could easily be 
adapted to incorporate a distribution of incident type ratios instead of the fixed values used here. 
 Note that the definition of expectation in Equation 5 holds when 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) and 
𝑝𝑟(𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶) are independent. This is reasonable based on current understanding of 
𝑝𝑟(𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶), since TYPACC itself is not a factor in the three 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) distributions developed. 
However, if future research shows there to be common factors, the two will no longer be 
independent, and this would need to be accounted for by modifying Equation 5.  
 The spreadsheet “Combined” evaluates Equation 5 by considering the likelihood of each 
𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) value based on the three TYPACC calculations. This produces the cumulative probability 
distribution (Figure 8.2). In the same manner, the distribution can be represented by an expected 
value, which is also provided as an output (Figure 8.1). 
 Based on the cumulative distribution, the spreadsheet also determines the 95% estimate 
(and other point estimates) of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) through interpolation. This means that 95% of the time 




will be less than the specified value. Due to how the distribution is developed and plotted, it is 
unlikely that any value of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) will fall exactly on the 95% line, so the spreadsheet determines 
the values of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) just below and above 95%, then interpolates using a linear approximation. 
The 95% estimate is presented as an output of the calculator (Figure 8.1). 
 
8.4. CALCULATOR USAGE GUIDE 
The calculator can be used in two ways. The first is single crossing mode, where the user 
manually enters the characteristics of a crossing on the “Calculator” spreadsheet. This is useful 
for studying how derailment likelihood would change if crossing conditions were altered.  
The second is batch processing mode. The user provides records for multiple crossings 
and activates a macro to automatically calculate the derailment likelihood for each crossing. This 
is useful for evaluating derailment likelihood for crossings in a corridor or state. To use this 
mode, the user goes to the “Data” spreadsheet and provides the requested information starting in 
the second row of the first five columns – warning device type (WDTYPE), highway 
classification (HWYCLASS), number of passenger trains per day (PASSCNT), total number of 
trains per day (TRNCNT), and track class (TRKCLAS). The values of WDTYPE and 
HWYCLASS must match the list of possible values shown in Appendix E. TRKCLASS must be 
a number between 1 and 5 (provided as a numeral). PASSCNT and TRNCNT must also be 
numeric, and TRNCNT must be greater than zero. The user may also provide a grade crossing 
identification number (GXID) that is not used in the calculation of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐼) but assists in 
identification of the crossing for subsequent analysis. 
Once information has been supplied on the “Data” spreadsheet, the user presses the 




macro enters each record into the calculator, and returns the distribution, expected value and 
point values of the derailment likelihood for each crossing. The user sorts the final data by any 
column using the filter arrows. 
 
8.5. DISCUSSION 
In previous chapters, the performance of the model and its components was evaluated in 
multiple ways. Evaluating the performance of the calculator specifically is more complex, since 
it relies not only on the underlying conditional derailment probability model but also the proxy 
variable distributions. Given that the calculator inputs are used to select appropriate proxy 
distributions, instead of directly serving as physical model variables, it is important to understand 
the effect of each calculator input variable on the estimate of derailment probability. To examine 
this, the calculator’s sensitivity to each input factor was evaluated using a tornado diagram. 
While the calculator has five input factors (warning device type, highway class, track 
class, number of freight trains and number of passenger trains), in practice the calculator 
combines the number of freight and passenger of trains into a single variable quantifying the 
percent passenger traffic. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis will use percent passenger traffic as 
a factor, along with warning device type, highway class and track class. The range and midpoint 
were identified for each factor (Table 8.3). For each categorical factor, the low, mid and high 
categories were identified by evaluating the calculator at each factor level and determining which 







Table 8.3. Factor level definitions 
 
Factor Low Mid High 
% Passenger 0% 50% 100% 
Track Class 1 3 5 
Highway Class Urban Local Rural Local Rural Arterial 
Warning Device Type Passive Other Active Gates 
 
  
To perform the sensitivity analysis, the calculator was first used to evaluate the 
derailment model with all factors at the mid level. This yielded the baseline expected p(D|I), 
0.854. Subsequently, for one factor at a time, each factor was evaluated at the low and high 
levels, providing 8 values. This demonstrates the range of p(D|I) values based on the range of 
model factors (Table 8.4, Figure 8.6). Of the three categorical variables, variations in track class 
have the greatest effect on predicted derailment likelihood, followed by highway class and 
warning device type.  
 
Table 8.4. Calculator results for each factor 
level 
Factor Low High 
% Passenger 0.0407 0.1764 
Track Class 0.0475 0.1218 
Highway Class 0.0584 0.1072 






Figure 8.6: Tornado diagram depicting variance of expected 𝒑(𝑫|𝑰) created by  
varying each model factor. 
 
It is more difficult to compare the effect of the continuous variable, percent passenger trains, to 
the three categorical variables. Since the categorical variables were examined over their entire 
high-to-low range, I initially also examined percent passenger traffic over its whole range 
(Figure 8.6). In this case, percent passenger traffic has a greater effect on the expected p(D|I) 
than the other three variables, which is logical given the strong difference in derailment 
likelihood between freight and passenger trains (Chapter 6). However, sensitivity analyses more 
typically examine the effect on the result of a calculation based on small variances in the factor 
values – typically 5-10%. This has a strong effect on the apparent influence of each factor on 
calculator results (Figure 8.7). If a smaller range of percent passenger traffic is considered, then 
it has a similar effect on the overall p(D|I) calculation as warning device type. This is a 






Figure 8.7: Tornado diagram depicting variance of expected 𝒑(𝑫|𝑰) created by  
varying each model factor, but with percent passenger traffic varying from 45% to 55% 
instead of 0% to 100%. 
 
Tornado diagrams as a form of sensitivity analysis are a useful way to envision model 
variability, but due to the nature of the calculator, which mostly relies on categorical variables, it 
may not be as useful in this instance. The tornado diagram is just one way to consider a model’s 
sensitivity to factor variance; there are other potential ways to examine variance, including 
propagating the error forward at each step to determine overall error in the calculator.  
 
8.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained the development of a derailment likelihood calculator that 
combines the statistical models and distributions developed in Chapters 6 and 7 using Microsoft 
Excel. The user provides five variables describing conditions at the crossing, and the calculator 




Chapter 9 will present a case study demonstrating the results of the derailment likelihood 




CHAPTER 9: EVALUATION OF THE DERAILMENT LIKELIHOOD CALCULATOR 
USING A CASE STUDY CORRIDOR OF HIGHWAY-RAIL GRADE CROSSINGS 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 8 I described a spreadsheet model that calculates the conditional probability of 
derailment given that a grade crossing collision has occurred. In this chapter I present an 
example of how the calculator can be used to provide an additional criterion for ranking grade 
crossings in terms of derailment likelihood by combining the calculator’s output with the output 
of an incident likelihood model. Derailment likelihood has not traditionally been used to 
prioritize grade crossing warning upgrades or elimination.  
On an annual basis, each state is allocated funds from the U.S. DOT for grade crossing 
upgrades. It is up to each state to decide how to use them. Typically, states use some form of 
incident prediction model (such as the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Formula or a state-specific 
model (FRA, 1987; Ogden and Korve Engineering, 2007; Benekohal and Elzohairy, 2001)) to 
determine which crossings to upgrade, as well as what warning devices to install during that 
upgrade. The only formally-considered grade crossing risk components in the current systems 
are the risk to highway users. As discussed in Chapter 1, this ignores other sources of risk at the 
crossing, particularly the risk related to derailment occurrence. If a derailment occurs, then not 
only highway users but also train passengers, train crew and potentially others in the vicinity will 
be affected. If a hazardous materials release results, the general public can also be affected, as 
well as the environment. Therefore, understanding the risk of derailment can help quantify these 
additional risks. 
The derailment modeling tool developed in the preceding chapters can be used in 




an incident likelihood model, yielding a ranking of crossings by their derailment risk. It can also 
be used to calculate derailment risk over a rail corridor, considering total risk, average crossing 
risk or per-mile risk. The derailment likelihood model might also be used as a “tie-breaker” in 
cases where multiple crossings have similar collision likelihood but differ in their derailment 
risk. Each of these uses will be demonstrated. In this example, I use the U.S. DOT Accident 
Prediction Formula to model incident likelihood. I specifically used the FRA Web Accident 
Prediction System (WBAPS) to determine values for each crossing. The same techniques 
discussed in this chapter could work with other incident prediction models. 
 
9.2. CASE STUDY CORRIDORS 
Use of the grade crossing derailment calculator will be demonstrated using four rail 
corridors in the state of Illinois. Each corridor is six miles long. These corridors were selected 
because I have first-hand familiarity with each of them, and could therefore verify the accuracy 
of the data from the databases I used. I selected corridors that exhibit a variety of characteristics. 
63% of the case study crossings have gates, so gates are overrepresented compared to the state-
wide ratio of 45%. Additionally, 8% of the study crossings are passive, compared to the state-
wide ratio of 31%. Gates are overrepresented because Corridor 1, which has very high train 
volume, is completely gated. The case study corridors also have different ratios of passenger 
traffic. The ratio of freight to passenger traffic seems to have the greatest effect on derailment 
likelihood, since the effect of all factors change depending on the type of train involved. 
Corridor 1 is a segment of the BNSF Metra line running from downtown Chicago to the 




trains per day, of which between 104 and 112 are Metra passenger trains (depending on the 
location along the corridor). 
Corridor 2 is a segment of the Illinois Central track (owned by Canadian National) 
running from north to south through Champaign, IL. It has six grade crossings on class 5 track. It 
has fewer than 30 trains per day, six of which are passenger (specifically Amtrak) trains. It is in a 
predominantly rural area though it passes through some small urban areas.  
Corridor 3 is a segment of the former Elgin, Joliet and Eastern, now owned by Canadian 
National. Since it runs through the suburbs around Chicago, it is in an urban area. It has five 
grade crossings on class 3 track, with 12 trains per day and no passenger traffic.  
Corridor 4 is a segment of track owned by Norfolk Southern that runs from east to west 
through Champaign, Illinois. It is in an urban area with 23 crossings mostly on class 1 track 
(with a small portion of class 3 track). It has 2-4 trains per day and no passenger traffic.  
Multiple comparisons can be made of the crossings, both within and between corridors. 
Considering risk rankings within one corridor shows the effect of warning device and highway 
classification, since these factors vary with crossing. By contrast, track class and number of 
trains tend to stay constant over longer railroad segments, and therefore for multiple crossings in 
a row. As a result, the effect of track class and number of trains is best illustrated by comparing 
different corridors. Lastly, risk on a corridor will be related to the density of crossings, not just 
the probability of derailment at individual crossings. This can be expressed in multiple ways: as 
the expected yearly derailment frequency, the average derailment frequency per crossing, and the 





For each of the grade crossings in the case study, the required factors (warning device, 
highway classification, number of passenger trains, total trains per day, and track class) were 
used as inputs to the derailment likelihood calculator. This produced the six estimates of 
derailment likelihood p(D|I) (expected value, 5th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th 
percentile, and 95th percentile). For simplicity, this case study compares only the expected value 
(p(D|I)exp), but the same analysis could be done using any of the point estimates. If a different 
point estimate is used, the ranking would be expected to change, though the subsequent analysis 
technique would be the same. Those who use the model can decide which point estimate to use, 
depending on their risk preferences.  
Since the derailment likelihood calculator produces a conditional probability, it must be 
combined with an incident likelihood model to give derailment probability. In this chapter, the 
calculator is demonstrated using the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Formula, the most 
commonly used incident model in the U.S. This model produces an expected yearly incident 
frequency (not probability) at a grade crossing, f(I). This means that, combined with the p(D|I) 
values from the calculator, it will produce an expected derailment frequency. Other incident 
prediction models produce expected incident probability; if combined with one of these models, 
the results of the calculator would produce an expected derailment probability. 
The values of f(I) for each crossing were calculated using (WBAPS) (FRA, 2013). This 
web service generates current reports of the 10-year collision history and predicted collisions per 
year – which includes an adjustment based on the 5-year collision history at the crossing. The 
calculation is based on the physical characteristics of the crossing as reported by railroads and 




the data in the inventory is known to vary by state, as some states are better than others about 
updating information. Therefore, all data for the case study were selected from the state of 
Illinois, which is generally considered to have reliable data.  
Once p(D|I) and f(I) are determined for each crossing, their product is calculated to give 
the expected number of derailments at the crossing per year, f(D). Here, two values are 
presented: the product of f(I) with the expected value of p(D|I) (f(D)exp), and the product of f(I) 
with the 95% confidence estimate of p(D|I) (f(D)95) 
 
9.4. RESULTS 
The results in this section are presented in tabular form. Tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4 show 
an assigned crossing name, the crossing’s characteristics, and the values of the five incident 
probability or likelihood estimates: p(D|I)exp, p(D|I)95, f(I), f(D)exp, and f(D)95. For each estimate, 
a numerical rank is also assigned. A rank of one (1) means the crossing has the highest value of 
an incident estimate for that corridor, while higher ranks have lower incident estimates. Broadly, 
the “worst” or “most dangerous” crossing will have rank one.  
A red-orange-green color gradient is applied to each rank column to assist readers in 
detecting how crossings vary in the five estimates. Red is assigned to rank one. The less red (or 
more green) a cell, the less likely that crossing is to experience an incident. Each table is sorted 
by largest to smallest value of p(D|I)exp, meaning from most to least likely to derail, given that an 


























9.4.1. Corridor 1 
Corridor 1 is in an urban environment. All crossings have gates, as well as the same 
number of trains and track class (Table 9.1). Therefore, they have similar estimates of p(D|I). 
There are two passenger train counts: 112 (70% passenger traffic) and 104 (65% passenger 
traffic). The crossings with 112 passenger trains have larger p(D|I) values than those with 104. 
Of the crossings with 112 passenger trains, crossings 1F, 1C, 1I, 1D, and 1G have the highest 
value of p(D|I). These are the crossings located on urban local roads. The next group of crossings 
(1A, 1H, 1B, 1K, and 1J) are on urban connectors, followed by crossing 1E on an urban arterial.  
This ordering may appear counterintuitive, since derailment probability increases with 
increased vehicle speed (Chapters 4 and 6), and vehicle speeds are typically highest on urban 
connectors, followed by urban arterials and urban local roads. However, highway class also 
affects the ratio of large to small highway vehicles. Looking at the statistical models used in the 
calculator (Chapter 6), the large vehicle effect outweighs the vehicle speed effect for most 
vehicle speeds. Based on the proxy data (Chapter 7), at gated crossings, local roads generally 
have more large vehicles than connectors or arterials. This is true for all passenger train 
incidents, and for TSV freight train incidents. Interestingly, this is not true for VST freight train 
incidents, where local roads have fewer large vehicles. Since Corridor 1 is passenger-dominated, 
the freight VST effect is not as important in the results. 
After the crossings with 112 passenger trains come those with 104 passenger trains. At 
these crossings, passenger trains constitute a smaller percentage of overall traffic. Since 
passenger trains are more likely to derail than freight trains, crossings with less passenger traffic 




The ranking by WBAPS-predicted incident frequency is different, as is obvious looking 
at the color gradient for the f(I) rank column. The crossing most likely to have an incident is 1E, 
which ranks third (of five) in p(D|I). At the other end of the spectrum, the five crossings least 
likely to have a crossing incident (1F, 1C, 1I, 1D, 1G) all ranked first in p(D|I). Crossing 1E is 
almost 30 times more likely to experience an incident than crossing 1G (the least likely to have 
an incident). 
Considering the rankings based on expected derailment frequency (f(D)exp), the ranking is 
similar to that produced by f(I). There was not much variation in p(D|I)exp, but there was a lot of 
variation in f(I). As a result, when the product of the two was calculated, the rankings based on 
f(D)exp differed only slightly from the rankings based on f(I) prediction alone. 
9.4.2. Corridor 2 
Corridor 2 has the greatest diversity of crossing conditions, although there are few 
crossings in the corridor (Table 9.2). The crossings have different passenger train ratios, a mix of 
rural and urban highway classifications, and a mix of gated and passive crossings. Due to this 
blend, it is more difficult to determine exactly which factors lead to the resulting values of 
p(D|I). Generally, the analysis shows that crossings with gates have higher p(D|I)exp values than 
passive crossings. Again, this is due to the large vehicle ratio, which covaries with warning 
device as well as highway class. Additionally, crossings with a higher percentage of passenger 
trains have higher p(D|I)exp values. 
The ranking by WBAPS predicted incident frequency is different from the p(D|I)exp 
ranking. The crossing most likely to have a grade crossing incident is 2B, which ranks fifth (out 
of six) in expected conditional probability of derailment. However, crossing 2E has the second 




The rankings by f(D)exp are almost identical to those produced by f(I). The variation in 
p(D|I)exp was small compared to the variation in f(I), therefore only small shifts in the ranking 
occur.  
9.4.3. Corridor 3 
Corridor 3 is also located in an urban environment. All crossings have gates, as well as a 
consistent number of trains and track class (Table 9.3). The corridor has no passenger train 
traffic. Consequently, the crossings all have similar estimates of p(D|I). Crossings 3D and 3E 
have the highest value of p(D|I)exp. These crossings are located on urban local roads. Crossings 
3C and 3B are on urban arterials. Crossing 3A is on an urban connector. As explained in Section 
9.4.2, this order is explained by the proxy variable for highway vehicle size. Since this corridor 
has only freight trains, the freight VST effect dominates. 
The f(I) ranking is almost opposite to the p(D|I)exp ranking. The crossing most likely to 
have a grade crossing incident is 3A, which ranks last in expected conditional probability of 
derailment. At the other end of the spectrum, the two crossings least likely to have a crossing 
incident (3D and 3E) ranked first in conditional probability of derailment.  
Looking at the rankings by expected derailment frequency (f(D)exp), the ranking is 
identical to that produced by f(I). Since there was not much variation in p(D|I)exp the values of 
f(I) dominate.  
9.4.4. Corridor 4 
Corridor 4 is also in an urban environment, and its crossings have similar train counts and 
no passenger traffic. However, this corridor shows more variability in warning device and track 




The crossings with the highest conditional probability of derailment (4U, 4V and 4W) are 
those on class 3 track. 4U is on an urban arterial and has bells and flashers (but no gates). The 
next two crossings in the ranking (4V and 4W) are on urban local roads and have passive 
warning devices only. They have a lower p(D|I)exp, again because of the effect of large highway 
vehicles, as explained in Section 9.4.2. 4D, the crossing with the lowest p(D|I)exp, is the only one 
with gates. Gated crossings have lower average highway vehicle speeds and a lower percentage 
of large highway vehicle involvement compared to other warning device types.  
The f(I) ranking is very different from the p(D|I) ranking, as is obvious looking at the 
color gradient for the two columns. Crossing 4S is most likely to have an incident, but ranks 
fourth (out of seven) in expected conditional probability of derailment. The five crossings least 
likely to have a crossing incident (4V, 4J, 4L, 4C, and 4G) have a wide range of p(D|I)exp values. 
4V has the lowest f(I) but ranks second by p(D|I)exp, 4C ranks fifth while the others tie for sixth.  
Considering the rankings based on expected derailment frequency (f(D)exp), the ranking is 
similar to that produced by f(I). There is, however, more variability than for the other corridors. 
A good example is crossing 4T. It ranks 16th out of 22 for f(I) and 3rd for p(D|I)exp. When 
combined, it ranks 9th out of 23 for derailment frequency, f(D)exp. This comparatively large 
change in ranking draws attention to 4T and suggests that it should be investigated as a source of 
risk. 
9.4.5. Inter-corridor Comparisons 
In addition to comparing crossings within a corridor, inter-corridor comparisons are of 
interest as well. First, consider the ranking of derailment likelihood for all grade crossings on all 

















Considering all crossings, it is obvious that those on Corridor 1 have the highest values of 
both p(D|I)exp and f(I). This is likely due to two different, but related factors. The values of 
p(D|I)exp are high because of the high ratio of passenger to freight trains, since passenger trains 
are more likely to derail. The values of f(I) are high because Corridor 1 has high train volumes, 
which increases exposure, the product of the number of trains and highway vehicles that operate 
over a crossing. Exposure is essentially the number of opportunities that exist for a grade 
crossing collision to occur. This is a critical factor in the incident likelihood model used by 
WBAPS. In contrast, crossings on Corridor 4 rank low in both metrics, because it has very few 
trains, all of them freight. 
Comparing the f(I) ranking to the f(D)exp ranking, crossings on either extreme (those with 
the highest or lowest incident likelihood) generally maintain a consistent place in the ranking. 
However, there are substantial changes in the middle ranges. For example, crossing 2F ranks 38th 
when only incident likelihood is considered, but jumps to 25th once derailment likelihood is 
taken into account. This can also be observed for crossings 4T (43rd to 36th) and 2A (49th to 40th). 
It is also possible to compare the total incident or derailment frequency between the 
corridors (Table 9.6). This total is obtained by summing all the values of f(I), f(D)exp, or f(D)95 for 
the corridor.  
 
 
Corridor Crossings Total Rank Total Rank Total Rank
1 17 1.21456 1 0.26595 1 0.578007 1
2 6 0.10293 4 0.00833 3 0.036723 3
3 5 0.14221 3 0.00505 4 0.029628 4
4 23 0.34961 2 0.00901 2 0.062993 2





 Generally, corridors with more crossings have higher totals, which is to be expected. 
However, Corridor 1 has a total f(I) value about three times greater than that of Corridor 4, even 
though Corridor 4 has six more crossings (23 compared to 17). This indicates that both the 
number of crossings and the total derailment frequency should be considered. Therefore, the 
frequency was normalized by crossing count to produce an average incident frequency for each 




 A disadvantage of using corridor derailment frequency as a crossing average is that it 
may overlook the benefits of corridor-based crossing closure programs. Some states have taken 
the approach of closing several (sometimes more than half) of the crossings in a specific 
corridor, and upgrading warning devices (or grade separating) the remaining crossings. The idea 
is to direct vehicle traffic to a limited number of crossings, and then allocate greater resources to 
safety upgrades at fewer crossings. Since total highway vehicle traffic over the whole corridor 
typically remains the same, exposure and therefore incident likelihood may increase significantly 
at the remaining crossings, despite the improved warning devices.  
 Another way to consider corridor derailment frequency is on a per-mile average. It is not 
useful for this case study, because the selected corridors are all six miles long; however, in 
practice, it may make more sense because users will have corridors of non-uniform lengths. If 
Corridor Crossings Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank
1 17 0.07144 1 0.01564 1 0.034000 1
2 6 0.01715 3 0.00139 2 0.006120 2
3 5 0.02844 2 0.00101 3 0.005926 3
4 23 0.01520 4 0.00039 4 0.002739 4





this is the case, normalizing corridor derailment frequency by corridor length will provide a more 
accurate comparison between corridors. 
 
9.5. DISCUSSION 
The output of the derailment likelihood calculator can be considered and interpreted in 
multiple ways, and each has value depending on particular user questions. Within a corridor, the 
prioritization of crossings for upgrade may change if derailment likelihood is considered in 
addition to incident likelihood. However, crossings that are considered most likely to have an 
incident are typically also the most likely to have a derailment. This means that an effective way 
to reduce derailment occurrence is to reduce incident occurrence, with whatever crossing 
upgrades that entails. 
Comparing between corridors – especially those of similar lengths – can be especially 
useful for understanding overall crossing risk. A crossing could have an exceptionally high 
derailment likelihood, but might be the only crossing for miles because of crossing closure 
programs (for example). In contrast, another corridor could have many crossings each with much 
lower derailment likelihoods. At first glance, the single high-likelihood crossing could appear to 
be a greater source of concern, but total derailment likelihood on the second corridor could be 
higher, contributing to increased risk. 
This is related to consideration of average crossing derailment frequency. If only total 
corridor derailment frequency is compared, the effect of number of crossings might be 
overlooked. Normalizing the total by number of crossings mitigates this effect. If a corridor has a 




contrast, a corridor where both total and average derailment frequency are high would likely 
merit additional mitigation measures. 
Corridor-level analysis is also useful for adding in consideration of consequence metrics 
for the risk model. A derailment on a corridor in an urban, densely-populated area could have 
much higher consequences than a similar corridor in a rural, sparsely-populated area.   
 
9.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this chapter was to illustrate and explain how the calculator developed in 
Chapter 8 can provide guidance to users when determining which grade crossings to prioritize 
for upgrade. The derailment likelihood model can be used in combination with an incident 
likelihood model such as the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Model, yielding a ranking of 
crossings according to their derailment likelihood. The results can be compared within a corridor 
of crossings, between multiple corridors, or even across a state as a whole. Each of these 





CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1. FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
Since the topic of grade crossing derailment risk had previously not been researched in 
depth, there are a number of directions for future research that could improve our understanding 
of this risk. I developed a robust derailment likelihood model, but as with any model there are 
areas where it could continue to be further refined. Here, I present some future work that would 
improve our understanding of factors affecting grade crossing safety. 
10.1.1. Data Availability and Potential Improvements 
Researchers in the U.S. are fortunate to have a large dataset collected by FRA concerning 
grade crossing collisions and other railroad incidents. A number of variables are recorded, 
enabling researchers to address numerous questions with the existing data. FRA is also reactive 
to new research questions, occasionally adding data fields in response to new safety concerns.  
However, as with any data source, there are other factors that would further improve the 
utility of the databases. I discuss a number of these factors in the pertinent chapters in my 
dissertation including explanations of both the database usage and some of the limitations in 
terms of the variables that are present, variable fields provided, and completeness of the data in 
the existing fields. 
In the GCI database, the crossing angle variable should provide exact crossing angle, or 
at least a more fine-grained categorization of the angle. This would improve the ability to 
analyze a variety of aspects of the physical factors affecting collisions, including the effect on 




grade, and aspects of crossing geometry including humped crossings, would be beneficial for 
evaluating the effect on safety and risk of crossing design factors. 
For the HRA, more detailed information about the type of highway vehicle involved in 
collisions, including its weight, and the exact angle of collision between the train and the vehicle 
would remove the need for many of the assumptions necessary to estimate crossing risk. 
Currently, the angle of collision can only be determined by combining information from the GCI 
on the crossing angle category with information from the HRA about the cardinal direction 
(north, south, east, or west) each vehicle was traveling at the time of the collision, and then 
comparing this information to Google Earth images of the crossing. This process is very time 
consuming, and also relies heavily on interpretation of the data. In addition to these data, 
information on damage to the grade crossing warning system in an incident would improve the 
ability to determine if the increase in REA-reportable grade crossing incidents is simply due to 
more costly equipment being present at more crossings, or if something else is occurring.  
In the REA database, the type of rail vehicle involved in either a VST or TSV incident 
should be defined (locomotive, railcar, EMU, etc.), and its weight should be included. This 
would improve the utility of the data for derailment prediction and other aspects of grade 
crossing incident safety analysis. The position of each locomotive in the train consist, especially 
if distributed power is being used, should be defined. More generally, complete consist 
information in the REA database would enhance the ability to address a variety of rail safety 
questions, not just at grade crossings. Additionally, many individuals who commented on this 
work over the course of its development asked if emergency brake application played a role in 
derailment occurrence. Adding a field indicating if emergency brakes were applied would 




At a higher level, a helpful addition would be new field with a standard incident number 
to enable unambiguous linkage of incidents reported to the HRA with the report for the same 
incident in the REA database (if it met the criteria for inclusion in the latter). To link the data, I 
developed a technique for creating a unique incident ID relying on the date and location of each 
incident in the REA and HRA databases. However, this required certain assumptions and 
additional data processing that could be avoided if a standard incident number was provided. 
This would bring all REA variables into play for HRA analyses whenever an incident exceeds 
the REA threshold, and vice versa, substantially leveraging the value of both databases with little 
additional effort. 
Perhaps the greatest value that could be added to all three databases is better enforcement 
of completion of all fields in a form when it is submitted, as well as cross-checking logic as 
appropriate to make sure different fields do not contain conflicting data. Due to incomplete, 
incorrect or ambiguous data, I discarded thousands of records from the analysis that could 
otherwise have provided useful information and improved the resolution of the results presented 
here.  Such improvements in reporting accuracy and consistency would have broader benefits in 
terms of improving the utility of these FRA databases that transcend the objectives of my 
research. The three databases varied in terms of the completeness of the information. The REA 
and HRA were roughly similar, but both were more complete than the GCI. The quality and 
completeness of the GCI database varied the most of the three. It is the responsibility of 
individual states to update the GCI data, and states vary widely in their reliability in updating the 
GCI as crossing circumstances change over time.  Further details of opportunities to improve the 
databases and their utility to the U.S. highway and railway safety community can be found in the 




10.1.2. LIDAR Data Opportunities 
Some important opportunities will be available to future researchers in the coming years. 
FRA is currently collecting locomotive-mounted LIDAR data on grade crossings across the U.S. 
LIDAR takes a 3-D scan of the area surrounding the measuring device, which in this case is 
mounted on a locomotive. It can be used to measure clearances (it has been used to assist double-
stack operation), check for encroachment of trees or other debris on the track, etc. Of interest to 
grade crossing research, it could assist with identification of additional variables. For example, 
many railroad practitioners who commented on the work in this dissertation said they believed 
(based on their experience) that track superelevation and curvature influenced derailment 
likelihood. Currently, there is no way to know these factors based on information in the FRA 
databases (though it could be manually cross-referenced from track charts if desired). It would 
also be useful for identifying humped crossings from the database, a factor which currently can 
only be evaluated through visual inspection of crossings. The LIDAR project could also facilitate 
accurate determination of the crossing angle. Depending on how the LIDAR data are made 
available, these factors could be determined based on the output.  
Even if the LIDAR data are not made available to researchers in their entirety, it could be 
possible for FRA to include additional fields for these specific factors. The GCI in particular 
could include these fields by requesting such data from the crossing’s host railroad. The forms 
providing information for the GCI are already being completed by railroad employees (as of 
2015 it was a requirement) and it could be possible to provide more detail. 
Having data about these additional factors would enable refinement of the models 





10.1.3. Proxy Variables 
The proxy variables developed in this dissertation were developed to serve as “average” 
or “typical” conditions at a grade crossing, since it is not possible to determine the exact 
distributions (for example, highway vehicle speeds) at specific crossings based on available 
information. Two approaches could be taken to improve the results of the calculator by 
improving or removing the need for proxies. First, researchers could conduct field studies to 
determine if the proxies discussed here are faithful to real-life scenarios, or to develop more 
accurate proxies. Second, the calculator could be modified so practitioners can provide their own 
distributions based on field studies conducted as part of a crossing upgrade project. The latter 
approach would probably provide the most accurate estimation of derailment likelihood at a 
crossing. A piece of software could be developed that allows users to provide detailed data, or 
select from the available “preset” data developed with the proxy variables.  
10.1.4. Model Adaptability 
It would be interesting to know if the models developed in this dissertation, which were 
developed using U.S. incident data, work for predicting derailments in other countries. The U.S. 
has substantially more freight than passenger traffic. Compared to many other countries this 
pattern is unusual. North American rail equipment is also heavier than that of most other 
countries. This is especially true for passenger rail equipment, which is required to comply with 
robust crashworthiness standards due to the potential for collisions between passenger and 
freight rail equipment (a hazard that is less common in most other countries).  
Refining the model using international data would not only make the model globally 
applicable and therefore helpful to more people, but would provide additional predictive ability 




to derail. What would happen to this likelihood if the U.S. were to begin higher speed rail service 
using lighter passenger rail equipment? Using only U.S. data, it is not possible to answer this 
question analytically, but incorporating international data could enable such analysis. 
10.1.5. Incorporation into Holistic Risk Framework 
The ultimate potential of this model depends on how it is incorporated into the overall 
railroad safety picture. By incorporating collision likelihood models as well as consequence 
models, it would be possible to fully illustrate grade crossing risk. 
10.1.5.1. Collision Modeling 
Considerable research has been conducted related to grade crossing collision likelihood 
modeling. However, there is room to expand on the existing knowledge base and explore new 
techniques for improving safety, especially in the context of the impacts on railroad safety. 
Collision likelihood modeling should continue to develop and evolve. New research may 
be conducted to understand if the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Formula needs to be updated to 
reflect the current state of technology, or if an entirely new formula needs to be developed. The 
latter approach has been undertaken by a variety of researchers to date, producing a variety of 
more accurate models. These may be useful in replacing or augmenting the U.S. DOT formula, 
but since many use small, regional data sets to develop regression models, it should first be 
understood if these are applicable on a wider scale. Current formulas do not differentiate 
between four-quad gates or sealed corridor approaches, compared to traditional two-quad gated 
crossings. As use of these and other augmented warning systems increases, understanding how 




10.1.5.2. Consequence Modeling 
Accurately representing the expected consequences of a grade crossing collision is 
another important aspect of quantifying grade crossing risk. Many of the potential consequences 
have already been investigated to some degree, including hazardous materials releases, highway 
user casualties, and train passenger casualties. However, more work is required to determine how 
these models can be incorporated into a holistic grade crossing risk model.  
Additional factors that have not been modeled previously – such as train crew casualties 
– should be considered as well. Data on such factors can be found in the HRA database. 
Researchers can use these data to develop additional models. 
Once the consequences have been modeled, they can be combined with the incident and 
derailment likelihood models to accurately compare risk between crossings. For example, two 
identical crossings may have the same incident and derailment likelihoods, but different 
consequences in the event of a hazardous materials release, based on population density, 
geography, and other features of the area.  
This grade crossing risk model should also take into account how decision makers react 
to uncertainty – i.e., how their risk aversion might affect the incorporation of various 
consequences. For example, it is likely that the majority of casualties due to grade crossing 
collisions are incurred by highway vehicle occupants, and comparatively few affect train 
passengers or people living near rail lines. However, a single catastrophic grade crossing 
derailment that results in a large number of casualties to passengers or the general public may be 
viewed more negatively than a series of smaller incidents where only one or two people are 




10.1.5.3. Corridor-Based Risk Assessment 
To maximize the utility of this and other railroad risk models, they could be combined 
into a single, corridor-based risk model. The railroad industry is often faced with choices 
regarding where it can invest in safety improvements that may reduce risk. Currently, these areas 
are considered separately; however, if they were all combined into an integrated model, it might 
be possible to determine the greatest sources of risk on a rail corridor and invest accordingly. 
Additionally, incorporating all railroad risks in this matter would help with route 
planning for hazardous materials and other sensitive cargo. Users could determine the tradeoffs 
between, for example, a corridor with a large number of grade crossings and higher FRA track 
class, and one with fewer crossings but lower FRA track class.  
10.2. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation developed a comprehensive statistical understanding of the factors that 
affect the occurrence of derailments caused by highway-rail grade crossing collisions. A core set 
of physical factors were identified and a set of regression models developed that are capable of 
identifying grade crossing incidents that are more or less likely to result in derailment. These 
models were then adapted to account for crossing-specific factors, using a set of proxy variables 
– a series of relationships between incident-specific factors and crossing characteristics. These 
proxy variable relationships were developed based on the study data and provide “expected” 
relationships based on average crossing conditions, a necessary provision in the absence of 
crossing-specific relationships. 
The regression models and proxy variables were incorporated into an Excel calculator that 
prompts users for selected crossing characteristics (highway classification, warning device, 




equations are then evaluated based on the distributions of other factors generated by these 
crossing characteristics. The calculator provides an expected value of the conditional probability 
of derailment (p(D|I)) as well as several point estimates based on percentile. An additional 
output is the p(D|I) distribution, that shows how likely each value of p(D|I) is to occur, based on 
the likelihood of different factor combinations. 
I concluded by explaining how the calculator can be used to consider derailment likelihood 
in a case study. Incident likelihood (and the associated risk to highway users) is just one aspect 
of grade crossing risk. Derailment likelihood, another aspect of that risk, must be considered if 
we are looking at the overall safety implications of grade crossings. My research adds this new 
dimension to our understanding of how to assess grade crossing risk and warning system upgrade 
prioritization. The model allows users to identify crossings with high derailment likelihood, 
something that was not previously possible. This model will enable more informed allocation of 
safety resources to minimize risk due to grade crossings. It can be integrated into an overarching 
risk analysis framework that would consider all sources of risk at a grade crossing. Ultimately, 
such a tool would open up new opportunities for railroad risk reduction, leading to a safer 
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APPENDIX A: DATA CLEAN-UP PROCEDURE 
 
VEHSPD and TRNSPD: If no speeds were reported for a given incident, that incident was 
omitted from the data set. 
LGVEH: The HRA database has a field named TYPVEH. This field defines 11 categories 
of highway user, including automobiles, semi-tractor-trailers, buses, motorcycles and 
pedestrians. For the purposes of this study, incidents involving straight trucks and tractor-
semitrailers (categories B and C) were defined as “large vehicles” and all others were defined as 
“small vehicles”. All incidents were omitted which were classified as “other motor vehicles,” 
“pedestrian” or “other”. The “other motor vehicles” and “other” categories were omitted because 
it is not possible to reliably identify whether the vehicle is large or small. According to the 
narrative fields for the “other motor vehicle” entries, the vehicles range from small vehicles such 
as snowmobiles and SUVs to very large vehicles such as road graders and farm equipment. The 
“other” category should be used to describe any vehicle involved in a collision which is not a 
motorized vehicle; however, the narrative field indicates that many of these incidents involved 
motorized vehicles such as all-terrain vehicles, SUVs, and farm equipment. Other collisions 
involve bicycles and horse-and-buggies. Since the “other” category is such a mixture of vehicle 
types, these incidents were omitted. Removing these categories decreased the size of the dataset 
by about 2,500 entries. It is possible that about half of these could be added back to the dataset if 
the narrative fields were used to recode the vehicle type manually. However, the dataset is large 
enough that these entries are unnecessary. 
TRNSTK: The HRA database has a field named TYPACC, which indicates whether the 




TYPACC = 1, then rail equipment struck the highway user, therefore TRNSTK =  Y; if 
TYPACC = 2, then the rail equipment was struck by the highway user, therefore TRNSTK = N.  
TRKCLAS, WARNSIG, VIEW and PUBLIC: If any of these fields had no value reported, 
then that data point was excluded. 
XTYPE: The HRA database contains a field called CROSSING which lists all of the 
crossing warning devices in use at the time of the incident. CROSSING has 12 values indicating 
the type of device. For the purposes of this study, the data were re-categorized into 5 groups, as 
shown in Table A.1. Any incident record missing the CROSSING data was omitted from 
analysis. 
 
Table A.1  XTYPE and CROSSING categories 
 
XTYPE CROSSING 
1: Gates 01: Gates 
2: Active (excluding gates) 02: Cantilever flashers; 03: Standard flashers; 04: Wig wags; 
05: Highway traffic signals; 06: Audible 
3: Passive 07: Crossbucks; 08: Stop signs 
4: Other 09: Watchman; 10: Flagged by crew; 11: Other (specify) 




















1 Freight Train 258 36,727 Freight 
2 Passenger Train 38 3,380 Passenger 
3 Commuter Train 4 671 Passenger 
4 Work Train 7 740 Freight 
5 Single Car 0 47 Freight (cars) 
6 Cut of Cars 1 45 Freight (cars) 
7 Yard or Switching Train 3 3,734 Freight 
8 Light Locos 6 2,983 Freight (locos) 
9 Maintenance/Inspection Car 10 528 Passenger (cars) 
A Maintenance-of-Way 
Equipment 





APPENDIX C: WARNING DEVICE GROUPS 
 
Table C.1: Warning Device Groups 
HRA Data File 
Structure Value 
WDCODE 
HRA Data File Structure 
Definition 
Chadwick Grouping 
01 8 Gates Gates 
02 7 Cantilever Flashing Lights Active 
03 7 Standard Flashing Lights Active 
04 6 Wig Wags Active 
05 6 Highway Traffic Signals Active 
06 6 Audible Active 
07 3 Cross Bucks Passive 
08 4 Stop Signs Passive 
09 1 Watchman Other (Omitted) 
10 1 Flagged by Crew Other (Omitted) 
11 2 Other (Specify) Other (Omitted) 












Figure D.1: Speed distributions for VST incidents, for (top) passive, (middle) active, and 










Figure D.2: Speed distributions for TSV-M incidents, for (top) passive, (middle) active, and 




APPENDIX E: HIGHWAY CLASSIFICATION CODES 
 
Table E.1: Highway Classification Codes 




Rural Arterial 2 
6 
 
Rural Principal Arterial 
Rural Minor Arterial 
Rural Collector 7 
8 
 
Rural Major Collector 
Rural Minor Collector 
Rural Local 9 
 
Rural Local Road 
Urban Arterial 14 
16 
 
Urban Other Principal Arterial 
Urban Minor Arterial 
Urban Collector 17 
 
Urban Collector 
Urban Local 19 
 






APPENDIX F: LIKELIHOOD OF TRUCK INVOLVEMENT 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table G.2: Large-to-small vehicle ratio by incident type, equipment type, warning device 
type and highway classification 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Freight  Passenger 
Count  Percent of Total  
All Vehicles Percent 
of Total 
Large 




Vehicles   
1 1408 4448  0.56433 0.55565  381 0.75595 
2 235 594  0.09419 0.07420  64 0.12698 
3 96 195  0.03848 0.02436  27 0.05357 
4 46 113  0.01844 0.01412  12 0.02381 
5 36 126  0.01443 0.01574  1 0.00198 
6 39 91  0.01563 0.01137  6 0.01190 
7 29 70  0.01162 0.00874  4 0.00794 
8 22 66  0.00882 0.00824  1 0.00198 
9 15 49  0.00601 0.00612  1 0.00198 
10 28 104  0.01122 0.01299  3 0.00595 
11 19 42  0.00762 0.00525  0 0.00000 
12 18 51  0.00721 0.00637  1 0.00198 
13 15 46  0.00601 0.00575  0 0.00000 
14 14 49  0.00561 0.00612  2 0.00397 
15 13 69  0.00521 0.00862  0 0.00000 
16 8 54  0.00321 0.00675  0 0.00000 
17 9 42  0.00361 0.00525  0 0.00000 
18 8 32  0.00321 0.00400  0 0.00000 
19 12 32  0.00481 0.00400  0 0.00000 
20 8 94  0.00321 0.01174  1 0.00198 
21 12 29  0.00481 0.00362  0 0.00000 
22 11 43  0.00441 0.00537  0 0.00000 
23 12 34  0.00481 0.00425  0 0.00000 
24 10 28  0.00401 0.00350  0 0.00000 
25 15 45  0.00601 0.00562  0 0.00000 
26 8 28  0.00321 0.00350  0 0.00000 
27 9 35  0.00361 0.00437  0 0.00000 
28 6 33  0.00240 0.00412  0 0.00000 
29 5 27  0.00200 0.00337  0 0.00000 
30 13 45  0.00521 0.00562  0 0.00000 
31 6 32  0.00240 0.00400  0 0.00000 
32 6 27  0.00240 0.00337  0 0.00000 
33 8 21  0.00321 0.00262  0 0.00000 
34 11 18  0.00441 0.00225  0 0.00000 
35 11 28  0.00441 0.00350  0 0.00000 
36 4 19  0.00160 0.00237  0 0.00000 
37 4 16  0.00160 0.00200  0 0.00000 
38 5 26  0.00200 0.00325  0 0.00000 
224 
 





Freight  Passenger 










Vehicles   
39 6 18  0.00240 0.00225  0 0.00000 
40 13 42  0.00521 0.00525  0 0.00000 
41 4 25  0.00160 0.00312  0 0.00000 
42 1 21  0.00040 0.00262  0 0.00000 
43 2 16  0.00080 0.00200  0 0.00000 
44 7 24  0.00281 0.00300  0 0.00000 
45 7 22  0.00281 0.00275  0 0.00000 
46 15 23  0.00601 0.00287  0 0.00000 
47 6 20  0.00240 0.00250  0 0.00000 
48 6 20  0.00240 0.00250  0 0.00000 
49 6 15  0.00240 0.00187  0 0.00000 
50 6 46  0.00240 0.00575  0 0.00000 
51 5 18  0.00200 0.00225  0 0.00000 
52 5 24  0.00200 0.00300  0 0.00000 
53 4 9  0.00160 0.00112  0 0.00000 
54 4 16  0.00160 0.00200  0 0.00000 
55 4 19  0.00160 0.00237  0 0.00000 
56 3 19  0.00120 0.00237  0 0.00000 
57 5 17  0.00200 0.00212  0 0.00000 
58 3 17  0.00120 0.00212  0 0.00000 
59 2 13  0.00080 0.00162  0 0.00000 
60 5 34  0.00200 0.00425  0 0.00000 
61 7 18  0.00281 0.00225  0 0.00000 
62 3 12  0.00120 0.00150  0 0.00000 
63 5 16  0.00200 0.00200  0 0.00000 
64 3 18  0.00120 0.00225  0 0.00000 
65 5 22  0.00200 0.00275  0 0.00000 
66 2 17  0.00080 0.00212  0 0.00000 
67 2 21  0.00080 0.00262  0 0.00000 
68 7 8  0.00281 0.00100  0 0.00000 
69 1 8  0.00040 0.00100  0 0.00000 
70 3 12  0.00120 0.00150  0 0.00000 
71 4 16  0.00160 0.00200  0 0.00000 
72 1 11  0.00040 0.00137  0 0.00000 
73 4 11  0.00160 0.00137  0 0.00000 
74 2 12  0.00080 0.00150  0 0.00000 
75 4 22  0.00160 0.00275  0 0.00000 









Freight  Passenger 










Vehicles   
77 2 8  0.00080 0.00100  0 0.00000 
78 6 10  0.00240 0.00125  0 0.00000 
79 1 14  0.00040 0.00175  0 0.00000 
80 6 22  0.00240 0.00275  0 0.00000 
81 3 14  0.00120 0.00175  0 0.00000 
82 3 8  0.00120 0.00100  0 0.00000 
83 1 9  0.00040 0.00112  0 0.00000 
84 3 16  0.00120 0.00200  0 0.00000 
85 4 17  0.00160 0.00212  0 0.00000 
86 3 6  0.00120 0.00075  0 0.00000 
87 5 4  0.00200 0.00050  0 0.00000 
88 4 12  0.00160 0.00150  0 0.00000 
89 2 12  0.00080 0.00150  0 0.00000 
90 1 15  0.00040 0.00187  0 0.00000 
91 4 6  0.00160 0.00075  0 0.00000 
92 0 8  0.00000 0.00100  0 0.00000 
93 2 11  0.00080 0.00137  0 0.00000 
94 2 11  0.00080 0.00137  0 0.00000 
95 2 8  0.00080 0.00100  0 0.00000 
96 3 13  0.00120 0.00162  0 0.00000 
97 0 9  0.00000 0.00112  0 0.00000 
98 3 10  0.00120 0.00125  0 0.00000 
99 0 10  0.00000 0.00125  0 0.00000 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight
1 - 5 16 28 0.5926 0.0802 24 66 0.4706 0.0547
6 - 10 6 41 0.2222 0.1175 16 113 0.3137 0.0936
11 - 15 4 41 0.1481 0.1175 8 82 0.1569 0.0679
16 - 20 0 27 0.0000 0.0774 2 72 0.0392 0.0597
21 - 25 0 20 0.0000 0.0573 0 63 0.0000 0.0522
26 - 30 0 16 0.0000 0.0458 0 63 0.0000 0.0522
31 - 35 0 17 0.0000 0.0487 0 54 0.0000 0.0447
36 - 40 1 8 0.0370 0.0229 0 50 0.0000 0.0414
41 - 45 0 7 0.0000 0.0201 1 66 0.0196 0.0547
46 - 50 0 11 0.0000 0.0315 0 42 0.0000 0.0348
51 - 55 0 8 0.0000 0.0229 0 35 0.0000 0.0290
56 - 60 0 12 0.0000 0.0344 0 36 0.0000 0.0298
61 - 65 0 10 0.0000 0.0287 0 34 0.0000 0.0282
66 - 70 0 13 0.0000 0.0372 0 34 0.0000 0.0282
71 - 75 0 10 0.0000 0.0287 0 45 0.0000 0.0373
76 - 80 0 12 0.0000 0.0344 0 51 0.0000 0.0423
81 - 85 0 12 0.0000 0.0344 0 33 0.0000 0.0273
86 - 90 0 4 0.0000 0.0115 0 34 0.0000 0.0282
91 - 95 0 12 0.0000 0.0344 0 49 0.0000 0.0406
96 - 100 0 4 0.0000 0.0115 0 30 0.0000 0.0249
101 - 105 0 5 0.0000 0.0143 0 31 0.0000 0.0257
106 - 110 0 9 0.0000 0.0258 0 25 0.0000 0.0207
111 - 115 0 12 0.0000 0.0344 0 22 0.0000 0.0182
116 - 120 0 2 0.0000 0.0057 0 21 0.0000 0.0174
121 - 125 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 13 0.0000 0.0108
126 - 130 0 2 0.0000 0.0057 0 10 0.0000 0.0083
131 - 135 0 1 0.0000 0.0029 0 12 0.0000 0.0099
136 - 140 0 1 0.0000 0.0029 0 9 0.0000 0.0075
141 - 145 0 1 0.0000 0.0029 0 3 0.0000 0.0025
146 - 150 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 3 0.0000 0.0025
151 - 155 0 2 0.0000 0.0057 0 3 0.0000 0.0025
156 - 160 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 1 0.0000 0.0008
161 - 165 0 1 0.0000 0.0029 0 1 0.0000 0.0008
166 - 170 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
171 - 175 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
176 - 180 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
181 - 185 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 1 0.0000 0.0008
186 - 190 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
191 - 195 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
196 - 200 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
201 - 205 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
Track Class 1
Count Percent of TotalTrain Length 
(rail vehicles)
Track Class 2
Count Percent of Total
228 
 




Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight
1 - 5 76 66 0.2992 0.0257 278 82 0.3244 0.0163
6 - 10 132 103 0.5197 0.0401 293 146 0.3419 0.0290
11 - 15 33 111 0.1299 0.0432 177 141 0.2065 0.0280
16 - 20 9 84 0.0354 0.0327 61 165 0.0712 0.0328
21 - 25 2 115 0.0079 0.0447 20 171 0.0233 0.0340
26 - 30 0 92 0.0000 0.0358 8 228 0.0093 0.0453
31 - 35 1 98 0.0039 0.0381 4 217 0.0047 0.0431
36 - 40 0 107 0.0000 0.0416 2 241 0.0023 0.0479
41 - 45 0 110 0.0000 0.0428 6 246 0.0070 0.0489
46 - 50 1 103 0.0039 0.0401 4 202 0.0047 0.0401
51 - 55 0 101 0.0000 0.0393 2 226 0.0023 0.0449
56 - 60 0 90 0.0000 0.0350 0 232 0.0000 0.0461
61 - 65 0 106 0.0000 0.0412 0 232 0.0000 0.0461
66 - 70 0 109 0.0000 0.0424 0 238 0.0000 0.0473
71 - 75 0 97 0.0000 0.0377 0 203 0.0000 0.0403
76 - 80 0 118 0.0000 0.0459 0 211 0.0000 0.0419
81 - 85 0 98 0.0000 0.0381 0 193 0.0000 0.0383
86 - 90 0 109 0.0000 0.0424 0 166 0.0000 0.0330
91 - 95 0 133 0.0000 0.0518 0 182 0.0000 0.0361
96 - 100 0 98 0.0000 0.0381 1 179 0.0012 0.0356
101 - 105 0 105 0.0000 0.0409 1 179 0.0012 0.0356
106 - 110 0 90 0.0000 0.0350 0 162 0.0000 0.0322
111 - 115 0 76 0.0000 0.0296 0 150 0.0000 0.0298
116 - 120 0 67 0.0000 0.0261 0 180 0.0000 0.0357
121 - 125 0 50 0.0000 0.0195 0 118 0.0000 0.0234
126 - 130 0 48 0.0000 0.0187 0 114 0.0000 0.0226
131 - 135 0 22 0.0000 0.0086 0 74 0.0000 0.0147
136 - 140 0 19 0.0000 0.0074 0 67 0.0000 0.0133
141 - 145 0 13 0.0000 0.0051 0 19 0.0000 0.0038
146 - 150 0 10 0.0000 0.0039 0 20 0.0000 0.0040
151 - 155 0 7 0.0000 0.0027 0 31 0.0000 0.0062
156 - 160 0 5 0.0000 0.0019 0 3 0.0000 0.0006
161 - 165 0 1 0.0000 0.0004 0 9 0.0000 0.0018
166 - 170 0 5 0.0000 0.0019 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
171 - 175 0 3 0.0000 0.0012 0 4 0.0000 0.0008
176 - 180 0 1 0.0000 0.0004 0 1 0.0000 0.0002
181 - 185 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
186 - 190 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
191 - 195 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 2 0.0000 0.0004
196 - 200 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 1 0.0000 0.0002






Count Percent of Total
Track Class 4
Count Percent of Total
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Table G.5 (cont.) 
 
 
Passenger Freight Passenger Freight
1 - 5 12 10 0.1395 0.0122
6 - 10 54 10 0.6279 0.0122
11 - 15 16 15 0.1860 0.0183
16 - 20 1 17 0.0116 0.0207
21 - 25 0 22 0.0000 0.0268
26 - 30 2 30 0.0233 0.0366
31 - 35 0 25 0.0000 0.0305
36 - 40 0 45 0.0000 0.0549
41 - 45 0 37 0.0000 0.0451
46 - 50 0 36 0.0000 0.0439
51 - 55 0 40 0.0000 0.0488
56 - 60 0 41 0.0000 0.0500
61 - 65 0 41 0.0000 0.0500
66 - 70 1 59 0.0116 0.0720
71 - 75 0 70 0.0000 0.0854
76 - 80 0 56 0.0000 0.0683
81 - 85 0 34 0.0000 0.0415
86 - 90 0 19 0.0000 0.0232
91 - 95 0 20 0.0000 0.0244
96 - 100 0 23 0.0000 0.0280
101 - 105 0 34 0.0000 0.0415
106 - 110 0 30 0.0000 0.0366
111 - 115 0 32 0.0000 0.0390
116 - 120 0 30 0.0000 0.0366
121 - 125 0 9 0.0000 0.0110
126 - 130 0 14 0.0000 0.0171
131 - 135 0 7 0.0000 0.0085
136 - 140 0 9 0.0000 0.0110
141 - 145 0 3 0.0000 0.0037
146 - 150 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
151 - 155 0 1 0.0000 0.0012
156 - 160 0 1 0.0000 0.0012
161 - 165 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
166 - 170 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
171 - 175 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
176 - 180 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
181 - 185 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
186 - 190 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
191 - 195 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
196 - 200 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
201 - 205 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
Track Class 5







APPENDIX H: SUPPLEMENTARY FILES 
 
 
The supplementary file “Form_54_REA_DataStructure” is a .pdf file containing the 
datafile structure and field input specifications for the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
Rail Equipment Accident/Incident database.  
 
The supplementary file “Form_57_HRA_DataStructure” is a .pdf file containing the 
datafile structure and field input specifications for the FRA Highway-Rail Grade Crossing 
Accident/Incident database.  
 
 The supplementary file “GX_Inventory_FileStructure” is a .pdf file containing the data 
file structure and field input specifications for the U.S. DOT Crossing Inventory Form.  
 
 These files were downloaded from the FRA Office of Safety website in 2015. They are 
included with this dissertation because the fields and associated file structures in the databases 





APPENDIX I: STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
 
 
I.1. CHAPTER 5 – FREIGHT MODEL 
I.1.1. Unified Model (Section 5.4.1) 
Input 
title 'Stepwise regression on freight set c2'; *best; 
proc logistic data=work.freight_c2 outest=betas covout; 
class lgveh trnstk ; 
model derail(event="1")= trnstk lgveh vehspd2 trnspd2 / selection=stepwise 
waldcl clparm=wald ctable lackfit; 






Stepwise regression on freight set c2 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.FREIGHT_C2  
Response Variable DERAIL DERAIL 
Number of Response Levels 2   
Model binary logit   
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring   
 
Number of Observations Read 996 







1 0 664 
2 1 332 
 
Probability modeled is DERAIL=1. 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Class Level Information 
Class Value Design 
Variables 
LGVEH N 1 
  Y -1 
TRNSTK N 1 
  Y -1 
 




Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
-2 Log L = 1267.936 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
145.9513 4 <.0001 
 
Step 1. Effect VEHSPD2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 1269.936 1166.291 
SC 1274.840 1176.098 
-2 Log L 1267.936 1162.291 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 105.6453 1 <.0001 
Score 109.3188 1 <.0001 
Wald 90.9321 1 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
39.4155 3 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 1 are removed. 
 
Step 2. Effect LGVEH entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 1269.936 1151.122 
SC 1274.840 1165.833 
-2 Log L 1267.936 1145.122 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 122.8141 2 <.0001 
Score 123.5302 2 <.0001 





Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
23.6777 2 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 2 are removed. 
 
Step 3. Effect TRNSTK entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 1269.936 1137.059 
SC 1274.840 1156.674 
-2 Log L 1267.936 1129.059 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 138.8768 3 <.0001 
Score 139.4060 3 <.0001 
Wald 113.2547 3 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
7.1074 1 0.0077 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 3 are removed. 
 
Step 4. Effect TRNSPD2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 1269.936 1131.981 
SC 1274.840 1156.500 
-2 Log L 1267.936 1121.981 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 145.9548 4 <.0001 
Score 145.9513 4 <.0001 
Wald 117.7824 4 <.0001 
 





Note: All effects have been entered into the model. 
Summary of Stepwise Selection 






Pr > ChiSq Variable 
Label Entered Removed 
1 VEHSPD2  1 1 109.3188   <.0001 VEHSPD2 
2 LGVEH   1 2 16.1397   <.0001 LGVEH 
3 TRNSTK   1 3 16.7521   <.0001 TRNSTK 
4 TRNSPD2  1 4 7.1074   0.0077 TRNSPD2 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
TRNSTK 1 13.0373 0.0003 
LGVEH 1 16.2197 <.0001 
VEHSPD2 1 35.5985 <.0001 
TRNSPD2 1 7.0565 0.0079 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept   1 -0.6001 0.2470 5.9027 0.0151 
TRNSTK N 1 0.3822 0.1059 13.0373 0.0003 
LGVEH N 1 -0.4106 0.1019 16.2197 <.0001 
VEHSPD2   1 0.0316 0.00530 35.5985 <.0001 
TRNSPD2   1 -0.0141 0.00533 7.0565 0.0079 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
TRNSTK N vs Y 2.148 1.418 3.252 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.440 0.295 0.656 
VEHSPD2 1.032 1.021 1.043 
TRNSPD2 0.986 0.976 0.996 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 69.8 Somers' D 0.401 
Percent Discordant 29.7 Gamma 0.403 
Percent Tied 0.6 Tau-a 0.178 
Pairs 220448 c 0.700 
 
Parameter Estimates and Wald Confidence 
Intervals 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -0.6001 -1.0842 -0.1160 
TRNSTK N 0.3822 0.1747 0.5897 
LGVEH N -0.4106 -0.6104 -0.2108 
VEHSPD2   0.0316 0.0212 0.0420 
TRNSPD2   -0.0141 -0.0246 -0.00371 
 
Partition for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Group Total DERAIL = 1  DERAIL = 0  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 100 12 12.46 88 87.54 
2 101 20 19.25 81 81.75 
3 100 29 22.78 71 77.22 
4 100 27 24.42 73 75.58 




6 98 21 28.16 77 69.84 
7 100 31 31.77 69 68.23 
8 100 36 38.91 64 61.09 
9 100 55 54.11 45 45.89 
10 96 77 73.53 19 22.47 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 


















0.080 332 0 664 0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 . 
0.100 330 6 658 2 33.7 99.4 0.9 66.6 25.0 
0.120 325 33 631 7 35.9 97.9 5.0 66.0 17.5 
0.140 320 71 593 12 39.3 96.4 10.7 65.0 14.5 
0.160 316 99 565 16 41.7 95.2 14.9 64.1 13.9 
0.180 314 119 545 18 43.5 94.6 17.9 63.4 13.1 
0.200 307 137 527 25 44.6 92.5 20.6 63.2 15.4 
0.220 295 170 494 37 46.7 88.9 25.6 62.6 17.9 
0.240 265 250 414 67 51.7 79.8 37.7 61.0 21.1 
0.260 232 342 322 100 57.6 69.9 51.5 58.1 22.6 
0.280 217 405 259 115 62.4 65.4 61.0 54.4 22.1 
0.300 198 461 203 134 66.2 59.6 69.4 50.6 22.5 
0.320 175 499 165 157 67.7 52.7 75.2 48.5 23.9 
0.340 168 531 133 164 70.2 50.6 80.0 44.2 23.6 
0.360 158 549 115 174 71.0 47.6 82.7 42.1 24.1 
0.380 155 565 99 177 72.3 46.7 85.1 39.0 23.9 
0.400 145 575 89 187 72.3 43.7 86.6 38.0 24.5 
0.420 139 586 78 193 72.8 41.9 88.3 35.9 24.8 
0.440 133 597 67 199 73.3 40.1 89.9 33.5 25.0 
0.460 125 606 58 207 73.4 37.7 91.3 31.7 25.5 
0.480 119 610 54 213 73.2 35.8 91.9 31.2 25.9 
0.500 114 613 51 218 73.0 34.3 92.3 30.9 26.2 
0.520 105 615 49 227 72.3 31.6 92.6 31.8 27.0 
0.540 103 619 45 229 72.5 31.0 93.2 30.4 27.0 
0.560 99 623 41 233 72.5 29.8 93.8 29.3 27.2 
0.580 92 627 37 240 72.2 27.7 94.4 28.7 27.7 
0.600 87 631 33 245 72.1 26.2 95.0 27.5 28.0 
0.620 82 638 26 250 72.3 24.7 96.1 24.1 28.2 
0.640 77 642 22 255 72.2 23.2 96.7 22.2 28.4 
0.660 72 645 19 260 72.0 21.7 97.1 20.9 28.7 
0.680 63 646 18 269 71.2 19.0 97.3 22.2 29.4 
0.700 57 651 13 275 71.1 17.2 98.0 18.6 29.7 
0.720 52 651 13 280 70.6 15.7 98.0 20.0 30.1 
0.740 46 651 13 286 70.0 13.9 98.0 22.0 30.5 
0.760 42 653 11 290 69.8 12.7 98.3 20.8 30.8 
0.780 34 655 9 298 69.2 10.2 98.6 20.9 31.3 
0.800 27 657 7 305 68.7 8.1 98.9 20.6 31.7 
0.820 17 660 4 315 68.0 5.1 99.4 19.0 32.3 
0.840 11 663 1 321 67.7 3.3 99.8 8.3 32.6 
0.860 10 664 0 322 67.7 3.0 100.0 0.0 32.7 
0.880 5 664 0 327 67.2 1.5 100.0 0.0 33.0 
0.900 2 664 0 330 66.9 0.6 100.0 0.0 33.2 
0.920 1 664 0 331 66.8 0.3 100.0 0.0 33.3 





Fit Statistics for SCORE Data 














































I.2. Split Model (Section 5.4.2) 
I.2.1.1. Input 
title 'Stepwise regression on freight set c1n'; *best; 
proc logistic data=work.freight_c1n outest=betas covout; 
class lgveh  ; 
model derail(event="1")= lgveh vehspd2 vehspd2*vehspd2 trnspd2 
trnspd2*trnspd2 lgveh*vehspd2 lgveh*trnspd2 / selection=stepwise waldcl 
clparm=wald ctable details lackfit outroc=roc1; 
score data=work.freight_an fitstat; 
run ;; 
 
title 'Stepwise regression on freight set c2y' ; *best; 
proc logistic data=work.freight_c2y outest=betas covout; 
class lgveh  ; 
model derail(event="1")= lgveh vehspd2 vehspd2*vehspd2 trnspd2 
trnspd2*trnspd2 lgveh*vehspd2 lgveh*trnspd2/ selection=stepwise waldcl 
clparm=wald ctable details lackfit outroc=roc1; 





Stepwise regression on freight set c1n 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.FREIGHT_C1N   
Response Variable DERAIL DERAIL 
Number of Response Levels 2   
Model binary logit   
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring   
 
Number of Observations Read 330 










1 0 220 
2 1 110 
 
Probability modeled is DERAIL=1. 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Class Level Information 
Class Value Design 
Variables 
LGVEH N 1 
  Y -1 
 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
-2 Log L = 420.099 
 
 
Note: Under full-rank parameterizations, Type 3 effect tests are replaced by joint tests. The joint test for an effect 
is a test that all the parameters associated with that effect are zero. Such joint tests might not be equivalent 
to Type 3 effect tests under GLM parameterization. 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.6931 0.1168 35.2332 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
145.5167 7 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 101.6950 <.0001 
VEHSPD2 1 64.0986 <.0001 
TRNSPD2 1 1.2611 0.2614 
 
Step 1. Effect LGVEH entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 422.099 315.792 
SC 425.898 323.390 





Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 108.3075 1 <.0001 
Score 101.6950 1 <.0001 
Wald 81.0998 1 <.0001 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 81.0998 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept   1 -0.8855 0.1527 33.6325 <.0001 
LGVEH N 1 -1.3750 0.1527 81.0998 <.0001 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.064 0.035 0.116 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 62.6 Somers' D 0.586 
Percent Discordant 4.0 Gamma 0.880 
Percent Tied 33.4 Tau-a 0.261 
Pairs 24200 c 0.793 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
61.5805 6 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Removal 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 81.0998 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 1 are removed. 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
VEHSPD2 1 49.6191 <.0001 
TRNSPD2 1 0.3041 0.5814 
 
Step 2. Effect VEHSPD2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 422.099 266.042 
SC 425.898 277.439 





Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 160.0573 2 <.0001 
Score 138.4282 2 <.0001 
Wald 85.7872 2 <.0001 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 68.6283 <.0001 
VEHSPD2 1 41.6378 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept   1 -2.5140 0.3180 62.4968 <.0001 
LGVEH N 1 -1.4430 0.1742 68.6283 <.0001 
VEHSPD2   1 0.0578 0.00896 41.6378 <.0001 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.056 0.028 0.110 
VEHSPD2 1.060 1.041 1.078 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 87.5 Somers' D 0.770 
Percent Discordant 10.6 Gamma 0.785 
Percent Tied 1.9 Tau-a 0.343 
Pairs 24200 c 0.885 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
9.8623 5 0.0792 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Removal 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 68.6283 <.0001 
VEHSPD2 1 41.6378 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 2 are removed. 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
VEHSPD2*VEHSPD2 1 8.2480 0.0041 
TRNSPD2 1 0.6923 0.4054 
VEHSPD2*LGVEH 1 0.9219 0.3370 
 
Step 3. Effect VEHSPD2*VEHSPD2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 





Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 422.099 258.609 
SC 425.898 273.806 
-2 Log L 420.099 250.609 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 169.4899 3 <.0001 
Score 143.7228 3 <.0001 
Wald 77.8157 3 <.0001 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 65.0136 <.0001 
VEHSPD2 1 1.1976 0.2738 
VEHSPD2*VEHSPD2 1 8.0992 0.0044 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept   1 -1.6815 0.4086 16.9338 <.0001 
LGVEH N 1 -1.5233 0.1889 65.0136 <.0001 
VEHSPD2   1 -0.0359 0.0328 1.1976 0.2738 
VEHSPD2*VEHSPD2   1 0.00159 0.000558 8.0992 0.0044 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.048 0.023 0.100 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 87.1 Somers' D 0.762 
Percent Discordant 11.0 Gamma 0.776 
Percent Tied 1.9 Tau-a 0.340 
Pairs 24200 c 0.881 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
1.9391 4 0.7470 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Removal 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 65.0136 <.0001 
VEHSPD2*VEHSPD2 1 8.0992 0.0044 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 3 are removed. 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
TRNSPD2 1 0.6109 0.4344 
VEHSPD2*LGVEH 1 0.0525 0.8188 
 




Summary of Stepwise Selection 






Pr > ChiSq Variable 
Label Entered Removed 
1 LGVEH   1 1 101.6950   <.0001 LGVEH 
2 VEHSPD2   1 2 49.6191   <.0001 VEHSPD2 
3 VEHSPD2*VEHSPD2   1 3 8.2480   0.0041   
 
Parameter Estimates and Wald Confidence Intervals 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -1.6815 -2.4824 -0.8806 
LGVEH N -1.5233 -1.8936 -1.1530 
VEHSPD2   -0.0359 -0.1002 0.0284 









Partition for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Group Total DERAIL = 1  DERAIL = 0  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 36 2 1.16 34 34.84 
2 25 1 0.82 24 24.18 
3 30 1 1.03 29 28.97 
4 29 1 1.12 28 27.88 
5 31 2 2.31 29 28.69 
6 35 11 10.95 24 24.05 
7 39 19 16.82 20 22.18 
8 35 16 17.51 19 17.49 
9 33 21 23.72 12 9.28 
10 37 36 34.56 1 2.44 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 


















0.020 110 0 220 0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 . 
0.040 105 106 114 5 63.9 95.5 48.2 52.1 4.5 




0.080 104 137 83 6 73.0 94.5 62.3 44.4 4.2 
0.100 103 137 83 7 72.7 93.6 62.3 44.6 4.9 
0.120 103 144 76 7 74.8 93.6 65.5 42.5 4.6 
0.140 103 144 76 7 74.8 93.6 65.5 42.5 4.6 
0.160 103 144 76 7 74.8 93.6 65.5 42.5 4.6 
0.180 103 150 70 7 76.7 93.6 68.2 40.5 4.5 
0.200 103 150 70 7 76.7 93.6 68.2 40.5 4.5 
0.220 103 151 69 7 77.0 93.6 68.6 40.1 4.4 
0.240 103 151 69 7 77.0 93.6 68.6 40.1 4.4 
0.260 99 151 69 11 75.8 90.0 68.6 41.1 6.8 
0.280 99 159 61 11 78.2 90.0 72.3 38.1 6.5 
0.300 99 159 61 11 78.2 90.0 72.3 38.1 6.5 
0.320 99 159 61 11 78.2 90.0 72.3 38.1 6.5 
0.340 99 159 61 11 78.2 90.0 72.3 38.1 6.5 
0.360 99 159 61 11 78.2 90.0 72.3 38.1 6.5 
0.380 99 159 61 11 78.2 90.0 72.3 38.1 6.5 
0.400 98 159 61 12 77.9 89.1 72.3 38.4 7.0 
0.420 84 166 54 26 75.8 76.4 75.5 39.1 13.5 
0.440 70 179 41 40 75.5 63.6 81.4 36.9 18.3 
0.460 70 192 28 40 79.4 63.6 87.3 28.6 17.2 
0.480 65 193 27 45 78.2 59.1 87.7 29.3 18.9 
0.500 65 204 16 45 81.5 59.1 92.7 19.8 18.1 
0.520 65 204 16 45 81.5 59.1 92.7 19.8 18.1 
0.540 65 204 16 45 81.5 59.1 92.7 19.8 18.1 
0.560 59 205 15 51 80.0 53.6 93.2 20.3 19.9 
0.580 57 205 15 53 79.4 51.8 93.2 20.8 20.5 
0.600 57 205 15 53 79.4 51.8 93.2 20.8 20.5 
0.620 57 205 15 53 79.4 51.8 93.2 20.8 20.5 
0.640 50 212 8 60 79.4 45.5 96.4 13.8 22.1 
0.660 50 212 8 60 79.4 45.5 96.4 13.8 22.1 
0.680 50 212 8 60 79.4 45.5 96.4 13.8 22.1 
0.700 50 212 8 60 79.4 45.5 96.4 13.8 22.1 
0.720 44 212 8 66 77.6 40.0 96.4 15.4 23.7 
0.740 44 215 5 66 78.5 40.0 97.7 10.2 23.5 
0.760 44 215 5 66 78.5 40.0 97.7 10.2 23.5 
0.780 44 216 4 66 78.8 40.0 98.2 8.3 23.4 
0.800 44 216 4 66 78.8 40.0 98.2 8.3 23.4 
0.820 36 219 1 74 77.3 32.7 99.5 2.7 25.3 
0.840 36 219 1 74 77.3 32.7 99.5 2.7 25.3 
0.860 36 219 1 74 77.3 32.7 99.5 2.7 25.3 
0.880 35 219 1 75 77.0 31.8 99.5 2.8 25.5 
0.900 25 220 0 85 74.2 22.7 100.0 0.0 27.9 
0.920 24 220 0 86 73.9 21.8 100.0 0.0 28.1 
0.940 12 220 0 98 70.3 10.9 100.0 0.0 30.8 
0.960 12 220 0 98 70.3 10.9 100.0 0.0 30.8 
0.980 9 220 0 101 69.4 8.2 100.0 0.0 31.5 
1.000 0 220 0 110 66.7 0.0 100.0 . 33.3 
 
Fit Statistics for SCORE Data 















































Stepwise regression on freight set c2y 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.FREIGHT_C2Y   
Response Variable DERAIL DERAIL 
Number of Response Levels 2   
Model binary logit   
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring   
 
Number of Observations Read 606 







1 0 404 
2 1 202 
 
Probability modeled is DERAIL=1. 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Class Level Information 
Class Value Design 
Variables 
LGVEH N 1 
  Y -1 
 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
-2 Log L = 771.455 
 
 
Note: Under full-rank parameterizations, Type 3 effect tests are replaced by joint tests. The joint test for an effect 
is a test that all the parameters associated with that effect are zero. Such joint tests might not be equivalent 
to Type 3 effect tests under GLM parameterization. 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.6931 0.0862 64.7010 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
239.0867 7 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 223.5137 <.0001 
VEHSPD2 1 10.0964 0.0015 





Step 1. Effect LGVEH entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 773.455 514.318 
SC 777.862 523.132 
-2 Log L 771.455 510.318 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 261.1371 1 <.0001 
Score 223.5137 1 <.0001 
Wald 121.6025 1 <.0001 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 121.6025 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept   1 -1.4475 0.1709 71.7278 <.0001 
LGVEH N 1 -1.8847 0.1709 121.6025 <.0001 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.023 0.012 0.045 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 65.9 Somers' D 0.644 
Percent Discordant 1.5 Gamma 0.955 
Percent Tied 32.6 Tau-a 0.287 
Pairs 81608 c 0.822 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
16.6537 6 0.0106 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Removal 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 121.6025 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 1 are removed. 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
VEHSPD2 1 2.5173 0.1126 





Step 2. Effect TRNSPD2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 773.455 511.554 
SC 777.862 524.775 
-2 Log L 771.455 505.554 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 265.9011 2 <.0001 
Score 226.4661 2 <.0001 
Wald 123.8537 2 <.0001 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 119.1551 <.0001 
TRNSPD2 1 4.7008 0.0301 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept   1 -2.0330 0.3239 39.4008 <.0001 
LGVEH N 1 -1.8687 0.1712 119.1551 <.0001 
TRNSPD2   1 0.0166 0.00766 4.7008 0.0301 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.024 0.012 0.047 
TRNSPD2 1.017 1.002 1.032 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 83.7 Somers' D 0.684 
Percent Discordant 15.3 Gamma 0.691 
Percent Tied 0.9 Tau-a 0.305 
Pairs 81608 c 0.842 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
11.4650 5 0.0429 
 
Analysis of Effects Eligible for Removal 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
LGVEH 1 119.1551 <.0001 
TRNSPD2 1 4.7008 0.0301 
 




Analysis of Effects Eligible for Entry 
Effect DF Score 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
VEHSPD2 1 3.6351 0.0566 
TRNSPD2*TRNSPD2 1 1.6524 0.1986 
TRNSPD2*LGVEH 1 1.1214 0.2896 
 
Note: No (additional) effects met the 0.05 significance level for entry into the model. 
Summary of Stepwise Selection 






Pr > ChiSq Variable 
Label Entered Removed 
1 LGVEH   1 1 223.5137   <.0001 LGVEH 
2 TRNSPD2   1 2 4.7511   0.0293 TRNSPD2 
 
Parameter Estimates and Wald Confidence 
Intervals 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -2.0330 -2.6677 -1.3982 
LGVEH N -1.8687 -2.2042 -1.5331 









Partition for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Group Total DERAIL = 1  DERAIL = 0  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 65 2 1.58 63 63.42 
2 68 4 2.07 64 65.93 
3 76 2 2.77 74 73.23 
4 62 1 2.59 61 59.41 
5 57 18 20.25 39 36.75 
6 61 34 34.13 27 26.87 
7 64 39 38.45 25 25.55 
8 64 41 40.45 23 23.55 
9 89 61 59.71 28 29.29 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 


















0.020 202 0 404 0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 . 
0.040 193 209 195 9 66.3 95.5 51.7 50.3 4.1 
0.060 192 278 126 10 77.6 95.0 68.8 39.6 3.5 




0.100 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.120 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.140 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.160 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.180 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.200 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.220 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.240 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.260 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.280 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.300 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.320 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.340 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.360 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.380 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.400 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.420 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.440 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.460 192 280 124 10 77.9 95.0 69.3 39.2 3.4 
0.480 189 281 123 13 77.6 93.6 69.6 39.4 4.4 
0.500 186 287 117 16 78.1 92.1 71.0 38.6 5.3 
0.520 183 294 110 19 78.7 90.6 72.8 37.5 6.1 
0.540 168 301 103 34 77.4 83.2 74.5 38.0 10.1 
0.560 159 310 94 43 77.4 78.7 76.7 37.2 12.2 
0.580 141 327 77 61 77.2 69.8 80.9 35.3 15.7 
0.600 125 334 70 77 75.7 61.9 82.7 35.9 18.7 
0.620 102 350 54 100 74.6 50.5 86.6 34.6 22.2 
0.640 76 368 36 126 73.3 37.6 91.1 32.1 25.5 
0.660 26 379 25 176 66.8 12.9 93.8 49.0 31.7 
0.680 13 389 15 189 66.3 6.4 96.3 53.6 32.7 
0.700 6 398 6 196 66.7 3.0 98.5 50.0 33.0 
0.720 1 403 1 201 66.7 0.5 99.8 50.0 33.3 
0.740 0 404 0 202 66.7 0.0 100.0 . 33.3 
 
Fit Statistics for SCORE Data 












































I.3. CHAPTER 6 – PASSENGER MODEL 
I.3.1. VST 
Input 
title 'logistic analysis for small VST2’; 
proc logistic data=work.sm_S_VST2 outest=betas covout plots=(roc); 
class lgveh frtpax wt_class; 
model der(event="1")=  vehspd2*lgveh vehspd2 lgveh trnspd2*wt_class trnspd2 
wt_class totleng nbrloco/ selection=stepwise waldcl clparm=wald ctable 
lackfit expb outroc=roc1; 








logistic analysis for small VST4 incl totleng stepwise -- good model  
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.SM_S_VST2   
Response Variable der der 
Number of Response Levels 2   
Model binary logit   
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring   
 
Number of Observations Read 292 







1 0 195 
2 1 97 
 
Probability modeled is der=1. 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Class Level Information 
Class Value Design Variables 
LGVEH N 1     
  Y -1     
wt_class FRT_CAR 1 0 0 
  FRT_LOCO 0 1 0 
  PAX_CAR 0 0 1 
  PAX_LOCO -1 -1 -1 
 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
-2 Log L = 371.260 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 





Step 1. Effect LGVEH entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 373.260 299.220 
SC 376.937 306.573 
-2 Log L 371.260 295.220 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 76.0410 1 <.0001 
Score 72.6854 1 <.0001 
Wald 61.7881 1 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
86.6937 11 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 1 are removed. 
 
Step 2. Effect vehspd2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 373.260 246.039 
SC 376.937 257.069 
-2 Log L 371.260 240.039 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 131.2218 2 <.0001 
Score 112.6715 2 <.0001 





Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
36.9456 10 <.0001 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 2 are removed. 
 
Step 3. Effect wt_class entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 373.260 230.713 
SC 376.937 252.773 
-2 Log L 371.260 218.713 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 152.5479 5 <.0001 
Score 125.4690 5 <.0001 
Wald 72.0964 5 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
14.2688 7 0.0466 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 3 are removed. 
 
Note: No (additional) effects met the 0.05 significance level for entry into the model. 
Summary of Stepwise Selection 








Pr > ChiSq Variable 
Label Entered Removed 
1 LGVEH   1 1 72.6854   <.0001 LGVEH 
2 vehspd2   1 2 53.5530   <.0001 vehspd2 





Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
vehspd2 1 37.7556 <.0001 
LGVEH 1 55.1555 <.0001 
wt_class 3 19.9865 0.0002 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est) 
Intercept   1 -2.0204 0.4179 23.3777 <.0001 0.133 
vehspd2   1 0.0607 0.00988 37.7556 <.0001 1.063 
LGVEH N 1 -1.5458 0.2081 55.1555 <.0001 0.213 
wt_class FRT_CAR 1 0.0648 0.3589 0.0326 0.8567 1.067 
wt_class FRT_LOCO 1 -1.3087 0.3737 12.2651 0.0005 0.270 
wt_class PAX_CAR 1 1.8213 0.7159 6.4720 0.0110 6.180 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
vehspd2 1.063 1.042 1.083 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.045 0.020 0.103 
wt_class FRT_CAR vs PAX_LOCO 1.901 0.368 9.808 
wt_class FRT_LOCO vs PAX_LOCO 0.481 0.093 2.486 
wt_class PAX_CAR vs PAX_LOCO 11.010 1.041 116.493 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 89.8 Somers' D 0.802 
Percent Discordant 9.6 Gamma 0.808 
Percent Tied 0.7 Tau-a 0.357 
Pairs 18915 c 0.901 
 
Parameter Estimates and Wald Confidence Intervals 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -2.0204 -2.8394 -1.2014 
vehspd2   0.0607 0.0413 0.0801 
LGVEH N -1.5458 -1.9538 -1.1379 
wt_class FRT_CAR 0.0648 -0.6387 0.7683 
wt_class FRT_LOCO -1.3087 -2.0411 -0.5763 












Partition for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Group Total der = 1  der = 0  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 23 0 0.22 23 22.78 
2 34 0 0.61 34 33.39 
3 30 0 1.13 30 28.87 
4 28 4 1.93 24 26.07 
5 30 4 4.67 26 25.33 
6 29 7 7.91 22 21.09 
7 29 13 12.88 16 16.12 
8 26 16 15.15 10 10.85 
9 29 23 21.68 6 7.32 
10 34 30 30.82 4 3.18 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 





















0.000 97 0 195 0 33.2 100.0 0.0 66.8 . 
0.020 97 47 148 0 49.3 100.0 24.1 60.4 0.0 
0.040 96 80 115 1 60.3 99.0 41.0 54.5 1.2 
0.060 95 96 99 2 65.4 97.9 49.2 51.0 2.0 
0.080 93 99 96 4 65.8 95.9 50.8 50.8 3.9 
0.100 93 109 86 4 69.2 95.9 55.9 48.0 3.5 
0.120 92 111 84 5 69.5 94.8 56.9 47.7 4.3 
0.140 91 121 74 6 72.6 93.8 62.1 44.8 4.7 
0.160 91 125 70 6 74.0 93.8 64.1 43.5 4.6 
0.180 89 128 67 8 74.3 91.8 65.6 42.9 5.9 
0.200 89 137 58 8 77.4 91.8 70.3 39.5 5.5 
0.220 87 141 54 10 78.1 89.7 72.3 38.3 6.6 
0.240 86 146 49 11 79.5 88.7 74.9 36.3 7.0 
0.260 85 146 49 12 79.1 87.6 74.9 36.6 7.6 
0.280 85 148 47 12 79.8 87.6 75.9 35.6 7.5 
0.300 84 155 40 13 81.8 86.6 79.5 32.3 7.7 
0.320 84 155 40 13 81.8 86.6 79.5 32.3 7.7 
0.340 84 156 39 13 82.2 86.6 80.0 31.7 7.7 
0.360 81 156 39 16 81.2 83.5 80.0 32.5 9.3 
0.380 77 158 37 20 80.5 79.4 81.0 32.5 11.2 
0.400 76 160 35 21 80.8 78.4 82.1 31.5 11.6 
0.420 74 160 35 23 80.1 76.3 82.1 32.1 12.6 
0.440 69 161 34 28 78.8 71.1 82.6 33.0 14.8 
0.460 69 165 30 28 80.1 71.1 84.6 30.3 14.5 
0.480 69 166 29 28 80.5 71.1 85.1 29.6 14.4 
0.500 69 169 26 28 81.5 71.1 86.7 27.4 14.2 
0.520 65 174 21 32 81.8 67.0 89.2 24.4 15.5 
0.540 61 174 21 36 80.5 62.9 89.2 25.6 17.1 
0.560 61 175 20 36 80.8 62.9 89.7 24.7 17.1 
0.580 56 177 18 41 79.8 57.7 90.8 24.3 18.8 
0.600 56 179 16 41 80.5 57.7 91.8 22.2 18.6 
0.620 55 179 16 42 80.1 56.7 91.8 22.5 19.0 
0.640 54 183 12 43 81.2 55.7 93.8 18.2 19.0 
0.660 54 183 12 43 81.2 55.7 93.8 18.2 19.0 
0.680 53 183 12 44 80.8 54.6 93.8 18.5 19.4 
0.700 48 184 11 49 79.5 49.5 94.4 18.6 21.0 
0.720 43 187 8 54 78.8 44.3 95.9 15.7 22.4 
0.740 43 188 7 54 79.1 44.3 96.4 14.0 22.3 
0.760 39 188 7 58 77.7 40.2 96.4 15.2 23.6 
0.780 36 188 7 61 76.7 37.1 96.4 16.3 24.5 
0.800 35 190 5 62 77.1 36.1 97.4 12.5 24.6 




0.840 26 191 4 71 74.3 26.8 97.9 13.3 27.1 
0.860 23 192 3 74 73.6 23.7 98.5 11.5 27.8 
0.880 21 192 3 76 72.9 21.6 98.5 12.5 28.4 
0.900 16 192 3 81 71.2 16.5 98.5 15.8 29.7 
0.920 14 192 3 83 70.5 14.4 98.5 17.6 30.2 
0.940 8 192 3 89 68.5 8.2 98.5 27.3 31.7 
0.960 4 194 1 93 67.8 4.1 99.5 20.0 32.4 
0.980 2 195 0 95 67.5 2.1 100.0 0.0 32.8 
































































title 'logistic analysis for small TSVZ2 -- backward'; 
proc logistic data=work.sm_TSVZ2 outest=betas covout plots=(roc); 




model der(event="1")=  trnspd2|wt_class|totleng|lgveh / selection=backward 
waldcl clparm=wald ctable lackfit expb outroc=roc1; 
output out=pred predprobs=(individual crossvalidate); 





logistic analysis for small TSVZ2 -- backward 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.SM_TSVZ2   
Response Variable DER DER 
Number of Response Levels 2   
Model binary logit   
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring   
 
Number of Observations Read 179 







1 0 120 
2 1 59 
 
Probability modeled is DER=1. 
 
Backward Elimination Procedure 
Class Level Information 
Class Value Design 
Variables 
LGVEH N 1 
  Y -1 
wt_class FRT_LOCO 1 
  PAX_LOCO -1 
 
Step 0. The following effects were entered: 
 
Intercept TRNSPD2 wt_class TRNSPD2*wt_class TOTLENG TRNSPD2*TOTLENG 
TOTLENG*wt_class TRNSPD*TOTLEN*wt_cla LGVEH TRNSPD2*LGVEH LGVEH*wt_class 
TRNSPD*LGVEH*wt_clas TOTLENG*LGVEH TRNSPD*TOTLENG*LGVEH 




Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 166.901 
SC 232.124 217.899 
-2 Log L 226.937 134.901 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 92.0354 15 <.0001 
Score 76.3803 15 <.0001 
Wald 38.1914 15 0.0008 
 
Step 1. Effect TRNS*TOTL*LGVE*wt_cl is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 165.025 
SC 232.124 212.836 
-2 Log L 226.937 135.025 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 91.9113 14 <.0001 
Score 75.9207 14 <.0001 
Wald 38.1054 14 0.0005 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
0.1345 1 0.7138 
 
Step 2. Effect TRNSPD*LGVEH*wt_clas is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 





Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 163.043 
SC 232.124 207.667 
-2 Log L 226.937 135.043 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 91.8932 13 <.0001 
Score 75.8217 13 <.0001 
Wald 38.1099 13 0.0003 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
0.1226 2 0.9405 
 
Step 3. Effect TOTLEN*LGVEH*wt_clas is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 161.524 
SC 232.124 202.960 
-2 Log L 226.937 135.524 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 91.4128 12 <.0001 
Score 75.7914 12 <.0001 
Wald 38.5853 12 0.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
0.4789 3 0.9235 
 
Step 4. Effect TRNSPD*TOTLEN*wt_cla is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 





Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 159.923 
SC 232.124 198.172 
-2 Log L 226.937 135.923 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 91.0135 11 <.0001 
Score 75.7754 11 <.0001 
Wald 38.5190 11 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
0.8954 4 0.9252 
 
Step 5. Effect TRNSPD2*wt_class is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 158.009 
SC 232.124 193.071 
-2 Log L 226.937 136.009 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 90.9274 10 <.0001 
Score 75.4053 10 <.0001 
Wald 37.9709 10 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
1.0706 5 0.9567 
 
Step 6. Effect TOTLENG*wt_class is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 





Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 157.471 
SC 232.124 189.345 
-2 Log L 226.937 137.471 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 89.4660 9 <.0001 
Score 74.3612 9 <.0001 
Wald 38.9802 9 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
2.3807 6 0.8816 
 
Step 7. Effect TRNSPD*TOTLENG*LGVEH is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 158.094 
SC 232.124 186.780 
-2 Log L 226.937 140.094 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 86.8432 8 <.0001 
Score 74.3058 8 <.0001 
Wald 41.4633 8 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
4.8330 7 0.6803 
 
Step 8. Effect TRNSPD2*LGVEH is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 





Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 156.097 
SC 232.124 181.596 
-2 Log L 226.937 140.097 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 86.8393 7 <.0001 
Score 71.0678 7 <.0001 
Wald 41.6754 7 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
4.8394 8 0.7746 
 
Step 9. Effect TOTLENG*LGVEH is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 154.585 
SC 232.124 176.896 
-2 Log L 226.937 140.585 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 86.3519 6 <.0001 
Score 70.9831 6 <.0001 
Wald 42.4885 6 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
5.3678 9 0.8011 
 
Step 10. Effect LGVEH*wt_class is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 





Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 154.911 
SC 232.124 174.035 
-2 Log L 226.937 142.911 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 84.0259 5 <.0001 
Score 69.1040 5 <.0001 
Wald 43.2677 5 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
7.1064 10 0.7154 
 
Step 11. Effect wt_class is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 228.937 153.244 
SC 232.124 169.181 
-2 Log L 226.937 143.244 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 83.6923 4 <.0001 
Score 69.0459 4 <.0001 
Wald 43.2527 4 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
7.6050 11 0.7482 
 
Note: No (additional) effects met the 0.05 significance level for removal from the model. 








Pr > ChiSq Variable 
Label 
1 TRNS*TOTL*LGVE*wt_cl 1 14 0.1330 0.7153   




3 TOTLEN*LGVEH*wt_clas 1 12 0.3080 0.5789   
4 TRNSPD*TOTLEN*wt_cla 1 11 0.4142 0.5198   
5 TRNSPD2*wt_class 1 10 0.0875 0.7674   
6 TOTLENG*wt_class 1 9 1.2888 0.2563   
7 TRNSPD*TOTLENG*LGVEH 1 8 2.4533 0.1173   
8 TRNSPD2*LGVEH 1 7 0.0038 0.9506   
9 TOTLENG*LGVEH 1 6 0.4834 0.4869   
10 LGVEH*wt_class 1 5 1.9523 0.1623   
11 wt_class 1 4 0.3293 0.5661 wt_class 
 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
TRNSPD2 1 14.9569 0.0001 
TOTLENG 1 6.8276 0.0090 
TRNSPD2*TOTLENG 1 5.6572 0.0174 
LGVEH 1 38.1410 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 





Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est) 
Intercept   1 -5.2729 1.2119 18.9295 <.0001 0.005 
TRNSPD2   1 0.0893 0.0231 14.9569 0.0001 1.093 
TOTLENG   1 0.0362 0.0139 6.8276 0.0090 1.037 
TRNSPD2*TOTLENG   1 -0.00075 0.000315 5.6572 0.0174 0.999 
LGVEH N 1 -1.5733 0.2548 38.1410 <.0001 0.207 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.043 0.016 0.117 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 86.9 Somers' D 0.738 
Percent Discordant 13.1 Gamma 0.738 
Percent Tied 0.0 Tau-a 0.328 
Pairs 7080 c 0.869 
 
Parameter Estimates and Wald Confidence Intervals 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -5.2729 -7.6483 -2.8975 
TRNSPD2   0.0893 0.0440 0.1345 
TOTLENG   0.0362 0.00904 0.0633 
TRNSPD2*TOTLENG   -0.00075 -0.00137 -0.00013 












Partition for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Group Total DER = 1  DER = 0  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 18 0 0.15 18 17.85 
2 18 1 0.71 17 17.29 
3 18 1 1.06 17 16.94 
4 18 1 1.29 17 16.71 
5 18 1 2.05 17 15.95 
6 18 9 6.05 9 11.95 
7 18 9 9.26 9 8.74 
8 18 12 11.31 6 6.69 
9 18 11 12.35 7 5.65 
10 17 14 14.78 3 2.22 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 





















0.000 59 0 120 0 33.0 100.0 0.0 67.0 . 
0.020 59 19 101 0 43.6 100.0 15.8 63.1 0.0 
0.040 59 27 93 0 48.0 100.00 22.5 61.2 0.0 
0.060 56 44 76 3 55.9 94.9 36.7 57.6 6.4 
0.080 55 69 51 4 69.3 93.2 57.5 48.1 5.5 
0.100 55 77 43 4 73.7 93.2 64.2 43.9 4.9 
0.120 54 79 41 5 74.3 91.5 65.8 43.2 6.0 
0.140 54 81 39 5 75.4 91.5 67.5 41.9 5.8 
0.160 54 83 37 5 76.5 91.5 69.2 40.7 5.7 
0.180 54 83 37 5 76.5 91.5 69.2 40.7 5.7 
0.200 53 84 36 6 76.5 89.8 70.0 40.4 6.7 
0.220 53 86 34 6 77.7 89.8 71.7 39.1 6.5 
0.240 53 87 33 6 78.2 89.8 72.5 38.4 6.5 
0.260 53 88 32 6 78.8 89.8 73.3 37.6 6.4 
0.280 53 88 32 6 78.8 89.8 73.3 37.6 6.4 
0.300 52 88 32 7 78.2 88.1 73.3 38.1 7.4 
0.320 51 89 31 8 78.2 86.4 74.2 37.8 8.2 
0.340 50 91 29 9 78.8 84.7 75.8 36.7 9.0 
0.360 49 92 28 10 78.8 83.1 76.7 36.4 9.8 
0.380 48 92 28 11 78.2 81.4 76.7 36.8 10.7 
0.400 47 92 28 12 77.7 79.7 76.7 37.3 11.5 
0.420 46 94 26 13 78.2 78.0 78.3 36.1 12.1 
0.440 46 94 26 13 78.2 78.0 78.3 36.1 12.1 
0.460 45 95 25 14 78.2 76.3 79.2 35.7 12.8 
0.480 45 97 23 14 79.3 76.3 80.8 33.8 12.6 
0.500 42 97 23 17 77.7 71.2 80.8 35.4 14.9 
0.520 41 98 22 18 77.7 69.5 81.7 34.9 15.5 
0.540 40 99 21 19 77.7 67.8 82.5 34.4 16.1 
0.560 38 100 20 21 77.1 64.4 83.3 34.5 17.4 
0.580 37 101 19 22 77.1 62.7 84.2 33.9 17.9 
0.600 35 104 16 24 77.7 59.3 86.7 31.4 18.8 
0.620 31 105 15 28 76.0 52.5 87.5 32.6 21.1 
0.640 25 107 13 34 73.7 42.4 89.2 34.2 24.1 
0.660 23 108 12 36 73.2 39.0 90.0 34.3 25.0 
0.680 19 111 9 40 72.6 32.2 92.5 32.1 26.5 
0.700 18 114 6 41 73.7 30.5 95.0 25.0 26.5 
0.720 14 114 6 45 71.5 23.7 95.0 30.0 28.3 
0.740 14 116 4 45 72.6 23.7 96.7 22.2 28.0 
0.760 13 117 3 46 72.6 22.0 97.5 18.8 28.2 
0.780 12 118 2 47 72.6 20.3 98.3 14.3 28.5 
0.800 12 119 1 47 73.2 20.3 99.2 7.7 28.3 




0.840 10 119 1 49 72.1 16.9 99.2 9.1 29.2 
0.860 10 120 0 49 72.6 16.9 100.0 0.0 29.0 
0.880 9 120 0 50 72.1 15.3 100.0 0.0 29.4 
0.900 7 120 0 52 70.9 11.9 100.0 0.0 30.2 
0.920 6 120 0 53 70.4 10.2 100.0 0.0 30.6 
0.940 5 120 0 54 69.8 8.5 100.0 0.0 31.0 









Fit Statistics for SCORE Data 




















































title 'logistic analysis for small TSVNZ incl totleng stepwise'; 
proc logistic data=work.sm_TSVNZ2 outest=betas covout plots=(roc); 




model der(event="1")=  vehspd2|trnspd2|wt_class|totleng|lgveh/ 
selection=stepwise waldcl clparm=wald ctable lackfit expb outroc=roc1; 
output out=pred predprobs=(individual crossvalidate); 




logistic analysis for small TSVNZ incl totleng stepwise 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.SM_TSVNZ2   
Response Variable DER DER 
Number of Response Levels 2   
Model binary logit   
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring   
 
Number of Observations Read 332 







1 0 218 
2 1 114 
 
Probability modeled is DER=1. 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Class Level Information 
Class Value Design Variables 
LGVEH N 1   
  Y -1   
wt_class FRT_CAR 1 0 
  FRT_LOCO 0 1 
  PAX_LOCO -1 -1 
 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 





Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
131.6820 32 <.0001 
 
Step 1. Effect LGVEH entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 429.117 292.548 
SC 432.922 300.159 
-2 Log L 427.117 288.548 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 138.5681 1 <.0001 
Score 110.3696 1 <.0001 
Wald 38.2011 1 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
44.4819 31 0.0554 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 1 are removed. 
 
Step 2. Effect TRNSPD2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 429.117 288.327 
SC 432.922 299.743 
-2 Log L 427.117 282.327 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 144.7892 2 <.0001 




Wald 42.6567 2 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
32.8017 30 0.3312 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 2 are removed. 
 
Step 3. Effect vehspd2 entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 429.117 285.750 
SC 432.922 300.970 
-2 Log L 427.117 277.750 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 149.3666 3 <.0001 
Score 116.8947 3 <.0001 
Wald 44.8643 3 <.0001 
 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
25.3573 29 0.6596 
 
Note: No effects for the model in Step 3 are removed. 
 
Note: No (additional) effects met the 0.05 significance level for entry into the model. 
Summary of Stepwise Selection 








Pr > ChiSq Variable 
Label Entered Removed 
1 LGVEH   1 1 110.3696   <.0001 LGVEH 
2 TRNSPD2   1 2 6.1187   0.0134 TRNSPD2 





Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
vehspd2 1 4.3007 0.0381 
TRNSPD2 1 7.3530 0.0067 
LGVEH 1 38.0959 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 




Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est) 
Intercept   1 -3.2144 0.5574 33.2572 <.0001 0.040 
vehspd2   1 0.0243 0.0117 4.3007 0.0381 1.025 
TRNSPD2   1 0.0233 0.00858 7.3530 0.0067 1.024 
LGVEH N 1 -2.2628 0.3666 38.0959 <.0001 0.104 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
vehspd2 1.025 1.001 1.048 
TRNSPD2 1.024 1.006 1.041 
LGVEH N vs Y 0.011 0.003 0.046 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and 
Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 84.3 Somers' D 0.688 
Percent Discordant 15.6 Gamma 0.689 
Percent Tied 0.1 Tau-a 0.311 
Pairs 24852 c 0.844 
 
Parameter Estimates and Wald Confidence 
Intervals 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -3.2144 -4.3069 -2.1220 
vehspd2   0.0243 0.00134 0.0473 
TRNSPD2   0.0233 0.00645 0.0401 












Partition for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Group Total DER = 1  DER = 0  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 33 0 0.22 33 32.78 
2 33 1 0.35 32 32.65 
3 33 0 0.47 33 32.53 
4 33 0 0.75 33 32.25 
5 33 13 12.18 20 20.82 
6 33 17 15.88 16 17.12 
7 33 17 17.87 16 15.13 
8 33 18 19.18 15 13.82 
9 34 22 21.63 12 12.37 
10 34 26 25.47 8 8.53 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 





















0.000 114 0 218 0 34.3 100.0 0.0 65.7 . 
0.020 113 114 104 1 68.4 99.1 52.3 47.9 0.9 
0.040 112 130 88 2 72.9 98.2 59.6 44.0 1.5 
0.060 112 133 85 2 73.8 98.2 61.0 43.1 1.5 
0.080 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.100 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.120 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.140 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.160 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.180 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.200 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.220 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.240 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.260 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.280 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.300 112 134 84 2 74.1 98.2 61.5 42.9 1.5 
0.320 111 134 84 3 73.8 97.4 61.5 43.1 2.2 
0.340 111 137 81 3 74.7 97.4 62.8 42.2 2.1 
0.360 111 137 81 3 74.7 97.4 62.8 42.2 2.1 
0.380 109 138 80 5 74.4 95.6 63.3 42.3 3.5 
0.400 107 140 78 7 74.4 93.9 64.2 42.2 4.8 
0.420 107 142 76 7 75.0 93.9 65.1 41.5 4.7 
0.440 105 144 74 9 75.0 92.1 66.1 41.3 5.9 
0.460 97 146 72 17 73.2 85.1 67.0 42.6 10.4 
0.480 88 156 62 26 73.5 77.2 71.6 41.3 14.3 
0.500 84 160 58 30 73.5 73.7 73.4 40.8 15.8 
0.520 78 169 49 36 74.4 68.4 77.5 38.6 17.6 
0.540 75 170 48 39 73.8 65.8 78.0 39.0 18.7 
0.560 64 178 40 50 72.9 56.1 81.7 38.5 21.9 
0.580 55 187 31 59 72.9 48.2 85.8 36.0 24.0 
0.600 49 196 22 65 73.8 43.0 89.9 31.0 24.9 
0.620 38 203 15 76 72.6 33.3 93.1 28.3 27.2 
0.640 35 205 13 79 72.3 30.7 94.0 27.1 27.8 
0.660 32 208 10 82 72.3 28.1 95.4 23.8 28.3 
0.680 26 209 9 88 70.8 22.8 95.9 25.7 29.6 
0.700 21 210 8 93 69.6 18.4 96.3 27.6 30.7 
0.720 16 211 7 98 68.4 14.0 96.8 30.4 31.7 
0.740 11 212 6 103 67.2 9.6 97.2 35.3 32.7 
0.760 8 213 5 106 66.6 7.0 97.7 38.5 33.2 
0.780 5 215 3 109 66.3 4.4 98.6 37.5 33.6 
0.800 3 217 1 111 66.3 2.6 99.5 25.0 33.8 




0.840 1 217 1 113 65.7 0.9 99.5 50.0 34.2 









Fit Statistics for SCORE Data 
Data Set Total 
Frequ
ency 
Log 
Likeli
hood 
Err
or 
Rat
e 
AIC AIC
C 
BIC SC R-
Squ
are 
Max-
Resc
aled 
R-
Squa
re 
AUC Brier 
Scor
e 
WORK.T
SVNZ 
15027 -
4296.6 
0.2
191 
8601.
215 
8601.
218 
8631.
686 
8631.
686 
-
0.62
04 
-
7.271
59 
0.862
518 
0.103
843 
 
 
 
